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A B S T R A C T
A Political -Zeonomie Viow of th#
Fodoral Organization of Work
by
Rose Marie Richardson
Dr. Robert Parker, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Sociology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Using a comparative historical review of changes in the 
organization of work, this study analyzes the changing 
organization of federal work in relation to the organization 
of work in the private sector. Following a break in 1883 with 
the simple control wielded by political appointees running 
federal agencies, federal work became more tightly controlled 
through a greater bureaucratic organization of government 
work. However, a continuing influence of private work 
practices on federal work, such as the incorporation of the 
principles of scientific management, suggests not only a 
relationship between private and federal work practices but 
one that is stronger than a mere copying of management styles, 
such as that which is occurring in the contemporary control of 
work through the use of externalized work forces. The 1980s
1 1 1
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were characterized by a reorganization of work in the private 
sector. Core work forces were shaved by outsourcing work to 
private contractors, moving work offshore, and/or creating 
temporary and partial jobs without beneficial employment 
contracts. In the 1990s the federal sector has been following 
the corporate lead by downsizing primary work forces and 
outsourcing or privatizing the work. Following three views of 
power, the social pluralist perspective, the structural 
Marxist conception, and an instrumentalist image of power, the 
connection between the private and public organization of work 
will be analyzed by looking at the introduction of scientific 
management into federal work and identifying civil service 
reform legislation and its proponents and then attempting to 
trace their social connections to private industry. Such an 
analysis may not only lend empirical support to a particular 
way of seeing the interaction between the economic and 
political structures but also may provide insight regarding 
the construction of the social organization of federal work.
IV
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PREFACE
This study is about federal employment, a labor force 
that is often maligned by the public, used as a pawn in 
political struggles, and, in my view, neglected by critical 
research which centers its concerns around relations in 
productive work seeking an understanding of the broader social 
relations between labor and capital. Notwithstanding the 
public's general disaffection for its civil servants, abuse 
meted out by politicians seeking to gain political advantage, 
or disregard by social researchers, federal employment offers 
an interesting view of the interrelatedness of industry and 
government which, albeit slightly removed from labor-capital 
relations, is no less influenced by those relationships.
As a salaried worker in the competitive federal service 
for over 30 years, I have felt the public derision and am 
acutely aware of the political vagaries which tend to 
influence, almost on a daily basis, all aspects of federal 
employment from benefit packages to work processes. The early 
years of my tenure with the federal government were spent 
performing the traditional women's work of secretarial and 
various typing clerical duties. The last 25 years have been
V I
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spent performing an array of work in a defense agency's 
employment offices. My inside view of federal employment has 
enabled me to gain first-hand experience in bureaucratic work 
practices, ranging from documenting the division of labor by 
classifying and grading position duties to determining 
workers' qualifications for positions and assisting 
supervisors with rewarding exceptional work or removing 
employees for misconduct. Disciplining and removing employees 
is not as difficult or time-consuming as it is often 
portrayed, providing the rules are followed. I have also 
learned on-the-job how unreasonable hierarchical authority may 
be when decisions do not follow the rules or workers are 
discounted and how equally irrational labor representatives 
may become when personal troubles are pursued rather than work 
force issues.
On the other hand, my training as a sociologist causes me 
to objectify my experiences, attempting to make sense of them 
in a larger context. Specifically, the work I have performed 
does not seem too different from that in the private sector. 
So, while it may take an "act of Congress” to realign federal 
employment practices, they seem awfully similar to those in 
private industry. And, despite the safeguards of rules for 
employers and for workers, the instability that has recently 
been introduced into the federal work place is reminiscent of 
the changes that occurred in private industry in the 1980s.
vii
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The federal civilian employment for executive branch agencies 
included about 3,067,200 employees in 1990, reduced to 
2,725,100 in 1996 and today still declining (Ü. S. OPM 1998: 
3) . Thus, the question that moves this research is whether or 
to what extent work practices of the private sector become 
implemented in the federal sector.
To answer this question, the approach that will be 
attempted will be to compare aspects of private employment 
with competitive federal service employment which requires 
employees compete for work based on merit. Although the 
competitive service does not cover all federal employment, it 
presents the classic federal employment situation. The 
significance of the competitive service is that it is 
established in law and requires additional legislation to 
change it. With this in mind, it is understandable that 
another typical feature about federal employment is reform. 
The Budget and Program newsletter of October 3, 1997, pointed 
out that in the last 50 years a total of 141 major reform 
statutes have been passed (FEDS 1997). Despite the plethora 
of civil service reforms available to study, this study will 
focus its analysis on the scientific management that was 
introduced in the private employment sector around 1910 and 
the recent flexible work arrangements initiated with the 
creation of a contingent labor force in the 1980s. Scientific 
management represents a serious concern with controlling
viii
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workers' behaviors to assure that all their activities at work 
would be realized as productive labor power. On the other 
hand, the more recent flexible work arrangements with workers 
who are weakly affiliated with employers seems to represent 
the opposite. There is no need, for example, for businesses 
to concern themselves with temporary workers' behaviors. If 
these marginal workers are not working to capacity, they will 
be replaced by someone who will exert maximum effort. The 
application of the principles of scientific management and the 
expansion of contingent work occur within the context of firms 
maximizing profits.
The federal government is not a profit-making enterprise 
and need not use the same employment methods, yet it does. 
There were four themes in the 141 major reform statutes that 
were passed in the last 50 years, one focused on scientific 
management (a push for a tight hierarchy, specialization, 
clear chains of command), and another addressed cutting red 
tape or "liberation management" letting managers do their job 
which could allow an influx of marginal workers into the 
federal work force (HDDS 1997) . Inasmuch as reform is a 
continuing saga, this research can only provide a glimpse into 
its processes.
It is with great appreciation and respect that I thank 
the members of my committee for their assistance and support 
in this project. But I am most grateful for their patience
ix
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and acceptance that research is a human endeavor. They 
encouraged me more when I was undergoing the additional stress 
of being directly affected by the National Performance Review 
downsizing as well as experiencing illness in my family. I 
would particularly like to thank my committee chair. Dr. 
Parker, for rekindling my sociological interests and bringing 
to my attention the sociology of work.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This study generally seeks to establish whether the 
economic structure helps to organize the state structure by 
influencing the organization of work at the federal level. 
Specifically, however, it is concerned with work practices; it 
will consider significant changes to employment practices in 
private industry to see to what extent they are subsequently 
adopted by the federal government and then attempt to identify 
how this comes about.
The thesis of this study is not new. Since Marx first 
pointed out that the state is a superstructure rising from and 
protective of its economic base, the connection between 
capitalism and its state apparatus has been framed from 
various points of view. A commonly accepted view sees the 
state attempting to resolve the contradictions of capitalism 
by playing an economic role. In addition to regulating, 
directing and stimulating the economy to assure a good 
business climate, the state operates to redistribute costs of 
doing business by providing, through taxation, such things as 
infrastructure to enable industrial production and
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2distribution and social welfare assistance to maintain a 
reserve army of workers consisting of the working poor and 
unemployed (Gottdiener 1990; Harvey 1990; Carnoy 1984; Hodson 
1978) . A recent example of state involvement in improving the 
business climate was the extensive deregulation carried out by 
the Reagan administration which, according to Oseem (198 9), 
signaled a return of corporate America to ownership power. 
Another assertion sees the hegemony of a capitalist driven 
political system administering the society in support of 
capitalist development rather than the political economy 
rising from citizens making democratic choices (Reich and 
Edwards 197 8).
While these views illuminate the involvement of the 
political system in the economic aspects of society, another 
notion, the ruling elite thesis, suggests why and how this 
takes place. Economic elites are part of and/or influence the 
state apparatus to an extent that there is a ruling class 
consisting of upper class and corporate elites which 
guarantees state policies coincide with the needs of the 
capitalist class (Domhoff 1996; Dye 1995; Mills 1956). It is 
this latter argument that activates this study.
The approach Domhoff (1983) advanced in his study of how 
a power elite dominates business, government and society, used 
by Domhoff (1986-87), Brents (1987), and Jenkins and Brents 
(1989) to reveal class conflict in the development of social 
programs such as Social Security legislation as well as the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3formation of labor legislation such as the Wagner Act (Domhoff 
1990) will be used in this study. Civil service reform 
legislation enacted since the Civil Service Act of 1883 will 
be reviewed in relation to significant changes in industrial 
and/or corporate personnel management, most notably scientific 
management which occurred early in the twentieth century and 
the more recent fragmentation of work which distinguished 
private employment practices during the 1980s.
Frederick Winslow Taylor's (1947) principles of 
scientific management were an innovation to extract labor from 
labor power. To capture more productive work per worker, 
Taylor recognized a need for management to identify the most 
efficient way of performing each work task, to standardize 
tools to assist in carrying out the most effective working 
method, and then to induce each worker to perform in that 
manner using up all the labor power. In addition to 
standardizing methods, tools, and materials, getting the 
worker to continuously engage in working activity requires 
rewards that fit with the person's goals or ambitions which 
can often be achieved by earning more money.
Directly applying the principles of scientific management 
was difficult, however, as most workers were more precocious 
than Taylor's Pennsylvania Dutchman, Schmidt, who was taught 
to load pig-iron according to Taylor's principles; they 
resisted the stop watch method of working (Edwards 1978; 
Aitken 1960; Nadworny 1955; Thompson 1914). Nevertheless, the
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4principles were implemented. In blue-collar work, for 
example, Henry Ford integrated Taylor's principles with 
machine control in his automobile assembly plant and despite 
a high turnover of immigrant workers was able to get 
individuals responding to capacity by minimizing their tasks 
and bringing the work to them on an assembly line to which 
they had to respond. And time and motion studies have 
occurred in many other types of work since they were first 
introduced by Taylor.
The significance of scientific management, however, is 
more extensive than charting the times and motions of a person 
performing work. It redefined the labor-management
relationship, with management taking over decisions regarding 
the way work was to be done and employees performing the work 
according to management's direction. By separating the mental 
labor regarding work processes from the worker, work processes 
became the concern of supervisors and personnel departments in 
determining the most effective selection, training, 
manipulation, pacification and/or adjustment of workers to 
work processes (Braverman 1975) . The implementation of the 
principles of scientific management saw a concomitant increase 
in the white-collar work force as specialists were enlisted to 
oversee selection, training, etc.
On the other hand, there is no need for time and motion 
studies or manipulating workers to perform to capacity with 
the rise in the use of workers who are hired conditionally to
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5produce short-term results and then are terminated. Known as 
contingent labor, this system operates in a similar way to the 
early piece work, which owners did not find profitable because 
often the machinery was operating below capacity. Contingent 
labor is hired for specific results.
The working relationship which adheres in contingent work 
varies and normally reflects less than full-time work 
commitment. It may be temporary, full-time employment for a 
specified period of time; intermittent or on-call work; part 
time work that is either temporary or permanent but is less 
than full employment ; or full-time work that is leased, 
contracted and/or subcontracted to others for completion. 
Regardless of type of work status, the worker's primary 
purpose is to perform a specified type of duties and then 
leave when the work contract expires, the work is completed, 
or management otherwise decides to terminate the association. 
In many cases management does not have to train these workers, 
supervise their work, or manipulate them with rewards, and the 
workers often, such as with subcontractors, provide and 
maintain their own equipment. Consequently, contingent labor 
stands apart from the traditional, core work force with its 
strong affiliation with the employer, implicit long-term 
contract, and being considered as part of the firm or 
corporate family; contingent laborers are external to the 
organization which requires the work be accomplished.
While there are a variety of categories comprising the
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6contingent labor force, they normally fall into three types: 
temporary work, part time work, and subcontracted work. 
Temporary workers are employed for a limited (temporary) 
duration which might be by project or by a predetermined 
length of time, not to exceed six months, for example. 
Regardless of the terms of the hire, the employee is an "at 
will" employee and may be terminated at any time. Temporary 
employees may be hired directly by firms or may be hired by a 
private firm specializing in providing temporary workers, a 
temporary help industry agency, which then places the worker 
with the business that has the work to be done. Although 
temporary work may include any type work, it has been found to 
be mostly constituted of unskilled industrial or clerical 
work. The varieties of work temporary employees may be hired 
to perform are endless, from that requiring a college degree 
(or multiple degrees in some cases like physicians or part 
time university instructors) to the unskilled "warm body" to 
perform industrial labor or clerical work.
Much of the contingent industrial labor is unskilled, 
strenuous, dirty, dangerous and/or boring— dead-end work in 
warehouses, as laborers in construction projects, or doing 
inventory work— the type of work which some "temps" believe a 
full-time employee cannot tolerate (Parker 1994: 118-9).
Clerical work, too, readily lends itself to the use of 
contingent workers, and these workers are not happily adapting 
to working in this manner. They are skilled workers who are
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7unable to find more appropriate work. About the only 
certainty they find in the work are low wages, normally around 
minimum wage, and lack of benefits. The greater
rationalization of clerical work has been occurring along with 
the general increase in white collar work which not only 
continues to expand but is also being moved offshore as 
computers, telephones and telefax machines allow delivery of 
completed work electronically.
Regardless of the category of peripheral worker, 
contingent labor generally reflects a division of work into 
portions of previous full time jobs and/or performance of work 
outside the work place with only tenuous ties to the employer. 
This method of buying labor is an equally significant 
transformation of the labor process. It denotes a break with 
the tenets of scientific management in attempting to control 
workers' behaviors.
Using contingent labor shifts management's focus from the 
labor process and how it is being carried out to the end 
product. This shift in focus, however, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. In the history of American capitalism, employers 
have sought to exert greater control over the labor process 
and thereby ensure a greater profit margin. While increasing 
profit is an essential feature of capitalism and therefore 
paramount in private employment, it is not inherent in 
government work. It will therefore be of interest to this 
study to see the extent to which government work operates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8according to these same principles.
To establish the linkages between private work practices 
and their public incorporation, this research initiated a 
preliminary search to identify civil service reform 
legislation that may be specifically related to scientific 
management and contingent work. Following that examination a 
more probing investigation to trace the origins of the reform 
legislation was accomplished. Federal legislation and 
executive orders effecting changes in civil service work 
practices provided the foundation from which to pursue their 
genesis in policy proposals flowing from commissions, 
committees, etc. It was anticipated that comparing different 
legislation over time could provide an internal check on the 
accuracy of the study's propositions. For example, should 
civil service legislation reflect similar ways of being 
developed at different times, a conclusion that civil service 
reform is linked to industrial/corporate interests would have 
greater validity.
Both primary or official documents, as well as secondary 
sources contained in historical or others' works, yielded 
information on how civil service work practices became defined 
as a problem which needed reforming, the process by which they 
were ultimately reformed, and the individuals involved in that 
process. These materials included supporting legislative 
documentation, i.e., records of congressional hearings, 
speeches, policy statements, etc., as well as historical
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9accounts and other available documents. The review attempted 
to locate key proposals, participants, and reform groups 
and/or organizations behind these actors, and from there to 
analyze the structural location of the individuals and/or 
organizations involved in the legislation.
Key concepts reflecting the major ideas or relationships 
pertaining to work pertinent to this research include power 
elite, scientific management, contingent labor, and civil 
service reform legislation.
Power elites are those active, working members of the 
upper class and the high level employees of institutions 
controlled by the upper class (Domhoff 1996: 31). Indicators 
of the power elite will be found in members ' high social 
status such as having a relative listed in the Social Register 
attending prestigious schools or belonging to upper-class 
social clubs; being among the top earners in income and wealth 
or having ownership control in large corporations, serving as 
chairperson of or on a large corporation board of directors, 
holding top corporate or institutional positions. This 
information will be sought in Poor's Register of Corporations, 
Directors and Executives/ Who's Who in America; and the Social 
Register.
Scientific management is that form of administering work 
processes that separates operations into their constituent 
elements, determines standards for time and activities
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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required for each element, trains employees to work according 
to those standards and generously rewards those workers who 
achieve the standards (Gilbreth 1973). Indicators of 
scientific management will include time and motion studies, 
standard operating procedures, increase in number of 
supervisors/work leaders, establishment or enlargement of 
personnel offices to handle the requirements, and provision 
for a reward system related to productivity.
Contingent labor includes those workers whose 
relationships with their employers are characterized by a 
looser, nontraditional affiliation (Parker 1994). Indicators 
of employing a contingent work force include reducing the core 
work force, outsourcing work, and increasing the use of 
temporary, part time, or intermittent workers, and hiring 
federal workers outside the competitive civil service.
Civil service reforms pertaining to this study are formal 
changes in work methods which attempt to establish greater 
control over work, especially reforms addressing the 
principles of scientific management or the use of contingent 
labor. Civil service reforms of concern are those laws or 
executive orders which enact these changes by altering the 
basic Civil Service Act of 1883.
Comparing legislative developments, the ensuing analysis 
of the relationship between private and public work practices 
sought, first, to determine whether there is a direct or 
indirect connection between changes in private employment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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practices and those in the civil service; secondly, to 
identify key individuals or groups most committed to civil 
service reform; and, lastly, to describe the extent to which 
the principal participants may be members of the power elite. 
This examination primarily covered the three periods 
surrounding the Civil Service Act, the implementation of 
scientific management, and the most recent National 
Performance Review.
Although the periods under review represent separate, 
chronological time frames which could be analyzed 
sequentially, only the legislative civil service reforms or 
formal attempts to reform follow in time order (Chapter 5). 
They begin at the end of the 19*^  Century with the passage of
the Civil Service Act in 1883 and continue to the end of the
20"^  Century into the 1990s with the development of the 
National Performance Review. Scientific management, an 
attempt to administratively introduce reforms into federal 
work during the first two decades of the 20*^*^ Century, is dealt 
with separately and portrayed first (Chapter 4) , out of its
time order following the Civil Service Act.
The introduction of Frederick Winslow Taylor's scientific 
management had been occurring since his early experiments at 
Midvale Steel in the 1880s. And, while the exemplar of his 
work was an experiment in the maximum utilization of a worker 
loading pig-iron, major efforts were undertaken to extend his 
conclusions to all types of work. The division of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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conception and execution of work in blue-collar work found its 
way into white collar work. Offices exhibit a concern for 
efficiency (often reduced to time-and-motion studies) and 
frequently adopt an assembly-line method of work operation. 
Even prior to the present reliance on computers to perform 
clerical work, clerical tasks were being separated so that 
many individuals could execute work more effectively and 
efficiently by handling only one portion of an overall job 
such as the processing of insurance claims that Garson (1975) 
described. Of specific interest to the research on scientific 
management, however, are the federal employers who directly 
applied the principles of scientific management such as was 
done by the Army at the Watertown Arsenal in Massachusetts 
(Aitken 1960; Thompson 1914). Pivotal civil service 
legislation for this era, therefore, will be that which 
introduces principles of scientific management into the 
federal management of work.
Because the principles of scientific management are very 
compatible with the bureaucratic control of work, it is 
possible that no legislation was necessary to incorporate 
these methods. In that event, policies of the Civil Service 
Commission will be reviewed to ascertain whether they were 
incorporated as a matter of policy and, if so, how they were 
introduced.
The legislative reform analysis will start with the civil 
service reform of 1883 as established in the Civil Service Act
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3
when the federal civil service was set up as a merit system 
and the Civil Service Commission was established to keep it on 
that course of action (22 Statute 403; 5 Ü.S.C. 632-33, 635) . 
This reform presents the federal government breaking with 
conventional work practices to become a model employer. It is 
anticipated that its rules would reflect greater bureaucratic 
structuring not only because the rules are established in law 
but also to fulfill their purpose of providing safeguards 
against the spoils system in which simple control 
characterized supervision by political appointees. Further, 
in keeping with Mills ' theory that a power elite did not fully 
develop until following World War II, it is expected that the 
architects of this law will reflect a different social 
positioning from those of later periods, especially those 
involved in recent reform legislation.
The last period of note is the present, starting in the 
1980s when a proliferation of contingent work began replacing 
core work forces in the private sector through the 1990s when 
similar changes were effected in the federal sector. The 
National Performance Review which signaled the downsizing of 
the federal work force during the 1990s appears to be 
mimicking the employment trend set in the private sector. 
Legislation of concern to this period will include that which 
tends to remove federal work from the cover of the competitive 
civil service merit system of employment, aligning it more 
closely with the nature of work in the private sector.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Nature of Work 
The nature of work under American capitalism is 
punctuated by the changing methods for controlling the labor 
process. From the industrial period of the late 1800s, 
characterized by full employment of mostly blue-collar 
(factory and craft) workers, through the growth of factories 
into corporations with an emphasis on white-collar work 
(office work and most professionals) into the globally 
fragmented labor forces of the late 1900s, control over work 
in some form has been of concern. This dynamic of capitalism 
which seeks to improve management's ability to increase 
profits by extracting maximum labor from labor power has 
matured along with an expanding economy, changing in response 
to a better understanding of the labor process and/or the use 
of machinery in job accomplishment. Edwards (1979) has 
identified three major types of control over work— simple, 
technical and bureaucratic— and maintains that they, in their 
implementation, underlie a fourth method for controlling work, 
a segmented labor market.
14
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Initially, control of workers is a simple process of an 
entrepreneur hiring people to perform work in a prescribed 
manner and when that does not occur taking appropriate 
corrective action. In larger businesses, however, such 
control by the owner is not possible and is, instead, carried 
out by the owner's representatives, the managers, 
superintendents or supervisors who direct work activities and 
take whatever actions are necessary to enforce the owner's 
rules. It is in this extension of simple control through 
representatives that we see the greater use of rules as well 
as hierarchical ordering of positions with workers in 
subordinate positions and management above them but below the 
owner(s).
Technical control of work is another form of control that 
evolves with the increased use of machinery in work 
accomplishment. Textile work, for example, is particularly 
adaptable to machine production but technical control is found 
in a wide range of production from assembly lines in 
automobile plants and steel mills to machine-paced clerical 
work. Machine monitored or paced work is able to speed up 
production as well as replace some of the supervisors found in 
extended simple control. The speed employed in using a hand 
loom, for example, resides largely in the operator; a 
mechanical loom, however, requires the operator to respond to 
the pace at which it is set. Thus in many situations, 
machinery could displace the need for supervisors; fewer
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people would be necessary to represent an owner's interests in 
work accomplishment because machines are able to keep workers 
from "soldiering" or working below capacity; employees who 
cannot keep up with the pace set by the machinery are let go. 
The greatest benefit of technical control has been its 
productivity which pinnacles in assembly line work, but to the 
owner's detriment it brings workers with common interests 
together. It is during periods in which technical control is 
accelerated that labor union membership increases to promote 
workers' interests. However effective technical control may 
be for some work accomplishment, much work nevertheless still 
rests almost entirely with the worker. White-collar work, for 
example, until rather recently with the advent of computers 
and scanners to enter written material into data bases, has 
not been able to rely as heavily on technology to regulate 
work accomplishment.
The greatest regulative device present in white collar 
work has been bureaucratic control which started coming into 
focus in the use of extended simple control. Bureaucratic 
control, ensconced in the social relations of work, 
institutionalizes the exercise of hierarchical power and 
establishes the primacy of organizational rules in directing 
work, eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance. Under 
this form of control meeting behavior and production 
objectives of the organization are to be rewarded and 
performance or behavior which does not support these
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objectives is to be punished. Such outcomes occur not because 
a boss has said so or because a machine has set the pace, but 
because the rules dictate them.
Bureaucratic rules not only order work but also establish 
and reinforce isolation of workers. Initially separated by 
their pay groups (salaried and wage workers), bureaucratic 
workers are further segregated by their occupations, types of 
duties, job classifications, pay levels, positions within the 
organizations, etc. in all types of work which are not only 
usually cleaner work but are oriented toward greater mental 
(rather than physical) exertion. Job security and career 
ladders are held out to workers who perform according to the 
rules, are dependable and predictable in their work, and 
internalize the organization's goals and values. Those 
employees who do not conform or perform according to the rules 
are removed, those who do are kept employed, and those who get 
good report cards get additional rewards through individual 
recognition or promotion. Under bureaucratic control 
management does not have to negotiate with employees or be the 
"bad guy," the rules dictate the conditions of work. 
Demanding demeanor and affection in addition to a hard day's 
work, bureaucratic control has come to characterize the 
American labor process. But despite bureaucratic control 
being perhaps the most effective form of controlling workers' 
productivity and compliance, Edwards (1979) argues that it, 
along with simple and technical control, contributes to the
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rise of segmented labor markets which further act to control 
work.
The principal labor market breakout is found in the 
division between primary and peripheral work, permanent and 
full employment as opposed to loosely affiliated, semi­
permanent and temporary work. Edwards (1979) posits further 
divisions in the existence of three labor markets rising from 
this process of segmenting workers by distinguishing among 
different types of work: a secondary market, distinguished by
its casual or non-permanent nature and demands for labor in 
its most basic physical or intellectual form performed by 
peripheral or contingent workers; a subordinate primary market 
where unionized labor is taught skills to perform repetitive, 
routinized work tasks subject to machine pacing; and an 
independent primary market comprised of administrative 
managers, craft workers and professionals requiring education 
and/or experience credentials to be considered for this work. 
While the independent primary market is the most difficult to 
enter, its workers receive the highest pay and benefits as 
well as training and career ladders. Each labor market is 
further distinguished by its organization of work—  
bureaucratic control organizes the independent primary market; 
a mixture of technical control and union influence marks the 
subordinate primary market; and the largely unskilled work 
force in the secondary market is regulated by simple control.
Controlling the labor process occurs in the context of
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businesses attempting to reduce labor costs to their lowest
practicable level in order to increase profits. It is
primarily derived from the continuing process of dividing
*
work, a characteristic Weber (1978) identified with the 
growing rationalization of work and Marx (1906) saw in the 
early factories as craft workers became detail workers.
The division of labor, however, not only separates tasks 
for workers within a work place but enables them to be 
physically separated and apportioned to others outside the 
work place as the technology becomes available. Technology 
complements the division of labor. The globalization of 
textile work, for example, is a method by which management has 
been able to reduce labor costs by separating assembly work 
and distributing portions of it to countries where clothing 
may be assembled at a fraction of the Ü. S. labor cost while 
continuing to charge the consumer the same or higher price per 
item. Thus division of labor is a process that is used under 
capitalism to not only control work and globalize work 
processes but, as such, lends itself to the overall 
fragmentation and deregulation of work. Relocating work off 
shore may also extend sweat shops into social environments 
which do not have the long fought for rules assuring worker 
safety or rights to challenge arbitrary management actions.
Work is today being divided to such an extent that core 
work forces have been reduced while continuing needs as well 
as periodic increased workloads are met by hiring marginal
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workers for wages only and terminating them as the workload 
dissipates or to expand profit margins. Not only are external 
workers paid less than those with full employment, they also 
lack benefit packages. And because their differences from 
full time workers in core work forces overshadow any common 
interests they may have, these peripheral workers are much 
less likely to form unions. Consequently, they are also 
cheaper labor because they are more tractable. Employers thus 
find marginal workers attractive for several reasons: they
pay only for the work done and not for labor power; they are 
afforded flexibility in staffing, enlarging or decreasing the 
work force as desired; they are able to attract a highly 
skilled work force; and they are provided a method for 
avoiding unions (Christensen 1987: 17).
So beneficial has fragmenting work been to employers that 
in 1995 it was reported that corporations were eliminating 
more than 2 million jobs annually while new jobs that were 
established were mostly low paying with a tenuous relationship 
to the employer (Rifkin 1995) . These new jobs, noted to be 
growing faster than full time work since the early 1970s 
(Parker 1994, du Rivage 1992, Belous 1989), created a 
contingent labor force between 1980 and 1988 that was 
expanding at a faster rate than the total labor force. 
Temporary workers in this tenuous force, for example, grew by 
175% in comparison to the 14% growth of the total labor force 
(Parker 1993, Belous 198 9). Further, it was estimated that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1
between one quarter to one third of the labor force now has 
only a loose affiliation with their employers (Parker 1993, 
Belous, 1989), a defining characteristic of contingent labor.
Contingent labor seems to be particularly adaptable to 
service work as opposed to traditional manufacturing work. 
Service work, activity that contributes to the welfare of 
others but does not produce a tangible commodity, has grown 
dramatically. It is comprised of both white-collar and blue- 
collar work and much of its increase has come from work that 
women had been performing in their homes as unpaid labor, such 
as food service, cleaning service, health service, etc. 
Health service, legal service and financial service may be 
comprised of mostly white collar work, whereas food service, 
cleaning service and household service contain work that is 
physically arduous and dirty. There is also a range of work 
within service industries. Health services, for example, 
range from the highly skilled and educated work of the doctor 
to that performed by nursing assistants who clean patients. 
In this way, the work of America has shifted from producing 
tangible commodities to providing services.
While the distinction between work that produces a 
tangible commodity from that work which does not characterizes 
the overall change in the nature of American work, service 
work has traditionally been white-collar work. The first 
individuals hired in factory offices to keep books were paid 
for labor power providing a service, while the worker on the
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factory floor was paid for labor power used in manufacturing 
objects. Thus, while the identification of service work helps 
reveal the general makeup of work, it does not fully erase the 
distinction between types which have become known as blue 
collar and white collar.
As a general type, white collar work is cleaner work, 
allowing the wearing of street clothes, is more intellectually 
oriented exhibiting a greater variety of operations in the 
work and degree of autonomous decision-making, and is held in 
higher regard. Historically, white collar workers gained 
status above their consumptive power through descent, 
association and expectation (Mills 1951: 242) . White collar 
work was given status because white-collar people intermingled 
and intermarried with members of the old middle class, and 
often provided a source of recruits for the old middle class. 
Starting with early industrialization, white collar work had 
been associated with that of the owner, such as when the 
bookkeepers who tracked factory financial transactions 
borrowed social status from their bosses because of their 
similarities and greater interaction (Mills 1951).
White collar work, however, is not necessarily better 
work than more physically arduous factory or construction 
work. In fact, as white collar work has grown and become more 
technically controlled and deskilled, it has become more 
proletarianized. A declining need for extra education or 
experience in acquiring white collar skills, higher incomes
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for blue collar workers, more mobility among people from the 
lower classes into white collar work because of achieving high 
school diplomas, as well as an influx of women into clerical 
work have removed many status differences between blue collar 
and white collar work. Concomitant with these changes is a 
lowered chance to borrow prestige, a decrease in real income, 
an increased threat of unemployment as more people are able to 
enter this type work, and a loss of skills as white collar 
work becomes more technically controlled and fragmented.
Much of the groundwork for the present fragmentation of 
work can be found in the early rationalization of clerical 
work between 1900 and 1910 when it was reorganized in a 
systematic manner and divided into departments of specialized 
functions. Following the rationalization of work, new 
technology such as the typewriter and adding machine
contributed to further rationalization. While machines
naturally allowed greater control over clerical work, Taylor's 
principles of scientific management were also applied for that 
reason. In 1919 the National Association of Office Managers 
was organized under Taylor's ideas. Office pools were 
subsequently developed to get maximum use of costly office 
machines, and by the 1920s companies were using time-and- 
motion studies. In other words, factory-like work procedures 
with compulsory rest periods set up to relieve fatigue were 
introduced into offices as they were expanding. By
eliminating some work and simplifying the rest, a functional
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breakdown of job operations was made in concert with a
functional breakout of human abilities (Mills 1956: 196—7).
Following World War II office machine technology improved
and generally allowed continued growth in the size of
corporations. However, when corporate size no longer was
profitable in itself, the technology was at a stage where it
could accommodate the fragmentation of work that appears in
clerical work such as that which Garson (1975) experienced at
the insurance company where "hundreds of women sat typing up
and breaking down sextuplicate insurance forms." Her job was
endorsements :
— First, third and fourth copies staple 
together/ Place the pink sheet in back of the 
yellow/ If the endorsement shows a new mortgagee/
Stamp the fifth copy "certificate needed"—
Other sections like coding, checks, filing, 
and endorsement typing did similar subdivided parts 
of the paper work. Ever section had a supervisor 
who counted and checked the work. She recorded the 
number of pieces we completed, and the number of 
errors we made, on our individual production 
sheets. These production sheets were the basis for 
our periodic merit raises.... Aside from counting 
and checking, the supervisors also tried to curtail 
talking and eating at the desks (Garson 1975: 157) .
Not only does Garson's research document the distance clerical
work had traveled from the way it was originally organized,
but it also reveals features which make clerical work a prime
candidate to be turned over to subcontractors, home workers,
temporary help, part-time workers and, in some cases, with
advances in computer technology, to become completely
automated, as telephone voice mail has replaced reception and
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operator duties. As work is further divided, the range of 
duties become more limited, and a new restricted and thus 
repetitive character lends itself to being easily picked up by 
a new worker without previous experience. As a consequence, 
the lower levels of white collar work are losing some of their 
defining properties: much of it does not require its previous
intellectual orientation; there is less need to manage a 
variety of work operations; and decision-making has almost 
been eliminated. Higher levels of white collar work may 
retain these traits but much of this can be performed by 
peripheral workers through contracts.
Civil Service Work 
Civil service work fits the definition of traditional 
white collar work but is also marked by many of the changes 
that have occurred in private industry. Executive,
administrative, professional, managerial and clerical 
categories of white-collar work predominate in federal work 
because the state's primary business, besides securing the 
national defense, is creating social and economic legislation 
and then administering it. And, despite the weakening social 
status and class position of white collar workers as well as 
periods of anti-government bias, government work has retained 
a relatively high level of status. That one or more 
government job types continues to score in the upper quartile 
of occupational prestige rankings may be attributed to the
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nature by which occupational status is accorded: restricted 
entry, important work requiring education/experience to 
qualify, full employment, and an association with military 
and/or political elites, some of whom may belong to the upper 
class.
Work in the federal service is restricted to U. S. 
citizens who pass tests to meet experience and/or educational 
requirements. Only those individuals who score well on Office 
of Personnel Management (0PM) entrance examinations will be 
referred to agencies for employment consideration. Agencies 
may then impose a further screening device and interview the 
job candidates. Once an individual scores high enough on both 
tests to be selected for a position, he or she is sworn in and 
becomes an employee in the competitive civil service. A 
first-year probationary period and three-year career- 
conditional status signify further on-the-job screening 
devices :
...to determine the fitness of the employee and 
[the agency] shall terminate his services if he 
fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for 
continued employment (Federal Register 1996: 157) .
After serving three years in a career-conditional status an
employee automatically becomes a career civil service employee
which means that civil service employment may be sought
directly from agencies rather than retesting through the
Office of Personnel Management.
Employment in this career or primary work force conveys
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job security and fringe benefits. In addition to the workers 
compensation, social security and unemployment compensation 
programs mandated in some form for both public and private 
workers, career civil service employees at all levels are 
offered various fringe benefits: group life insurance, health 
benefits, a retirement program, a tax-deferred thrift savings 
plan, and various types of paid absences for holidays and 
personal reasons (such as annual leave, court leave, military 
leave) or illness (sick leave). In addition to restricted 
entry and benefit packages for workers, status may also be 
accorded because many elected and/or appointed officials may 
be members of the military/economic elite or upper class (Dye 
1995, Domhoff 1983) which also tends to elevate the overall 
status of government work (Mills 1951: 242).
Although white-collar government work, like white-collar 
work generally, may gain status above its consumptive power, 
it does differ from private employment in the rigidity of its 
bureaucratic control, being based in law. Bureaucratic 
control in civil service work highlights codified rules, 
super- and subordination in hierarchical levels, and rewards 
and penalties in support of the rules in directing work, 
eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance. The rules for 
federal employment are established in various titles of the 
United States Code (USC), with Title V providing core coverage 
of the majority of the competitive service. Work is 
stratified by occupation, types of duties, job
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classifications, pay levels, and position within the 
organization; performance is only rewarded when it is aligned 
with the goals of the organization.
Besides five levels of pay grades for a Senior Executive 
Service, positions which exercise important policy-making, 
policy-determining or executive functions, federal work is 
currently broken out into 459 job series, 15 general schedule 
grades with 10 steps within each grade for white- collar 
workers, and for blue-collar (crafts and trades) workers 15-19 
hourly wage grades with five steps within each grade. There 
are 15 grades each for blue-collar workers and work leaders 
and 19 grades possible for their supervisors.
Individuality is established and enforced through this 
fragmentation of work identities. Employees are further 
discouraged from group action because of legal constraints on 
union activities and by differentially rewarding or punishing 
employees. When employees do not follow agency or federal 
rules regarding performance (5 USC Chapter 43) or conduct (5 
USC Chapter 73), they are disciplined or removed according to 
the rules (5 USC Chapter 43 for failure to perform or 5 USC 
Chapter 75 for misconduct) . Employees who meet or surpass 
performance expectations may be rewarded with time off or cash 
awards, as the rules allow. While there are always ways for 
bending the rules through interpretation, federal work is 
bound to operate fairly uniformly throughout the competitive 
service even when there are supervisors who would wish to
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exercise simple control and fire an employee or promote an 
employee when there are no higher level duties available for 
the person to perform.
Elements of simple control, like denying time off, 
watching an employee's every move or rewarding an individual 
who has a personal relationship with the boss can occur, but 
simple control by definition cannot occur in the competitive 
federal work force. At the outset, there is no entrepreneur 
making rules; the rules are in the law. If the boss were to 
take personal action outside the rules regarding personnel, an 
employee would have recourse, and probably prevail, through 
the administrative and/or federal court systems. Basically, 
all employees are to be treated according to work-related 
practices and may take claims of mistreatment to higher level 
officials.
On the other hand, when looking at all work performed for 
the federal service, to include work outside the competitive 
service, such as the work provided by service industries 
through contracts, then simple control could exist in the 
externalized work force. Janitorial work, for example, is one 
type of work that is often accomplished through contracts with 
private firms, especially small businesses, and would 
naturally lend itself to simple control. Additionally, higher 
level federal work such as editorial work, health services, 
librarian services, etc., which span the segmented labor 
market is contracted to private firms.
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Also in this external work force, there is work 
contributed by nonappropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI) 
employees, individuals who perform largely service work for 
Defense agencies but whose services are not paid by funds 
appropriated by Congress; the businesses for which they work 
pay their wages. Examples of NAFI businesses include 
department stores, movie theaters, and food concessions (many 
of which have been contracted out) operated by the Exchange 
Services and an array of other facilities operated by the 
Coast Guard or individual Defense components such as officer 
and enlisted clubs, golf courses and other recreational 
facilities, and child care.
Congress ordains the operation of NAFI businesses and 
regulates the way they are paid, but with some exceptions does 
not appropriate monies to be used to hire employees nor does 
it regulate their personnel practices. The Department of 
Defense (DOD) Wage Fixing Authority, for example, surveys work 
in the larger communities and sets the pay according to the 
prevailing rates for similar work in the areas in which the 
work is performed. Individual agencies establish some 
uniformity in the way employees are treated, but it is much 
less regulated than the competitive service, so NAFI managers 
are able to act more in the manner of extended simple control. 
Thus, while peripheral work with which simple control is 
identified is primarily a work force external to the 
competitive civil service, it is nonetheless performing
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government work.
Technical control in its pure sense of assembly-line 
mechanical presentation of fragmented work is not present in 
the competitive civil service. By definition technical 
control only emerges when the entire production process of the 
plant or large segments of it are based on a technology that 
paces and directs the labor process (Edwards 197 9: 113) .
While there are large numbers of Department of Defense 
industrial workers in depot maintenance of armament systems 
whose work is paced by technical processes, they are also 
subject to bureaucratic control. Hence, technical control in 
its pure sense does not apply to federal employment. However, 
depending on the needs of the agency and the extent to which 
the agency has been able to invest in the necessary 
technology, elements of technical control in combination with 
bureaucratic control have been implemented in many types of 
work.
Any type of information-processing technology, in 
particular, is amenable to government white-collar work. 
Computers and communications technology perhaps account for 
the most widespread mechanization of government work, both of 
which are susceptible to work flow pacing and work output 
monitoring. Employees working in call-in centers, such as the 
Internal Revenue Service's help lines and the Defense 
Department's Field Advisory Services or its components' 
Personnel Centers which provide human relations services, may
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have their work paced by the speed by which the connections 
can be made as well as have their calls monitored by 
management. In these situations, work perfoimiance may also be 
assessed electronically by the number of connections made and 
the length of each call. Thus, bureaucratically controlled 
work is becoming even more efficiently controlled with 
advancements in technology.
Whether the exercise of control in federal work has 
contributed to segmented labor markets is debatable, but it 
may have insofar as the federal government has been 
externalizing work which can be performed outside the auspices 
of the federal government and continues to seek ways to 
privatize more work. In 1996, for example, the Defense 
Department sought legislative change to repeal the 60/40 rule 
(10 USC 24 66) which limits depot level work performed by 
private companies to 40 percent of the total. The objective 
was to contract out at least 50 percent of this work in the 
Army, Navy and Air Force. Legislative changes were also 
sought to repeal the requirement for public-private 
competition before transferring workloads in excess of S3 
million to private companies. However, there are differences 
between the federal experience and Edwards' (1979) design. He 
specifies an independent primary market organized by 
bureaucratic control, a subordinate primary market where 
unionized labor and technical control prevail, and a secondary 
market of unskilled or low-skilled workers performed by
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contingent: workers regulated by simple control. While it is 
apparent that the core work force of managers, executives, 
professionals, clerical workers, etc., in the competitive 
civil service is organized by bureaucratic control and falls 
into the independent primary market, the parallel is not as 
clear in the case of the subordinate primary market.
The technical control that generates the subordinate 
primary labor market depends on the performance of production 
work and heavy labor union influence. Except for the Defense 
Department, federal agencies are normally not involved in 
industrial work subject to technical control or to heavy labor 
union influence. Indeed, any union influence is indirect at 
best. Because blue-collar workers are paid at "prevailing 
rates" (according to a scale set from surveying similar work 
in the surrounding private sector) , areas with heavy labor 
union activity like Las Vegas, Nevada, have higher wage 
schedules than those in other areas. Although these wages are 
set according to prevailing rates, they will never match the 
rates of the private sector since they are bureaucratically 
capped by the percentage of cost of living increase that is 
given to general schedule employees. Thus labor union 
influence in the private sector only tangentially affects 
control of these workers. And, federal unions are also 
limited in their influence. Regardless of whether they are 
dues-paying members of unions, federal employee bargaining 
units cover all employees who are not classified as management
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officials or supervisors, professionals who have opted out, 
confidential employees (such as individuals engaged in purely 
personnel work or a secretary to someone who handles labor 
issues), or individuals involved in intelligence, 
investigative or security work which directly affects national 
security. In addition to limitations introduced by the 
breadth of employee interests, union influence is blocked 
because federal workers normally cannot bargain over wages, 
and work-stoppages are forbidden. The firing of the Federal 
Aviation Agency air traffic controllers who challenged the no- 
strike provision in 1981 reinforced this prohibition.
Unable to affect the structure of work, work processes or 
pay, federal employee unions generally concern themselves with 
negotiating over working conditions and handling employee 
grievances. Even given their general lack of power,
bargaining units are being further disabled by the downsizing
of federal agencies. Although the strongest union membership
has been with blue-collar employees, between 1992 and 1997 
federal bargaining units lost 164,487 members, mostly among 
blue-collar workers. Perhaps a peace offering during this 
period in which federal labor unions are being cut into pieces 
has been the Presidential Executive Order 12871 directing 
federal managers to form Labor-Management Partnerships to
involve their bargaining units in operational matters. While 
there is not a great deal of change to core management rights 
contained in Title VII to the Civil Service Reform Act, some
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agencies which have signed partnership agreements report 
improved labor-management relations generally and a reduction 
in grievances and unfair labor practices. In addition to the 
questionable influence of federal labor unions, all 
competitive civil service employees regardless of type work 
performed are supervised according to bureaucratic control. 
Therefore, it appears that the federal service does not 
contribute to the rise of the subordinate primary market 
characterized by technical control and union influence.
Since Edwards (1979) argues that forms of control 
undergird segmented labor markets, bureaucratically controlled 
federal work by definition does not support a secondary labor 
market with its emphasis on simple control. However, outside 
the competitive civil service individuals belonging to the 
secondary market in the private sector (characterized by 
casual or non-permanent work which demands labor in its most 
basic physical or intellectual form) are becoming more 
significant to federal work as more government work is being 
turned over to private contractors (privatization). Thus, 
when considering those in the "shadow government" of the un­
monitored private contract service sector, simple control is 
being used in the performance of federal work, and therefore 
may contribute to the rise of a secondary labor market.
Overall, then, federal work seems to be taking on the 
characteristics of the general labor force. Except, there 
exists a sharper dividing line between its internal and
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external labor markets than there is between core and 
peripheral workers in private industry. In private industry, 
temporary and part time employees are by definition external; 
in federal work, contingent workers may be a peripheral part 
of the internal competitive service as well as in the external 
federal labor force. For example, applicants for time-limited 
temporary positions (established to meet workloads lasting 
from a few months up to two years) or term appointments (for 
projects expecting to last more than one year and/or up to 
four years) also have to compete for these positions.
Even the lowest level clerical jobs may only be filled by 
individuals with competitive status or who compete through 
special programs like the Veterans Readjustment Act or 
successfully completing a three-year worker-trainee program. 
Often, applicants who have special status such as having 
previously held a career civil service position or having 
veterans preference and are seeking full employment are hired 
into these positions. Nevertheless, these competitive 
temporary workers are often paid less than competitive 
permanent workers when they are placed in the first step of 
their civil service grade, and they may not be considered 
along with permanent employees for promotion, and only with 
recent legislation have they been able to gain health benefits 
coverage after one year. Also, the rules were changed in 1994 
to assure that these internal time-limited "temporary" 
positions were indeed temporary; now a position may not be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 7
filled for more than twice at a maximum of one-year each or 
two years. Despite the marginal status of these internal 
peripheral workers, they, too, are supervised according to 
bureaucratic employment practices and therefore do not conform 
exactly to Edwards' (197 9) argument.
Nevertheless, relying on externalized federal work and 
exempting industrial work characterized by a mix of technical 
and bureaucratic control, federal work does seem to be 
generally divided by labor market segment along the line of 
Edwards' framework. The following table attempts to 
categorize federal work as closely as possible to the 
correspondence Edwards (197 9: 17 9) made between systems of
control and labor market segments.
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For federal work to parallel private work practices as 
closely as it does seems inconsistent with the nature of the 
two labor forces. Controlling the labor process in private 
industry occurs in the context of businesses attempting to 
reduce labor costs to their lowest practical level in order to 
increase profits. Most federal work, on the other hand, is 
not performed in the interest of turning a profit. This 
capitalist orientation, nonetheless, seems to characterize the 
federal work force which is, in the 1990s, following the 
example corporations set in the 1980s, reducing their core 
work forces and replacing them with contingent workers.
The federal government rationalizes its recent downsizing 
with the argument of balancing the budget. Yet, Senator Craig 
Thomas (R-WY) introduced legislation (S-1724, The Freedom from 
Government Competition Act of 1996) which required privatizing 
any federal work that was not "inherently governmental" 
without conducting cost comparisons or other financial 
analyses to determine who can perform the work at the least 
cost to the taxpayer (Federal Times 1997) . (The 1997 version 
of the bill does require that cost/benefit studies be made.) 
And, Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) noticed that while 
the $85 billion a year federal agency work force is being cut 
each year, support of the $114 billion annual service 
contracting portion of the federal budget continues for a 
growing private-contract work force. Delegate Holmes Norton 
realistically acknowledges that at this point resisting
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contracting out will not work: "Just say no won't work...we 
have a $114 billion train that's left the station" (ETIDS 
1997b). It will be very expensive for American taxpayers to 
follow the dictates of the National Performance Review as it 
emulates work practices set by private industry.
Nevertheless, in 1993 President Clinton implemented the 
National Performance Review "to put America's house in order." 
Not only was it oriented toward cutting federal spending on 
employment but he indicated that it also would help government 
to work better. Calling the effort an attempt to move from 
red tape to results, the National Performance Review 
recommended changes which would produce an estimated savings 
of $108 billion over five years. Most of these changes, 
however, were directed at personnel reductions and personnel 
management practices.
Targeting the non-postal federal Executive Branch 
agencies, an overall 12 percent reduction (252,000 positions) 
was proposed to bring the federal work force below two million 
employees for the first time since 1967. And to assure that 
the red tape was cut, most of the personnel reductions were 
aimed at bureaucratic work structures of control, labeled as 
"structures of over-control and micro management," which were 
felt to bind the federal government rather than binding the 
employee to the service of the federal government. Employees 
selected for elimination were supervisors, headquarters 
staffs, personnel specialists, budget analysts, procurement
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specialists, accountants, and auditors who were seen as 
inhibiting the creativity of line managers and work as well as 
costing billions per year in salary, benefits and 
administrative costs.
In addition, rules and regulations were to be eliminated, 
thereby simplifying paperwork and further reducing 
administrative costs. In their absence an entrepreneurial 
spirit along with a customer orientation was to be engendered. 
Entrepreneurial governments are, the National Performance 
Report explains, those which empower their employees to make 
their own decisions and solve their own problems, embrace 
labor-management cooperation, provide training and tools 
employees need to be effective, and humanize the work place.
Further, market as opposed to administrative solutions 
would be sought in the performance of federal work, and 
federal operations would be opened to competition, meaning 
that government work would be contracted out to be performed 
in the private sector. Thus, work which remained, with the 
government would assimilate corporate practices and other work 
would be performed entirely by private enterprise. One matter 
exemplifying the need for these measures was the Defense 
Department's purported "$4 0 billion in unnecessary supplies." 
Presumably such stockpiling could have been avoided in private 
industry since it has implemented the just-in-time delivery 
method of material acquisition.
Clearly, the National Performance Review has been a call
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for the organization of government work to be patterned after
that established by major American corporations which were
seen to have reinvented themselves in the 1980s. Corporations
trimmed intermediate levels of management, reducing the number
of managers at all levels, particularly those in middle
management (Hodson and Sullivan 1990: 187) and, in addition to
this reduction in the core work force, made greater use of
peripheral or contingent labor.
The individual seemingly most concerned with present
efforts to refashion government work practices to resemble
those which swept private employment is Vice President Gore.
With candor he acknowledged that
Through the ages, public management has tended to 
follow the prevailing paradigm of private 
management. The 1930s were no exception.
Roosevelt's committee— and the two Hoover 
commissions that followed— recommended a structure 
patterned largely after those of corporate America 
in the 1930s. In a sense, they brought to 
government the GM model of organization (Gore,
1993 : 8) .
But is the General Motors organization of work proper for the 
conduct of government work? Is the federal work force capable 
of negotiating its way through a mine field of market 
influences? Do we want a federal work force that may suffer 
the worst of market-economy consequences when the business of 
government must not only continue but may have to increase? 
Nevertheless, apparently because in the past the public has 
followed the private that such reforms have been initiated.
In reviewing the results of the downsizing and remodeling
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 2
efforts, the most success has been in reducing the federal 
competitive service. Between January 1993 and January 1997, 
federal civilian employment for Executive Branch agencies 
(excluding the Postal Service) experienced a 14 percent 
reduction or the loss of 300,000 federal civilian employees, 
40,000 in the Washington D. C. area. In 1963 this work force 
was 1,910,545 strong but rose to 2,250,323 in 1990 and was 
back down to 1, 933,979 in 1996 (FEDS 1997c) . But, rather than 
using the term downsizing, externalizing might be a more 
appropriate description (as externalizing and globalizing 
might be more appropriate characterizations of the reductions 
in private industry in the 1980s). The work continues, just 
different people are doing it.
Trends in hiring into the federal work force also reflect 
practices that not only further segment labor markets, but add 
to the impoverishment of workers. Agencies are using the 
internet to advertise federal job vacancies, and temporary and 
term appointments are being used to fill positions. Also, the 
new federal worker has little concern for life-long 
employment. Besides the working poor and unemployed all but 
excluded from consideration for federal employment, what about 
those dispirited workers left behind? If the working poor 
and/or unemployed are qualified for blue-collar or less- 
skilled white-collar jobs such as clerical positions, they 
need not apply since most of the reduction has been in those 
jobs (FEDS 1996) . And for the remaining federal force with
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its lower morale (Rivenbark 1997), in its now more highly 
skilled and educated and more highly graded white-collar form 
(85 percent), a review of structures found that budget types 
who were supposed to have been reduced by 50 percent 
maintained their proportional representation in both domestic 
agencies and defense work forces. The hierarchy has not been 
reduced either; supervisor ratios which were to be moved from 
1:7 to 1:15 have barely moved— in the non-DOD work force the 
ratio changed from 1:7 to 1:7.6 and in DOD from 1:6.9 to 
1:7.4. Thus, whether the federal government has moved from 
red tape to results and created a government that works better 
because it incorporates business-like practices is 
questionable. It does appear, however, that this federal 
government make over is the opposite of the reforms which were 
implemented in the Pendleton Act of 1883 that founded a civil 
service based on examinations and merit in a conscious move 
away from entrepreneurial government and simple control.
Prior to the implementation of the Pendleton Act, agency 
heads had ownership authority and exercised what was 
commonplace in large organizations, extended simple control. 
Although it was carried out under political sponsorship, the 
web of federal employment control was like the hierarchical 
extensions of authority occurring in large industry where 
owners assured their policies were carried out through their 
representatives. To support partisan politics, subordinate 
federal work forces were displaced as administrations changed.
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Newly appointed agency heads would undertake extensive 
removals of employees at all levels and replace them with 
individuals expected to contribute votes, time, energy and 
income to the newly elected President's party. Patronage 
"rules" required both partisan work and political assessments 
which caused some federal employees to spend more time on 
partisan work than the work of the agency in which they were 
employed (Van Riper 1958: 47). Although there was a segment 
of workers which kept its jobs during these political changes 
because those workers either did the basic administrative work 
which kept the agency operating or their positions were 
inconsequential for political needs, federal workers overall 
had no more legal protection against removal in the public 
service than workers in the private-sector. About the only 
difference between public and private sector workers was that 
public sector workers such as clerical workers were expected 
to work only six hours a day compared to workdays up to twice 
that length in the private sector (Van Riper 1958). It was 
not until the passage of the Pendelton Act that the federal 
sector distinguished itself by using merit as a basis for 
employment rather than patronage.
Among other things, the Pendleton Act or Civil Service 
Act of 18 83 provided for open competitive examinations which 
would form the basis for entry into the competitive civil 
service. Changing the basis for employment from "whom you 
support" or "whom you know" to "what you know" signaled a
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significant step away from political if not industrial 
business practices and extended simple control. Rather than 
following the factory owners' practice of rejecting the 
innovative and intelligent worker of the time in favor of 
those who were "hard-working, docile, dull, and 'mediocre'" 
(Maranto and Schultz 1991: 77), the federal merit system was 
seeking to hire those politically-neutral applicants who 
graded highest in competitive examinations. Rules established 
for the abolition of spoils-system appointments dislodged the 
simple extended control in favor of a bureaucratic control of 
workers which provided protection against dismissal for other 
than work-related infractions.
The bureaucratization of the civil service did not occur 
instantly with the passage of the new legislation, however. 
Coverage of federal employment by the competitive rules was an 
incremental process which did not reach its highest level 
until after World War II. In 1884, only 10.5% of 131,208 
federal employees were covered by the "classified-merit Civil 
Service rules" and reached around 80% by 1932. This breadth 
of coverage percentage dropped by about 20 percentage points 
during the period that President Roosevelt made large numbers 
of temporary and spoils system appointments to staff 
"alphabetical" agencies during the economic recovery period 
following the Great Depression. By the time his successor 
left office, however, the proportion of covered positions had 
risen to 86.3% of 2,603,267 federal employees (Pear 1968).
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The staffing of federal agencies predominantly through 
competitive procedures has continued largely unchanged. And, 
with the exception of special legislation to prohibit the 
implementation of Taylor's principles of scientific 
management, reforms of the Civil Service Act normally have 
been to tighten requirements for efficiency or effectiveness 
and clarification of the rules governing employment. A 
significant change occurred, however, with the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978. The CSRA mortally wounded the competitive 
service by dismantling the "...pioneer independent agency, the 
Civil Service Commission, and replacing it with a single 
patronage appointee who was given increased authority to 
promulgate rules for 'easy firing'" (Thayer 1997: 113). Thus, 
by regaining political control over civil service employment, 
it becomes clear how the competitive service can be 
manipulated, making way for the rise of a contingent labor 
force outside the competitive service.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
One premise guiding this research is that in order for 
federal civil service employment practices to emulate the 
prevailing paradigm of private personnel management, federal 
legislation must be enacted to change the competitive civil 
service rules already established in law. That is, to 
understand the process by which the federal organization of 
work is changed, it is necessary to address the legal basis of 
the framework through which federal employment is 
administered. Law, as has been seen, develops in different 
ways. On the one hand, it is the outcome of competing 
interests and interaction among many individuals, of 
adversaries and allies, representing a negotiated agreement in 
the end (Jones 1995) . Thus lawmaking can been seen as a 
method by which democratic action among many is felt to 
produce an equitable arrangement insofar as it represents all 
interests in some way. This depiction of the legislative 
process is identifiable with the social pluralistic view of 
power (Olsen 1970, Rose 1967, Dahl 1961) . There are, however, 
other theoretical views of power. Those found within the
47
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Marxist tradition, for example, suggest that the "democratic" 
action of social pluralism is shaped by or in accordance with 
the power relations within the economic system or its agents. 
Thus, to clarify how private employment practices are brought 
into the public sector, this research will consider changes in 
federal employment practices not only in light of the social 
pluralist view but also the structural Marxist and the 
instrumentalist approaches (Poulantzas 1978; Althusser 1972; 
Miliband 1969).
When looking at these competing theoretical views 
together they seem to form a continuum of power, from not 
being possessed by any particular interest to being firmly 
grasped to maintain the socio-economic position of upper 
classes. Each perspective, however, provides a slightly 
different lens through which to examine and explain phenomena. 
In social pluralism, power is viewed as democratically 
shifting among individuals and/or groups and interests. 
Structural Marxism sees power as rising within the economic, 
political and ideological domains relatively autonomously in 
accord with the logic of each system. And, lastly, 
instrumentalism asserts that power is being exercised by 
individuals/groups possessing economic resources in an attempt 
to maintain their economic position by political means through 
the state.
Under social pluralism power occurs within a field of 
many influences— economic, cultural, social, political, etc.—
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political decisions or laws reflect a diversity of interests. 
In this respect society is viewed as a composite of private, 
voluntary, autonomous, special-interest, and other groups such 
as lobbies, movie censoring groups, farm groups, labor 
organizations, and professional associations, all which give 
citizens effective means to influence political decisions 
(Riesman 1970). Pluralism acknowledges that groups seize 
power at various times but does not see any one group 
controlling in the long term; power is a shifting alliance. 
The presence of elites is recognized insofar as groups are 
organized in a hierarchical fashion with authority and power 
vested in their leaders. However, elites are generally seen 
to be distributed among different spheres of society, some in 
the economic sector, some in political control, others in 
associations, the military, etc., and consequently hold 
different interests. And while segments of the economic elite 
may violate democratic political and legal processes, shifting 
group gains and losses tend to balance out one another.
Social pluralism suggests that there are multiple 
influences in society, none of which is able to impose its 
agenda on the society as a whole. Political power and 
influence are derived from and responsive to constituents' 
interests which are diverse and changing. And not only are 
the political parties not subordinate to the economic elite, 
they reflect different political agendas, developed presumably 
from the bottom up with manifold interests surfacing at
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different times as the distribution of power shifts. Although 
this view suggests a fragmented society, the social glue which 
keeps it together is found in common values, networks of 
communication, and division of labor, as well as an inherent 
resistance to elite control (Rose 1967).
From the social pluralist perspective laws changing 
federal employment practices would be seen as the outcome of 
competing interests whether they be, for example, from the 
general public seeking change in government administration (as 
is intimated in the current administration's call for a 
reinvention of government), political parties striving for 
political advantage, companies seeking contracts with the 
government or federal manager and/or employee groups 
attempting to redefine their employment contracts. Final 
legislation would more or less reflect, to differing degrees, 
the interests of all the groups wanting change. Contrasting 
the pluralistic position that power is transitory and shifts 
as different groups rise and fall through the democratic 
process are the structural Marxist and instrumentalist views 
which recognize lawmaking or any state activity to be the 
result of power generated in relation to the economy.
The structural Marxist perspective seems to bridge social 
pluralism and instrumentalism. At a more general level than 
social pluralism, it recognizes power relations emanating from 
various economic, political and ideological structures, but, 
then, in the last instance, sees these structures as
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determined by economic power (Poulantzas 1978: 113; Gold, Lo, 
and Wright 1975).
The idea that power originates with who controls the 
means of production was developed in The Communist Manifesto 
by Marx and Engles (Tuclcer 1978: 473-500). They advanced the 
notion that social power is located in the relationships which 
develop in the process of individuals using their human 
capacities and available technology to transform natural 
resources into ways to sustain life and centers in and around 
the possession of private property, the items produced and 
their exchange. They distinguished power relationships in 
terms of classes; power rests with those who control the 
forces of production and own the commodities produced, and 
those who only contribute their work in the production process 
lack power. Power emanating from these relationships formed 
in the production process shapes all other aspects of a 
society's social structure and functioning.
Central to structural Marxist analysis is the class 
structure with its inherent contradiction of an ever- 
increasing social character of production extending working 
class unity which poses a threat to capitalism. Competitive 
capitalist actions divide the capitalist class as different 
groups or factions of the class seek to acquire greater 
advantage politically or economically. The state acts to 
mediate the influences of each so that neither the working 
class nor capitalist class fractions upset the contentious
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balance achieved between the workers and owners. Structural 
Marxism law, cloaked in an ideology of fairness, has an 
autonomy and coherence of its own. While it may respond to 
interest groups, it does so according to its own logic, but in 
support of capitalist relations (Burawoy 1979). Thus, a 
structural Marxist view of laws effecting civil service reform 
would expect them to generally support capitalist relations in 
the long term but be responsive to the immediate needs of the 
political system out of which they arose and for which they 
provide administrative support. Laws affecting federal 
employment practices would be less likely to reflect private 
employment practices and more identifiable with the needs of 
the bureaucracy.
The instrumentalist position, on the other hand, is not 
stifled from exploring the full impact of economic agendas on 
state action by according these structures independent 
authority. And, without the autonomy accorded the economic 
and political domains by the structuralists, laws affecting 
civil service would follow economic agendas more closely.
The instrumentalist perspective regards the state as the 
medium through which those individuals or groups with economic 
power control society through dominant institutions and/or 
individuals in order to maintain their economic dominance 
(Tucker 1978; Miliband 1969). Thus, by incorporating 
classical elitist views into Marxist theory, instrumentalism 
shifts the focus to the role individual elites of the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 3
capitalist class play in state activities to support 
capitalism.
Classical elitist views identified the concentration of 
power in society but did not see it necessarily stemming from 
the economic system. Mosca's (1939) rulers, for example, may 
in fact have greater control of the economic system, but their 
power position could have stemmed from their being members of 
a priestly aristocracy if the culture supported strong 
religious beliefs. And, for Michels (1970), leaders rise in 
society as it organizes toward various purposes. Mills 
(1956), too, found that such leadership in society emanated 
from the social structure and, in effect, combined the 
instrumentalist and elitist views in his power elite. 
Individuals occupying leadership positions in the major 
hierarchies and organizations of society, which Mills 
identified as the economic, political and military sectors of 
American society, formed a power elite that essentially made 
the rules for the rest of society.
Mills' thesis is that a tripartite national power elite 
consisting of corporate, political and military leaders 
controls American society. The corporate rich and chief 
executives of the 200-300 giant corporations that dominate the 
economy hold the keys to power. Top military commanders, 
particularly the soldier-politicians in and around the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff who control the largest and most expensive 
feature of government, are military elites who not only
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determine the course of the military but secure for it a 
prominent position in society. Finally, the political 
directorate includes those individuals in the centralized, 
federal executive branch who are in a position to affect the 
course of society. The elite at the top of each of these 
domains not only shares similar backgrounds, they also have 
similar interests and outlooks on life.
The power elite, according to Mills, has a greater 
portion of society's most highly valued things and 
experiences. They have more money, power and prestige and the 
ways of life these conditions provide; their social origins 
are similar in terms of wealth, formal education, careers and 
associations in which they hold membership. Because of these 
shared similarities, they come to have a community of 
interests and a psychological class consciousness insofar as 
they recognize each other as common members. They live by 
similar codes of conduct and common values. Besides sharing 
similar backgrounds and lifestyles, they intermingle socially 
and thus have coinciding interests. Through their social and 
professional interactions, they form an intricate set of 
overlapping cliques that allow their political, economic and 
military agendas to be realized in decisions having at least 
national consequences. Thus, federal legislation affecting 
civil service employment reforms could be expected to reflect 
the interests of these groups.
Mills' power elite, in which the top of the various
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domains are on relatively equal footing, however, is a 
relatively recent occurrence. Initially, elites in the 
various domains were loosely organized and it was not until 
the rise of corporate economic power that the political domain 
became enlarged and centralized in response to the public 
consequence of the corporate economy (Mills 1956: 272) . Early 
corporate-political relations were not characterized by 
complex elites, rather those with economic power controlled 
the government rather directly. These industrial and 
financial corporate elites controlled parties, bought laws and 
"kept" Congressmen.
Mills claims that non-economic political power in America 
increased as it became more centralized in the era of the New 
Deal with the growth of the state, partially in an attempt to 
reduce the army of the unemployed. Also, it was during this 
period that the economic elites attempted to join the 
government at the higher levels. The military, which had 
always been subservient to political control, did not rise to 
the level of the power elite until following the Second World 
War when international problems centered around war. At this 
time, the economy continued to be heavily geared to the 
production of war machinery and materials that it had 
generated during World War II. During the 1950s when Mills 
recorded his observations, the concentration of power among 
these elites was at its apex. More recently, however, the war 
economy has been dissembling, the federal government since the
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1970s has been pressured to relax its control on all aspects 
of society and since the 1980s to reduce its presence, while 
corporate America has been moving its manufacturing operations 
outside the United States. In the face of these national 
changes in the economic, political and military domains. 
Mills' argument may seem outmoded. Domhoff (1996, 1990 and 
1983), however, has updated Mills' theory and with some 
modifications reached a similar conclusion: that there is a
power elite in the United States which shapes the American 
polity and through it conditions American social and economic 
policy.
For Domhoff (1983: 11) the upper class holds economic, 
social and political power, the cumulative and combined 
effects of which enable it also to be a ruling class. He 
arrived at this finding by looking at the distribution of 
power as an underlying trait or property which is revealed by 
looking at who benefits, who governs, and who wins. Insofar 
as the upper class has most closely achieved the American 
dream— good jobs, high incomes, wealth, ability to travel and 
experience leisure, and to live long and healthy lives— it 
benefits and consequently exhibits power in relation to other 
classes which have not reaped the same rewards. And, when 
upper class members occupy a greater number of important 
institutional positions as well as take part in important 
decision-making more often than representatives of other 
classes, they wield governing power. Lastly, power may be
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inferred by reviewing outcomes regarding policy issues to 
determine which classes prevail in issues over which they 
disagree such as welfare, foreign policy, taxation and the 
environment (Domhoff 1983: 12).
Domhoff not only highlighted perhaps the obvious in 
claiming that the upper class possesses the wealth and 
lifestyle which sets them apart from those who do not possess 
these things to the same degree, but he also showed how wealth 
is maintained and how access to it is controlled and 
restricted- Beyond economic security the upper class is 
organized; it has patterned ways of ordering the lives of its 
members and mechanisms for socializing newcomers, be it the 
children or new adult members who have risen from lower 
classes. The upper class has greater wealth, higher incomes, 
and an exclusive lifestyle, all of which preclude casual 
entrance. They attend a select set of schools, frequent 
certain clubs and resorts, and engage in predetermined social 
activities that sharply differentiate their lifestyle from the 
rest of society.
Finding similar relationships to those identified by E. 
Digby Baltzell's study of Philadelphia society in the 1950s, 
Domhoff located the upper class by tracing relationships 
between listings in the Social Register, attendance at private 
high schools and social club membership. In short, the upper 
class experiences a unique set of life experiences that are 
not present to the same extent among the rest of society.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5 8
Despite their greater social organization and access to 
social and economic resources, the upper class by and of 
itself does not constitute a power elite. Rather, it is those 
upper class members who are rooted in the ownership and 
control of large corporations who form the contemporary power 
elite. Domhoff ' s (1983: 56) study demonstrated that the most 
important corporations, commercial banks, investment banks and 
the law firms supporting these organizations are controlled by 
the upper class. Domhoff (1983: 58-59) agreed with Mills' 
estimation that .2% to .3% of the adult population owns the 
bulk of payoff shares of the corporate world. Not only does 
the upper class have ownership rights, but it also may
exercise control as is evidenced in an ability to replace top 
management, maintain active involvement on the board of
directors, and to have an influential part in major decisions 
concerning operations such as mergers, acquisitions, and 
large-scale changes in growth and profit strategies. Upper 
class families are able to consolidate their wealth and
maintain themselves as economic units with substantial clout 
with only as little as 2-3 percent of the total stock in a 
firm.
Control of corporations, however, goes beyond managing 
internal business processes; it also requires securing their 
viable place in society. Domhoff sees corporate America 
situated in society through upper class members actively
working in collaboration with institutional elites (high-level
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employees) in profit and nonprofit institutions controlled by 
members of the upper class through stock ownership, financial 
support, and/or involvement on boards of directors. Upper 
class members in conjunction with institutional leaders are 
able to manage their corporate interests through financial 
control and by personal participation in the policy making 
process that touches on all areas of society, from foreign aid 
to welfare, education, and the arts. The interests of 
corporate America are thus integrated with the general 
interests of society by filtering policy planning starting in 
corporate board rooms through a network of policy groups, 
foundations, think tanks and university research institutes 
and then seeking public approval of the end results.
Policy-discussion groups such as the Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) or the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR) formed at the national level to debate and offer 
solutions for major problems of society are composed of 
members of the upper class, corporate executives, lawyers, 
academic experts, university administrators and media 
specialists, as well as a fair representation of politicians, 
career government and/or political appointees. Even though 
the functions of these policy discussion groups may vary, 
overlapping membership and advisory personnel secure 
continuity between groups to ultimately assure that corporate 
and upper class goals are assimilated into societal concerns.
Foundations, which initiate discussion items as well as
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fund policy planning, may stem from family endowments, 
corporations or be formed for the benefit of urban 
communities. Despite their origins they are interrelated 
among themselves as well as being connected to the largest 
corporations. Foundation trustees are often members of other 
foundations and policy discussion groups and/or think tanks. 
The ultimate sources of policies, however, are attributed to 
think tanks and research institutes, which on the surface seem 
to represent societal needs rather than focus on corporate or 
upper class preoccupations. Yet, they, like the other 
organizations of the policy-planning network, share foundation 
funding sources as well as trustees.
In the early 197 0s Domhoff found, for example, that the 
Brookings Institute, which stands as a major source of new 
ideas for government leaders and policy groups (especially for 
Democrats), was directed by corporate leaders who were also 
foundation trustees, and 60% of its members were also 
foundation trustees. New ideas introduced by a large number 
of social scientists are influenced by corporate convictions 
even before they face further modification and assimilation by 
corporate leaders in policy groups. While one would be 
inclined to view university research institutes as providing 
unbiased views, Domhoff also highlights professors' corporate 
connections. During the 1957 to 1973 period, for example, 
more than 50% of the 55 directors on the President's Science 
Advisory Committee were directors of corporations with annual
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sales and/or assets of over $100 million. And, 15% were 
consultants to these large firms and/or directors of smaller 
companies. It is a common occurrence for some professors to 
have extra-academic employment, especially as consultants to 
national corporations.
Once policy has been formulated through the policy-
planning network, it is disseminated to the public through the 
media in order to create grass-roots support for corporate 
issues. While this support may legitimize corporate views in 
the eyes of the public, the stability of corporate capitalism 
and sustenance of the upper class as a ruling class are only 
assured with involvement in the state apparatus, the principal 
arbiter in American society. Hence, corporations become
involved in the political process. They introduce the
perspectives developed in the policy planning network, help 
elect candidates supportive of their views and work toward 
acquiring privileges for special interests.
The most publicized aspect of the candidate selection 
process, particularly with regard to the corporate community 
and upper class, is campaign donations. Money wields power 
and the role of wealthy donors and fund raisers have become 
critical in the prenomination, nomination and election of 
candidates; corporate political action committees and large 
donors are necessary for candidates to be considered
seriously. Thus, the corporate community and the upper class 
are central elements in determining who enters politics and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 2
who gets elected.
Lobbyists and/or others, such as lawyers serving on 
congressional staffs or corporate executives working directly 
with governmental agencies, associate with lawmakers in order 
to obtain favors, tax breaks, regulatory rulings or 
governmental supports. The third method by which the power 
elite involve themselves in the government is by promoting the 
perspectives developed in the policy-planning network. They 
do so as members of committees that advise the executive 
branch, by serving on presidential commissions, and by direct 
appointments to government positions. Presidential
commissions are an open channel for legitimating the ideas 
that have been developed in the policy planning network. Of 
these commissions, a sizeable proportion are directed toward 
the operation of the federal government. Domhoff (1983: 133) 
found that about one-third of the commissions formed between 
194 5 and 1972 were concerned with problems of governmental 
reorganization and federal salaries.
The operation of the federal government is a chief 
concern of the power elite to assure that our rational-legal 
system will support capitalist interests over others. Of the 
five commissions concerned with governmental affairs, "...four 
were chaired by members of the Committee for Economic 
Development, which has taken a special interest in such 
matters through its Committee for the Improvement of 
Management in Government." The Business Council, a corporate
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advisory group to the government, is controlled by the 
chairmen and/or presidents of the largest corporations. Its 
adjunct lobbying group of corporate chief executive officers, 
the Business Roundtable, directs its efforts toward addressing 
legislation that may have an adverse impact on business. And, 
the power elite who enjoy appointments to cabinet and other 
positions in government bring with them a vision supportive of 
the goals of corporate America, where health of the business 
is of greater importance than health of the worker. So, while 
they may temporarily divest themselves of active participation 
in the corporate community, they nonetheless apply corporate 
standards in the conduct of government.
Thus, Domhoff finds that legislation is shaped by the 
ideas that are molded in the interplay between the corporate 
rich and major corporations and organizations they sponsor. 
Legislation reflects the goals of the upper class which are in 
concert with corporate objectives.
Using Domhoff's (1996) class dominance theory to 
illuminate the development of federal employment practices 
starts with a principal question: whether federal civil
service employment practices— the organization of government 
at the lowest level— are arranged according to capitalist 
interests? And, if so, does this phenomenon occur through 
policy flows such as those identified by Domhoff? 
Specifically, are the framers of civil service reform 
legislation among a power elite identifiable among the top
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income earners and holders of wealth as well as being among 
the upper social class? And, is civil service reform brought 
into legislative consideration through a policy planning 
network of privately financed and/or controlled policy groups, 
foundations, think tanks and/or university research 
institutes?
The structural Marxist position also shares the concern 
whether federal civil service employment practices are 
arranged according to capitalist interests. However, it would 
then move to question to what extent working class unity or 
capitalist class fragmentation influences these practices. 
Specifically, is working class unity reflected in federal 
employment? And, if so, does it discourage the establishment 
of rules aimed at extracting greater productivity for the same 
or less pay, that is, increasing the surplus product?
The social pluralist position would not rest on whether 
the state activity protects capitalist practices, rather it 
would look to see what groups' concerns were to prevail. It 
would question whether the change in federal employment 
practices stemmed from sources such as the general public, 
political parties striving for political advantage, or 
companies seeking contracts with the government. Further, it 
would seek to reveal to what extent the viewpoints of all the 
groups wanting change are reflected in the federal employment 
rules and how the state action reflects democratic action in 
response to the groups' needs. It also may consider the
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extent to which the state was looking out for its own 
interests.
In light of these competing viewpoints, this research 
will investigate whether federal work processes are organized 
in the fashion found in the private sector and the extent to 
which capitalists bring methods for controlling productive 
work into the federal sector. Capitalists operating within 
the state would challenge the pluralist and state autonomy 
notions that the state is sufficiently independent from 
particular capitalist interests to be able to provide an arena 
for democratic action and/or class struggle. If capitalist 
interests have been involved in the basic organization of 
federal work practices, that is, have helped shape them, then 
any class struggle would, at best, be limited by those 
interests.
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SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
Introduction in Federal Work Places 
While this research anticipated finding traces of 
scientific management woven into the fabric of federal 
employment legislation, the opposite was disclosed. 
Scientific management was implemented in federal work places 
in Army and Navy manufacturing and shipbuilding and repair 
activities without the benefit of legislation. To remove it 
from these work places, however, special legislation to rule 
it unlawful was enacted.
The scientific management which was adopted by the Army 
and Navy in the early 1900s was the same as that which 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, the father of scientific management, 
had started introducing in private industry in the late 1800s. 
It was a system of supervision in which the means, materials 
and methods of productive work practices were calculated with 
the aim of achieving the most efficient and economical way of 
performing work. It sought to intensify the manufacturing 
process in order to achieve greater productivity which would 
obviously benefit the Army and Navy by increasing their
66
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production and reducing the time needed for repairs but also 
promised to enrich workers with premium pay for working at an 
accelerated and/or constant pace.
The focus of scientific management was on all work that 
required a cooperative effort whether it was worker-to-worker, 
worker-to-material, worker-to-machine, or machine—to-material 
coordination. However, it was done in stages, as General 
Crozier pointed out in his annual report for the Secretary of 
War (U.S. Army 1914) . The first step of scientific management 
was to standardize the work process and the second step was to 
systematize the worker in concert with the machines and 
materials. With an emphasis on detail, Taylor had left no 
aspect of the manufacturing process to chance or tradition. 
From fabrication, to assembly, to the tools used, to the form 
in which the raw materials were introduced into the productive 
process, each component of production was examined and 
charted. Such calculations were to eliminate lost motion in 
unnecessary movements whether they stemmed from availability 
or type of materials used, their size, or the sequence in 
which they were used.
Additionally, scientific management involved determining 
the quickest time in which a job could be done by an 
exceptional worker, and then adding to it two-thirds of that 
time to set the standard by which the work was to be 
accomplished by all workers. Deliberately keeping the worker 
busy every minute of time set aside for work was the overall
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intent. To do this, human responses to working at a pace 
devised by others were also calculated to determine the 
minimum rewards necessary to get the worker to perform the 
most work in the least amount of time. While Taylor proposed 
paying workers from 33 to 100 percent more for completing 
their tasks within the required time, the actual premium pay 
was normally around an additional 25 percent. Evans (1940) 
did not reveal the amount of extra pay which ended up in the 
compliant shipbuilder and repair workers' pay envelopes. 
However, the Army found that for ordnance activity in 1911, 
men in the Watertown Arsenal foundry increased their pay to 
"something over 25 per cent," but those in the machine shop 
earned a "little over 21 per cent of their wages" (U.S. Army 
1914: 782).
In many cases additional wages did not compensate workers 
adequately enough to provide them with the incentive to accept 
scientific management. Scientific management's greatest 
drawback was its adverse affect on workers who were expected 
to forget how they learned to do their work, follow 
management's explicit instructions, and greatly increase their 
physical effort, while performing parts of a production job 
rather than all the tasks involved in its manufacturing 
process. As a consequence scientific management engendered 
worker antipathy which stifled its implementation (Edwards 
1979; Nadworny 1955) . Despite this inherent barrier to 
acceptance, scientific management nonetheless was applied.
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The fact that scientific management emerged under a 
favorable social climate may have facilitated its acceptance. 
During the Progressive Era (18 90-1920) mechanical efficiency 
was infused into a national consciousness for efficiency which 
had become translated into all that was good and desirable for 
the society (Haber 1964). More to the point, Evans (1940: 
182) indicates that by the turn of the first decade of this 
century, "scientific management had become a household phrase, 
and the word efficiency was an American shibboleth." Having 
infiltrated all aspects of society, it is not surprising, 
then, that one of the first large-scale efforts at 
implementation of scientific management occurred with the 
federal government in the Departments of the Army and the 
Navy.
Army and Navy Manufactories 
While Army Captain Henry Metcalfe (1894) introduced cost 
accounting methods associated with Taylor's scientific 
management at several arsenals in the late 1800s and although 
the Army more directly embraced the implementation of 
scientific management than the Navy in the early 1900s, it was 
the Navy which first directly requested information from 
Taylor regarding his scientific management method of work and 
attempted to fully implement this method (Nadworny 1955: 29; 
Evans 1940; Copley 1923). Naval Constructor Holden A. Evans 
had read Taylor's Shop Management paper, published in 1903,
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and on his own initiative had applied his understanding of the 
principles of scientific management to Navy yard work at Mare 
Island in California where he was the head of the construction 
department (Evans 1940; Copley 1923b: 307-9). Evans (1940: 
182) translated Taylor's principles of Shop Management into 
five steps:
1. Determine by careful analysis before work is 
undertaken exactly what is to be accomplished.
2. Determine the best way to accomplish the work in 
the quickest time at the lowest cost.
3. Employ the best machines, the best facilities 
and the best men available.
4. Encourage cordial co-operations between 
management and employees in order that both may put forth 
the best efforts to secure low production costs.
5. Keep an accurate record of the cost of the work 
in such detail that the various elements of cost may be 
quickly determined.
After successfully increasing output by applying these rules
in the shops over which he was responsible, Evans wrote Taylor
in 1906 to request more information and eventually sought,
albeit unsuccessfully, to take a year's leave of absence from
the Navy in order to work with Taylor (Evans 1940; Copley
1923b).
Even though Evans was the first naval officer to attempt 
to apply the principles of scientific management, he was not 
the only one. Over the years during Taylor's work at Midvale 
Steel, Bethlehem Steel and other industrial firms which 
handled contracts for military ordnance, Taylor had met and 
befriended the army and naval officers who had been assigned 
to monitor the accomplishment of government contracts. Having
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seen the principles of scientific management in action under 
the direction of Taylor, many of the naval officers who later 
wanted to turn around the management of workers in navy yards 
believed that scientific management would help achieve that 
goal.
The nature of work in navy yards was largely comparable 
to that in commercial establishments, but the workers were 
not; they had been seen for some time as being inefficient 
(Cook undated). Evans (1940: 219) personally encountered
"loafers and incompetents" among his civil service work force 
at Mare Island, but the poor work habits of navy yard workers, 
in general, were legendary in the business world. In 1909 
Taylor (Copley 1923b: 302) in a letter to Evans noted how he 
had become aware of navy yard inefficiency when he was an 
apprentice and a foreman would tell the workers, "Here, young 
fellow, get a move on you. You ain't workin' in no damn navy 
yard."
Admiral Goodrich (Taylor Society 1920: 82) had also
encountered problems with civil service workers at navy yards. 
The admiral called on Taylor professionally when he went to 
the New York navy yard as commandant in 1907 "to find an 
industrial situation which beggars description." There seemed 
to be, however, more problems at the yards than civilian 
workers loafing or soldiering. With Taylor's assistance in 
cutting the "inconceivable weaving of red tape," Admiral 
Goodrich not only introduced several experiments at the New
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York navy yard, but also attempted to have them considered for 
Navy-wide implementation through Secretary of the Navy Truman 
H. Newberry. According to Goodrich (Taylor Society 1920: 83) 
these changes were possible because Secretary Newberry had 
great faith in Mr. Taylor's ideas and knew that the admiral 
would propose no scheme to him that had not been previously 
discussed between Newberry and Taylor.
Just before going out of office, Newberry had 
drawn up a comprehensive plan of navy-yard
organization. Based largely on Goodrich-Taylor 
ideas, it contained some features for which he was 
solely responsible, and among these was the turning 
over of the management of the navy yards complete 
to the corps of constructors. Having gained the 
ear of Newberry, the constructors had convinced him 
as a business man that they were logically the
people to run the yards. At this, line officers
were aghast; and there developed as fierce a
controversy between line and staff as ever had been 
known in the navy (Copley 1923b: 310).
While the proposed navy-yard reorganization may have been
based on Goodrich-Taylor ideas, it also reflected the changes
to increase efficiency Evans (1940: 355-374) had provided the
Secretary. Evans (1940: 220) noted that
With a few modifications, none very important, it 
[Navy Order 9] adopted as Navy law my plan for the 
reorganization of the navy yards.
But regardless whether it was Evans' plan that Secretary
Newberry adopted as Navy Order 9, or came from Taylor through
Admiral Goodrich, it contained Taylor's scientific management
inasmuch as both Evans and Goodrich maintained professional
and personal relationships with Taylor, and Evans (1940: 212)
had sent copies of his plan to Mr. Taylor and other engineers
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for criticism before he did anything else with it.
Naval Order 9, as decreed, was short lived. The 
Goodrich-Newberry (or Evans') plan had created too much 
conflict when it eliminated management jobs and relegated the 
former heads of the ordnance, equipment, and steam engineering 
departments to positions as inspectors. Evans, the ranking 
Naval Constructor at Mare Island, for example, was placed in 
what he called the mechanical superintendent position in 
charge of the departments and, in essence, the inspectors. 
The mechanical superintendent position not only required 
training and experience in industrial operations, but was 
given authority as second in command at navy yards. And, even 
then, were the commandant to overrule the mechanical 
superintendent in industrial matters, it would be immediately 
reported to the Secretary of the Navy.
Thus, on shore duty, seagoing officers would not be 
running the industrial operations as they had been doing. 
And, even if they were assigned as commandant, their authority 
in industrial matters would be limited. Needless to say. 
Naval Order 9 was not appreciated by the Sea Lords as Evans 
called them. Evans lost his job at Mare Island because of his 
involvement with the plan and the controversy over it was 
passed from Secretary Newberry to his replacement George von 
L. Meyer when President Taft took office in 1909.
The discordant views between line and staff officers 
became openly apparent in a line officer's point of view. He
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suggested that Taylor's scientific management was little more 
than the inclusion of some particular methods of work at navy 
yards barely distinguishable from the much larger Navy 
tradition of the pursuit of efficiency necessary to become 
battle ready (Tardy 1911; Cook undated). Besides devising the 
best methods, standardizing tasks, training, performing drills 
for proficiency and then timing and speeding up the process to 
hone wartime skills, the military aboard ship were equally 
able to apply these methods to other kinds of work. An 
anticipated two-day's work of "scraping and painting ship, 
cleaning and polishing propellers, renewing zinc protectors, 
grinding in sea valves, etc.," for example, was performed in 
one day because of planning the work in detail before the date 
of docking (Tardy 1911: 563-4).
Lieutenant Commander Cook (undated) felt that increasing 
naval efficiency using these methods occurred largely without 
the aid of scientific management formalized by Taylor and 
others. Claiming he had "no knowledge of the articles which 
had been published in the proceedings of the Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, and The Engineering Magazine, nor of 
other books on the subject," Cook (undated: 81) slowly
proceeded making changes in methods and details based on his 
training as an "ordinary naval officer, without previous 
experience in industrial management."
In contrast. Lieutenant Commander Tardy (1911: 554)
specifically had the ambition of applying Taylor's principles
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on battleships and toward that end spent two months of the 
summer of 1910 at the Tabor Manufacturing plant which Taylor 
used as a demonstration of scientific management in practice 
(Copley 1923a: 110; Copley 1923b: 317). Although Lt Comdr
Tardy (1911) did not specify his connection with the Taylor 
system, he does note that as the Navy progressed in improving 
its battleship techniques Taylor's scientific management was 
known to at least one naval officer. The commander of the 
Iowa after the Spanish War of 18 98, who had worked with Mr. 
Frederick W. Taylor "and imbibed some of his enthusiasm," was 
able to set a benchmark more than three times as high as the 
one it replaced.
Amid the dissension. Secretary Meyer ultimately took the 
line officers' point of view and developed a compromise plan 
of his own, but not until convening a Navy Department board at 
headquarters— the Vreeland Board of 1911— to study the navy 
yards and draft a plan for their reorganization. Membership 
included five line officers who were against scientific 
management (Admiral Vreeland, the Chair, Captain Theiss, 
Captain Fletcher, Captain Zane and Lieutenant Commander Tardy) 
two paymasters (Mr. Leutze and Mr. Conard) who were neither 
for nor against scientific management, and two naval 
constructors (George H. Rock and Holden A. Evans) who were in 
favor of scientific management.
Although Evans was generally in disfavor after being 
fired from his job at Mare Island, he was able to gain
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Secretary Meyer's confidence and personally met with him at 
various times at Taylor's urging when Taylor felt that 
Secretary Meyer would see him. Through these meetings, Evans 
was able to get Secretary Meyer to agree to implement 
scientific management, however, every time political pressure 
was exerted, Meyer would change his direction. The Vreeland 
Board prepared three positions, the third being a compromise 
position which became the only possible course of action once 
Secretary Meyer withdrew his support of the first or 
scientific management position that the naval constructors 
supported. Besides the naval constructors being outnumbered, 
the paymasters, lacking commitment, would sometimes vote with 
them and sometimes against them.
The significance of the third position is that it left 
the seagoing officers in charge of industrial operations at 
navy yards; it merely added a works manager position under the 
commandant to oversee manufacturing and/or repair operations. 
Not only were the line officers secure in their positions on 
shore, but their having had the politically advantageous 
position may, in retrospect, have accounted for the Vreeland 
reports often addressing aspects of scientific management as 
modern management. It may have been the only way to have them 
accept any of the processes of scientific management.
Meyer's plan took this information from the Vreeland 
Board (U.S. Navy 1912) into account, sought advice from Taylor 
and his followers (Gantt et al 1912) , as well as reviewed how
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the English Vickers plant had installed scientific management 
(Willits and Theiss 1912). Although scientific management 
organization and methods were fully known to Meyer, his plan 
was a political decision to support the seagoing officers at 
the expense of industrial progress. Thus Meyer, a consummate 
politician, struck a compromise which reflected his years of 
experience in politics and diplomatic positions.
Meyer was a Harvard graduate, Massachusetts politician, 
wealthy gentleman of social aspirations, and under the 
administrations of Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt 
successively Ambassador to Italy, Ambassador to Russia, and 
Postmaster General (Evans 1940: 230-231; Copley 1923b: 310). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, he conceded to line management, and 
scientific management was never as fully implemented by the 
Navy as it could have been, and certainly never as fully 
implemented as the industrial managers wanted it to be.
Navy workers, too, had been less than supportive of 
following the principles of scientific management. Evans 
(1940) introduced scientific management at Mare Island after 
he offered to accept the resignation of two supervisors who 
would not only not respond to his suggestions but refused to 
follow orders. And although their resignations started an 
overall acquiescence toward Evans' innovations, workers still 
did not openly embrace the changes Evans introduced. When he 
introduced scientific management into the machine shop, the 
opposition, which had arisen to all his reforms, became very
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active and protested to Washington (Evans 1940: 180-183).
They did not prevail, however, as the Navy Department 
supported Evans' replacement of skilled machinists by helpers 
at the turret lathes on repetition work. The work not only 
did not require skill, but the helpers were turning out "half 
again as much" output as the machinists. Thwarted in their 
attempt to have the Navy stop Evans' changes, the navy yard 
unions appealed to the "unions and central bodies in San 
Francisco and other Bay cities." The issue moved from being 
a problem workers had with their boss, to a problem the yard 
union had with management, to a problem labor unions had with 
industrial work management generally.
First, labor sought management concessions through 
negotiation and mediation. When that did not produce the 
desired relief, they enlisted assistance from workers outside 
the work place. Interestingly, the outside unions requested 
that businesses arbitrate the issue. After business leaders 
visited Mare Island, learned the processes and noted the 
increase in production, they supported Evans. Of course, that 
action did not placate the workers and labor-management 
relations continued to be tense until the first strike in navy 
yard history occurred when the "riveters 'downed tools' and 
walked out" after Evans (1940: 202-203) installed rivet
removing as piece work. Evans met with the strikers, promised 
that nobody would suffer and most would benefit and was able 
to talk them into voting to return to work, to the union
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officials' chagrin and the Secretary of the Navy's 
commendation. Labor challenges in the Army ultimately had 
greater success.
During this opening decade of the 1900s, the Army also 
made several starts at implementing scientific management in 
the manufacturing shops of its arsenals and was somewhat more 
successful than the Navy at doing so. Army arsenal 
management, which did not experience the same organizational 
problems between line and staff officers as that experienced 
in the Navy, embraced Taylor's principles of scientific 
management. This receptivity may have been due to the 
functioning of the army arsenals as a more professional 
activity; they were staffed with engineers educated to analyze 
and solve problems. According to Major General Crozier 
(1920), leadership in the army arsenals was generally held by 
the most capable military officers, and the designing and 
constructing ordnance officer was a mechanical engineer. 
Since 1832, ordnance officers had been supplied by the 
Military Academy at West Point with the second highest 
graduates appointed to the Ordnance Department. And, in 18 63 
an examination was instituted as a condition of promotion for 
ordnance officers "some twenty-seven years before this 
requirement was prescribed for officers of the Army at large" 
(Crozier 1920: 4-5).
Additionally, there was no splitting of interests between 
line and staff leadership inasmuch as the Army arsenals were
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in the Ordnance Department chain of command. Thus, run by the 
most capable officers, many of whom were educated engineers 
capable of moving up into staff positions, the ordnance 
manufacturing shops at Army arsenals provided the type work, 
workers, and leadership which, together, were conducive to the 
application of Taylor's mechanical and industrial engineering 
ideas. They were not, however, smoothly introduced.
Introduction of scientific management into the Army 
occurred in 1908 when Major F. E. Hobbs was the commanding 
officer at the Rock Island arsenal. Hobbs had met Taylor 
earlier at Midvale Steel when he was an observer there 
overseeing contracts for the Army Ordnance Department 
(Nadworny 1955: 31; Copley 1923b: 329). Hobbs' efforts were 
suspended, however, when workers lodged objections with their 
congressional representatives who, in turn, brought pressure 
to bear on the Secretary of War. Inasmuch as 1908 was an 
election year. Major General Crozier decided to wait for a 
calmer political climate and did not approve the 
implementation of Taylor's system (this time at the Watertown 
Arsenal in Massachusetts) until 1909, after the appropriations 
bill had been passed.
Carl G. Barth, one of Taylor's experts, began 
implementing scientific management at Watertown in June 1909 
after President Taft had waived civil service regulations so 
that he could be hired by the Army (Crozier 1909; U.S. CSC 
1909) . And as the standardization and systematization of the
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manufacturing process was initiated at Watertown, it was, in 
turn, extended to other arsenals. Again, the Rock Island 
arsenal machinists, sensitized from the earlier attempt to 
apply scientific management, objected when the job card on 
which to record work information was issued and, with the 
assistance of organized labor, were able to get the 
Congressional Committee on Labor to investigate labor's 
opposition to scientific management. Watertown workers, on 
the other hand, seemed receptive even as time-motion studies 
of the workers' efforts were slowly, without incident, started 
in the machine shop in May 1911 by Dwight V. Merrick, another 
Taylorite who was also hired with a presidential waiver of 
civil service regulations (Copley 1923b: 338; U.S. CSC 1911). 
By August, however, when the time studies moved to the 
foundry, labor problems arose when all the molders quit after 
one of the workers who refused to submit to timing was fired. 
They returned to work a week later with the understanding that 
the matter would be investigated by General Crozier. Although 
the Army leadership was united in its desire to use Taylor's 
principles of scientific management in the arsenals, it also 
was stifled in fully implementing them. The primary 
opposition confronting the Army's application of scientific 
management came from the workers who objected to time studies.
A summary of the civil service workers' complaints is 
found in two petitions submitted to the Secretary of War 
requesting the Taylor system and its stop-watch methods be
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discontinued at the Watertown arsenal (D. S. Army 1914) . The 
petition of June 17, 1913, represented 34 9 of a total of 373 
workers employed as molders, pattern makers, carpenters, 
painters, blacksmiths, laborers, machinists and helpers. The 
petition of June 21, 1913, was presented by representatives of 
the machine shop, blacksmith shop, foundry, pattern, 
carpenter, paint and yard laboring operations. The grievances 
disclosed a range of perceived injuries caused by scientific 
management.
Although premium pay was to be the feature of scientific 
management which would cause the worker to accept it, these 
federal workers were not in favor of scientific management 
remaining in their work place because they claimed that 
premium pay was applied inequitably. It was not paid on all 
jobs and an unskilled laborer could receive premium pay over 
a skilled craft worker. And, if there was no outside premium 
pay, then the pay remained the same for doing the work. (These 
workers also believed that the greater administrative costs 
the government had to pay for the nonproductive employees 
involved in the implementation of scientific management would 
cause their work to be outsourced to private industry where it 
would be less expensive to accomplish.)
Watertown workers found the stop watch humiliating. 
Timers would argue with the skilled workers, times for work 
processes were sped up, and unattainable lesser times were 
established for tasks. Workers further suffered from the
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system when compressing work times caused lack of work (a 
painter was suspended for lack of work) as well as an increase 
in the number of accidents. In addition to the workers being 
harmed, the work was characterized by increased error rates 
and rejections. According to the allegations in these 
petitions, there was nothing about scientific management that 
was worth continuing. It was injurious to the worker, the 
product, and it cost more than it saved.
General Crozier, the Ü. S. Army Chief of Ordnance, did 
not concur in these arguments and presented a different view. 
Answering the petitions at length in a memorandum for the 
Secretary of War, General Crozier (U.S. Army 1914) addressed 
each allegation individually pointing to an incomplete or 
erroneous representation by the workers. The stop watch 
system, for example, was nothing more than an attempt by 
management to learn the time in which a j ob is to be done and 
the best sequence of movements for performing it. An 
individual would time the various component elements of a work 
process several times in order to not only arrive at a 
reasonable time for its accomplishment; its "task time," but 
also to identify the best sequence of movements and periods—  
whether elements should be performed simultaneous or 
successively. Having distinguished the required task time and 
the most efficient method, the workers were not required to 
perform "unpleasant exertion," and received their regular pay. 
They earned a premium pay when they would meet the task time
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or complete the work in less time.
To illustrate that the accident rate did not increase
with premium work. General Crozier pointed to the machine shop 
where premium work had been increased by 300 per cent but
worker accidents increased by just 8.1 per cent. Furthermore,
upon being asked, no workers were found to be failing in 
health from working under the principles of scientific 
management. And, while there may have seemed like there were 
more work rejections, in fact, there was more quality control 
of not only the finished product, but work in progress with no 
distinguishable difference in rejections between work 
performed by day workers or those on premium work. Overall, 
General Crozier pointed to the advantages to both the workers 
and to the Army by the use of the premium system: for the 17 
months prior to May 31, 1913, workers were paid $22,257.82
over and above their standard daily wages. A further 
examination revealed a 200 per cent increase in output in a 
review of 39 different jobs. Clearly, the Chief of Ordnance 
painted a very different picture from that depicted by the 
disgruntled civil service workers.
General Crozier's attitude closely aligned itself with 
that of Taylor's insofar as he saw worker unhappiness with 
scientific management being fed by the outside influence of 
labor organizations— worker unions which, he felt, had not 
taken the time to investigate the application of scientific 
management in the arsenals. Including a circular distributed
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by the International Association of Machinists during the Rock 
Island employee protest in his 1911 Chief of Ordnance report. 
General Crozier suggested that labor organizations could 
better serve their members were they to investigate the actual 
application of scientific management (then they would see the 
beneficial effects accruing to the workers) (U.S. Army 1914).
Organized labor, however, had learned enough about 
scientific management to know it was an assault on the worker 
as well as on the principle of collective bargaining upon 
which organized labor was founded. Labor was, therefore, not 
inclined to wait until the system of scientific management was 
fully implemented in government work places to voice its 
disapproval. Whether responding to Taylor's ideas as 
presented in Shop Management or to workers' fears and 
objections as it was being implemented, organized labor 
attempted to show congressional committees addressing 
scientific management that it was sweatshop management which 
would enslave American workers and that it should be stopped.
Two subcommittees of the House Committee on Labor were 
convened specifically to address scientific management in 
government work. The first was assembled in 1911 to hold 
hearings to investigate the effect of the Taylor system of 
shop management on employees, its applicability to government 
work, effects on wages and labor costs, possible reduction in 
manufacturing expenses, and to what extent it was being 
adopted in government work and its effect. And the second
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subcommittee, formed in 1916, was for the express purpose of 
considering House Resolution 8 665, a bill to regulate the 
method of directing the work of government employees, or more 
pointedly, to eliminate the Taylor system from all federal 
work.
Labor laid significant groundwork for their case at the 
1911-1912 hearings convened to investigate the Taylor system 
with testimony ranging from an analysis of Taylor's published 
studies on scientific management to worker complaints based on 
their experiences. A machinist and a labor official 
representing the Rock Island arsenal workers, N . P. Alifas, 
opined at these hearings that based on his reading of Shop 
Management, the Taylor system generally lowered wages, speeded 
up work and deskilled work (U.S. House of Representatives 
1911: 10-21) . The only workers who might benefit, he
suggested, were unskilled laborers who would be paid a little 
more than they would receive as laborers but far less than the 
skilled machinists they were replacing. And, laborers were 
receptive not only because of the additional wages which 
rewarded their compliance with management's work direction, 
but also because they did not fully understand the work and 
were not in a position to question task times established by 
management.
The depths to which scientific management could sink, 
however, was delineated by Samuel Gompers, President of the 
American Federation of Labor (U. S. House of Representatives
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1911: 22-34), in his indictment of scientific management-
After establishing that Taylor had introduced scientific 
management at the Midvale Steel Company, Gompers presented 
testimony given eleven years earlier before the Committee on 
Labor of the House of Representatives on March 1, 1900, by a 
Mr. Harrah, president of Midvale Steel.
Harrah had testified that when they were experimenting 
with scientific management they did, in fact, apply oppressive 
procedures. When implementing time management, for example, 
they had their inspectors watching the workers very closely to 
see that there was absolutely no lost time: "We had men with
stop watches over the workmen working on an axle lathe, or 
whatever else it might be, and every time a man looked up they 
took his time; every time he stopped to breathe they took his 
time, and in that way they got absolutely the amount of time 
employed in doing a certain amount of work" (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1911: 25) .
Harrah further testified that when workers passed inside 
the gate, they had to stay until their day's work was through. 
And, if a machine did not break down within the time that 
constituted its normal work life, he would "go for" the person 
in charge of the work because he knew that person was not 
assuring the workers were operating at their maximum. When 
asked whether everything was run to full capacity, Mr. Harrah 
replied, "Yes sir. We have absolutely no regard for machinery 
or for men." Gompers, in essence, had management experienced
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in using the scientific management method of work 
accomplishment validate organized labor's greatest fears.
Gompers then linked scientific management to death, 
slavery and the inability of a nation to adequately protect 
itself if it did not protect its workers. He pointed to the 
150 women workers who had died in a shirtwaist factory fire in 
New York because they had been locked in to insure their work 
was done. And using Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
to make the point that while every instance of slavery 
depicted in that novel did not occur continuously under 
slavery, so also the incidence of inhumanity under efficiency 
work systems may not be a continuous process. Nevertheless, 
when they occurred, they devastated the individuals who 
suffered them, such as the Rock Island worker who was demoted 
and had his pay permanently reduced because he had to miss 
work due to quarantine, isolation and burial when his son 
contracted diphtheria and died.
The possibility that the overwork inherent in efficiency 
systems could have a more encompassing detrimental effect, 
however, emerges when Gompers pointed to the contrast between 
the "weazened, thin-chested, and undersized" condition of 
overworked English factory workers and the more robust German 
factory workers. Greater consideration was given to the 
industrial condition of Germans because factory workers were 
expected to become their soldiers in wartime. In this way 
Gompers provided lawmakers with multiple images of how the
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oppressive conditions inherent in scientific management could 
be expected to not only damage American workers but could, in 
turn, adversely affect the economic and political well-being 
of the country.
Other labor representatives concurred in Gompers' 
judgments and went on to emphasize additional debilitating 
features of Taylor's system. James O'Connell, International 
President of the International Association of Machinists 
(lAM), felt that Taylor's system dehumanized the worker 
insofar as it rejected workers' mental ability and wanted them 
only for their physical capabilities in the manner of animals 
responding to direction (O.S. House of Representatives 1911: 
34-41) . He also condemned any type piece work as being 
patently unfair which was evident in its history. Once piece 
work was established, management would reduce the price per 
piece by finding workers who would work for less. Not only 
did piece work undermine collegiality among workers by 
fostering competition, but it also separated the younger 
workers who could produce at a faster pace from their older 
counterparts.
Frank Jennings, representing the Boston Machinists' 
Union, supported these views and further condemned piecework 
and the efficiency system as methods for increasing production 
at a lessened cost, that is, increasing profits at the expense 
of workers. Jennings granted that while piece work might 
start off offering fair wages for the work, it digressed into
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9 0
little more than "industrial cannibalism." Workers in the 
Boston-Cambridge area, for example, could initially work under 
a fairly reasonable piece-work rate, but then their rates 
would be cut down to a "ridiculously small figure." Further, 
piece work did not fit in most shops where the piece sizes 
varied nor was it acceptable where piece rates were set solely 
by management without worker concurrence (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1911: 20-22).
Individual workers, too, voiced their opposition to 
scientific management in the 1911-1912 hearings. Molders, 
machinists, blacksmiths, sheet metal and other workers 
provided a litany of personal and coworker experiences, 
including having times cut after they had been set, close 
supervision by those implementing scientific management, 
skilled workers being told how to do the work by inexperienced 
managers, and a continuous pattern of speed-up to turn out 
ever greater production. Thus, while the machinists at 
Watertown may have accepted Merrick's time studies because he 
had machine experience and the foundry workers rejected them 
because of his lack of foundry experience, all types of 
workers came forth with criticisms which supported Mr. 
Harrah's earlier testimony that had been presented by Samuel 
Gompers at the beginning of the hearings.
All voices of opposition, however, were heard only after 
scientific management had been implemented. To the worker, 
the cause was personal to his everyday work life. To
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organized labor it was equally significant. Government 
workers engaged in manufacturing work may have comprised only 
a small segment of American workers, but their situation was 
strategic. The implementation of scientific management in 
government work could appear to have a "government stamp of 
approval" which would only support its further use in private 
industry (Ü. S. House of Representatives 1911: 37). Thus, 
labor was fighting for recognition and the life of collective 
bargaining when it was opposing Taylor's system of scientific 
management in government work.
Following these hearings, the special committee's final 
report in 1912 supported management's implementation of 
scientific management but encouraged management to "put forth 
every effort to invite and induce full cooperation between the 
working force and themselves," in its implementation (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1912: 7). Stop-watch time study was 
not to be made without the consent of the workers, and the 
bonus and premium work was likewise to be introduced only with 
mutual consent. Management, however, continued with business 
as usual because these recommendations were not mandated, and 
organized labor continued to work toward the elimination of 
the principles of scientific management in government work.
By March 1915 organized labor was able to get clauses 
added to the Army and Naval Appropriations bills prohibiting 
the essence of Taylor's system, time study and premium pay. 
Specifically, it stated:
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...That no part of the appropriations made in this 
bill shall be available for the salary or pay of 
any officer, manager, superintendent, foreman, or 
other person having charge of the work of any 
employee of the United States Government while 
making or causing to be made with a stop watch or 
other cime-measuring device, a time study of any 
job of any such employee between the starting and 
completion thereof or the movements of any such 
employee while engaged upon such work; nor shall 
any part of the appropriations made in this bill be 
available to pay premium or bonus or cash reward to 
any employee in addition to his regular wages, 
except for suggestions resulting in improvements or 
economy in the operation of any Government plant; 
and no claim for services performed by any person 
while violating this proviso shall be allowed.
(Army Appropriations Act, P.L. 63, Chapter 143,
March 4, 1915) .
The rider to the Naval Service Appropriations Act, Public Law 
63, Chapter 83, March 3, 1915, contained almost identical
language.
Despite these explicit mandates, the provisions did not 
eliminate the use of scientific management in government work 
because they only covered work paid from these particular 
appropriations. Scientific management was continued at the 
Watertown arsenal, for example, using funds from the 
Fortifications Act appropriations. It is not surprising, 
then, to see the same prohibitions applied to two more 
appropriations bills in 1916. On July 1, 1916, Public Law 64, 
Chapter 209, covering Appropriations for Sundry Civil Expenses 
included a prohibition against time study and premium pay. 
And, on July 6, 1916, the Fortifications Appropriations Bill 
(Public Law 64, Chapter 225) contained a similar prohibition. 
Prior to the enactment of these two new riders to
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appropriations legislation, however, organized labor was 
attempting to get a law passed to prohibit the implementation 
of the principles of scientific management in all federal 
work. Consequently, the 1916 hearings on H.R. 8665 provided 
an arena in which labor and management both attempted to 
achieve their incompatible objectives. Labor wanted
legislation that would shield government workers regardless of 
the source of the monies used to pay them. And management 
wanted the practice of scientific management to remain in 
federal work inasmuch as its wholesale elimination would be 
tantamount to its rejection by the government which could 
obstruct its use in all manufacturing activities.
Entry of Scientific Management in Federal Work 
In this brief sketch, it becomes clear that Taylor's 
principles of scientific management were not imposed on 
federal military manufacturing work centers, rather they were 
introduced into the federal work place at the request of 
military officials responsible for accomplishing the work. 
Several factors may account for management's ready acceptance 
of scientific management: a conducive social climate; a
personal and professional fraternization between military 
officers and capitalists through professional societies and a 
movement of military officials into private industry along 
with political appointments of upper class and/or corporate 
scions into government positions; and Taylor's position as a
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capitalist selling scientific management as his product.
The national social consciousness was very conducive to 
the introduction of the concepts and practices of scientific 
management into civil service industrial work. At the time 
scientific management was starting to appear in the federal 
work shops, the Civil Service Act of 1883 reforming federal 
employment practices had only been in effect for two decades. 
While the Civil Service Act signaled the need for capable 
workers to perform government work, it was followed by a 
period in which committees were established, one after the 
other, to review methods of business in the executive 
departments to assure their capable employees operated in an 
efficient and economical way.
The Cockrell Committee, established in 1887, continued 
until 188 9 to investigate the methods used by government 
business and work. Then, from 18 93 to 18 95, a joint 
commission of the House and Senate, the Dockery-Cockrell 
Commission, was charged with continuing the efforts of the 
Cockrell Committee. The Dockery-Cockrell Commission was not 
only to look at business practices, but to assess their 
governing laws, rules and regulations and "the time and 
attention devoted to the operations...by the persons employed 
therein, and the degree of efficiency of all such employees" 
(Weber 1919: 66).
The next review of federal business methods was 
undertaken by the Keep Committee (or Committee on Department
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Methods), in effect from 1905 to 1909, which was then followed 
by the President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency from 
1910 to 1913 for the purpose of "...inaugurating new or 
changing old methods of transacting such public business so as 
to attain greater efficiency and economy therein...." (Weber 
1919: 84). Such continuing efforts at efficiency and economy 
at the national level could not have escaped influencing the 
Secretaries of War and the Navy and the generals who worked at 
that level. The implementation of scientific management at 
navy yards and army arsenals occurred with the participation 
and/or knowledge of these leaders in Washington. Even Naval 
Constructor Evans apprised the Secretary of the Navy of his 
early efforts of incorporating the principles of scientific 
management in Mare Island shipbuilding and repair activities.
Beyond accepting the Presidents' concerns for efficiency 
and/or economy, military leaders may have been personally 
motivated to implement scientific management for its future 
effect on their employment opportunities. According to labor 
leader Alifas, officers who gained experience as managers in 
government industrial plants could be offered good positions 
with private manufacturers by operating a government plant as 
efficiently as it could be operated and make the workers work 
just as hard as they could be induced to work (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1916: 242).
Whether they were motivated for professional or for 
personal reasons, military leaders were provided the means to
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realize both objectives (to increase efficiency in government 
manufacturing as well as improve future employment prospects) 
through their close involvement with businessmen, many of whom 
were experimenting with Taylor's scientific methods of work. 
Contracts for war materials with private shipyards and steel 
companies such as Midvale or Bethlehem where Taylor personally 
practiced the principles of scientific management not only 
brought military observers into contact with Taylor and his 
followers but also gave them the opportunity to view the 
effectiveness of his system.
Taylor established key army and navy contacts while he 
was at Midvale Steel conducting experiments in scientific 
management during the 1880s (Kanigel 1997; Copley 1923). 
Although the army arsenals manufactured artillery, and navy 
yards were involved in manufacturing as well as shipbuilding 
and repair, such in-house efforts were not sufficient to arm 
the military. Consequently, contracts for weaponry were let 
with private manufacturers, one of which was Midvale Steel. 
And, while the military interests appeared to be separate from 
the interests of private industry, they may have, in fact, 
been more similar. Sanford E. Thompson (Taylor Society 1920: 
67) noted in his address at Taylor's memorial meeting in 
Philadelphia, PA, October 22, 1915, that Taylor had caught the 
attention of a "group of capitalists who, as government 
officials in the War Department, had noted Mr. Taylor's 
accomplishments in the manufacture of war materials at
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Midvale." At the same memorial. Admiral C. F. Goodrich 
(Taylor Society 1920: 81-86) recognizing Taylor's services to 
the National Government, acknowledged that he had first met 
Taylor in 1885, and they became lifelong friends after their 
dealings in 188 9.
Moreover, the military were involved in industrial 
concerns. Commander Robley D. "Fighting Bob" Evans and 
Commander Goodrich received leaves of absence from the Navy 
Department in order to run the Appleton, Wisconsin, and 
Madison, Maine, paper sulphite mills which converted wood into 
paper. These two mills were under the management of the 
Manufacturing Investment Company over which William C. 
Whitney, Secretary of the Navy under the Cleveland 
administration, was president. Not only did Whitney contact 
Taylor while he was reforming the post-Civil War Navy to offer 
him the job of running the Washington navy yard (Taylor turned 
it down), but he also kept his corporate contacts through his 
wife who was the sister of Colonel Oliver H. Payne, a 
multimillionaire associated with Standard Oil Company and the 
American Tobacco Company (Kanigel 1997: 241-2; Copley 1923a: 
332-337). Whitney was a political-economic bridge between 
corporate America as it was then and military operations.
Taylor himself was born into a Philadelphia family which 
had inherited wealth amassed by Taylor's grandfather as a 
merchant, and enlarged it through real estate investments and 
the founding of the Farmer's National bank. Growing up in
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"relaxed wealth" Taylor was educated at the prestigious 
Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, which was 
"well-endowed and well-connected, with a glorious pedigree" 
(Kanigel 1997: 74-75) . So while he did not continue his
education into Harvard with many of his Exeter classmates, 
Taylor was nonetheless connected enough to enter factories to 
carry out his experiments scientifically managing industrial 
work processes. His background and work experiences, however, 
led him to become an entrepreneurial capitalist whose product 
was information.
Taylor may have broadcast his scientific management with 
religious zeal, but he charged for his services as a 
consulting engineer in industrial management. Although he was 
not of the "hoggish" nature that he saw financiers to be, 
making money for money's sake, he obviously enjoyed living 
well and liked having substantial wealth; a standard of living 
he sought to replenish after his association with the 
Manufacturing Investment Company failed to enrich him and a 
Depression adversely affected his usual earning power (Copley 
1923a: 384-389). With his background and profession, Taylor 
was a link between the upper class, the very wealthy, 
competitive capitalists running businesses, and the military 
officer corps.
Another avenue by which Taylor became known to military 
leaders was through the American Society for Mechanical 
Engineers where he met engineers from around the country
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(Kanigel 1997: 240). That engineers, regardless of their
employers, share a meeting of the minds was expressed by 
Copley (1923a: 335) when he documented that:
The government inspectors at Midvale were 
drawn from the officers of the army's Ordnance 
Department and the navy's Bureau of Construction 
and Repair; and it is highly significant that 
throughout Taylor's career the men who officered 
these government departments were, with their 
engineering education and disinterested 
professional outlook, practically unanimous not 
merely in their approval of but enthusiasm for 
Taylor's leading management principles and
methods....
General Crozier (1920: 13) acknowledged that when they were 
facing personnel shortages during World War I, the Ordnance 
Department turned to business associates found among 
engineering societies including the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Institutes of Technology, 
including the Stevens Institute from which Taylor obtained his 
engineering degree, and "from efficiency engineers with wide 
professional acquaintance."
In summary, federal military management was intertwined 
with that of private industry through professional 
associations, social contacts and work experiences. 
Individuals, not rules, were responsible for introducing the 
principles of scientific management in federal work places. 
And because there was no federal order or law requiring it be 
implemented, it was done in somewhat of a piecemeal fashion. 
Individual management officials in the Navy started trying it 
at Navy yards and attempted to sell it to top management. Its
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use in Army arsenals, however, did have the support of top 
management in the Ordnance Department, which may account for 
the greater and more concerted effort at implementation in 
Army arsenals . The introduction of scientific management into 
federal work forces presents a commingling of interests 
between the state and industry, an acceptance, by government 
leaders, of the desirability for work efforts to be aimed 
toward maximum production despite their effects on workers. 
Clearly, the introduction of scientific management was not 
accomplished as a result of a diffusion of power from an 
interplay of diverse groups. Scientific management served 
capitalist class interests. Besides personally benefitting 
Taylor, its governmental use would act to legitimate its 
implementation in private industry. Further, the class 
struggle inherent in this situation became apparent as labor 
unions took exception to its implementation.
Cessation of Scientific Management in Federal Work
While federal military managers may have implemented 
Taylor's principles of scientific management voluntarily and 
without fanfare in the course of their normal operations, they 
were almost immediately rejected by both federal workers and 
their unions. Civil service workers at the Mare Island Navy 
Yard challenged them as they were implemented but were 
ultimately talked into working under them. Army workers at 
the Rock Island arsenal, on the other hand, rejected them
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before they were even put into effect.
Rock Island labor representative Alifas claimed that the 
first awareness at the Rock Island arsenal that the Taylor 
system might be implemented was when they found a copy of 
Taylor's book Shop Management on the desks of several of the 
officials in the machine shops. He indicated that they, too, 
read the book at that time "and concluded that that sort of 
system was not the kind that was going to be beneficial to the 
workmen, and we protested against its introduction" (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1916: 194) . Nevertheless, following 
this initial protest, Taylor's principles of scientific 
management were implemented at several arsenals, most fully at 
Watertown, before labor organizations were able to muster 
enough congressional support to get legislation to remove it 
from these federal work places.
Scientific management was routed due to the concerted and 
persistent efforts of organized labor. Organized labor 
objected to every aspect of Taylor's system, from the program 
Taylor first delineated in Shop Management to its practical 
application. Not only did scientific management want the 
worker to work harder while management reaped the profits, but 
it also relegated decisions regarding work processes solely to 
management, discouraged collective bargaining, and found 
unions unnecessary. To organized labor work management fell 
within the purview of the worker who was the expert. Work 
procedures would, at most, be a negotiated process. Under
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scientific management, on the other hand, management would 
make all the decisions and if there was any negotiation it 
would be with the individual workers, often in the form of a 
"take it or leave it" offer. True to Taylor's advice in Shop 
Management, recalcitrant workers were fired. Clearly, 
organized labor had to take a stand against the implementation 
of scientific management because it was intrinsically against 
worker rights and collective bargaining.
The process of removing it was, however, tedious. 
Scientific management was openly used in federal work places 
for seven years. It was started at Watertown in 1909 and 
remained there until the rider to the Fortifications 
Appropriations Act in 1916 prohibited its further use. The 
1911-1912 congressional hearings to investigate the Taylor 
system of shop management were inconclusive. Much like an 
arbitrator's decision that often "splits the baby," the 
conclusions and recommendations offered by the special 
committee conducting the hearings both supported management's 
use of scientific management and labor's objections to it. 
Scientific management could be continued in government work 
but its full implementation could only happen with labor's 
concurrence. No legislation was proposed. And, management 
ignored the recommendations.
Labor continued its efforts and finally in 1915 was able 
to get riders attached to Army and Navy appropriations bills 
which prohibited the use of these appropriations for time
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study and premium pay. Despite these laws, scientific 
management was continued at the Watertown arsenal using monies 
from the Fortifications Appropriations Act. In July 1916 this 
loophole was closed when similar prohibitive clauses were 
added to both the Fortifications Appropriations and the Sundry 
Civil Expenses Appropriations bills. Prior to these 1916 
riders, however, labor had started efforts to get an all- 
encompassing law passed which would prohibit time study and 
premium pay in all federal work. House Resolution 8 665, a bill 
to regulate the method of directing the work of government 
employees.
Although no legislation resulted from this bill, its 
hearings encapsulate the struggle that was occurring between 
labor and management over scientific management. Management, 
represented by the National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM), business owners and industrial engineers, was annoyed 
yet firm in its resolve to fully present a case for scientific 
management since it had not been able to do so prior to the 
riders prohibiting time management and premium pay being 
attached to the Army and Navy appropriations bills.
Including with his testimony an editorial which had been 
published in The Engineering Magazine in April 1916, Mr. John 
Dunlap, editor of the magazine, noted that not only had no 
public hearing ever been given but that the "vast majority of 
Congressmen and Senators were so wholly uninformed upon the 
subject that the rider was passed by the House practically
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without debate" (Ü. S. House of Representatives 1916: 87). He 
further charged that labor leaders had been able to pass the 
legislation without hearing or debate because of a conspiracy 
led by Congressman Buchanan of Illinois. Consequently, prior 
to the hearings on H.R. 8665, a group of 10, representing 
leading engineering societies, the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Metal Trades Association, and many 
local chambers of commerce, launched an all-out effort to 
adequately inform Senators and Congressmen about the dangers 
of removing the practice of scientific management from federal 
work.
Management representatives at the committee employed 
every approach possible to sway committee members. But it 
seemed quite clear, as management members were prodded for 
information regarding the intentions of the group of 10, who 
the members were, how it was operating, etc., that some 
officials had already accepted labor's arguments. 
Nonetheless, individuals testifying in favor of scientific 
management brought many positive anecdotes to the hearings, 
especially from businessmen who had implemented the principles 
of scientific management and their workers. Scientific 
management, they alleged, was pretty much a standard feature 
in private employment. While James A. Emery, counsel for the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), could not specify 
the precise proportion of the 4,000 NAM members which had 
installed scientific management, he reported that there was
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 0 5
hardly a plant in which the principle behind scientific 
management was not more or less in operation (U. S. House of 
Representatives 1916: 16).
At length, individuals highlighted the beneficial aspects 
of scientific management, how it eliminated waste of men and 
of time, and how, if it were not an approved practice, only 
the opposite— inefficiency and waste— could occur. By 
producing letters from workers supporting scientific 
management, they also attempted to show how labor unions and 
scientific management were not inconsistent. John Dunlap, 
acknowledging that he was not there to defend the Taylor 
system, went so far as to repudiate Taylor by pointing out the 
extremism of Taylor's pig iron experiment. Feeling that 
Taylor's experiment was to make the point of what was possible 
with work management, Dunlap testified that Taylor 
consequently gave a wholly false impression of what 
constituted scientific management. Henry R. Towne of the Yale 
& Towne Manufacturing Co. and also representing NAM at the 
hearings, made the point that modern industry was moving 
toward paying by the piece because it was only fair that the 
faster and harder workers receive higher compensation.
The greatest fear that management seemed to exhibit at 
the hearings was that were H.R. 8 665 to become law, it would 
cause a chain reaction leading to the elimination of 
scientific management in private industry. The bill, however, 
was not passed into law. Again, the lack of legislation seems
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to be an appeasement to both sides. No legislation meant no 
governmental endorsement against scientific management. And, 
the riders on the appropriations bills granted relief to 
labor's concerns.
With the exception of these riders on the appropriations 
bills prohibiting the management practices of time study and 
premium pay, other legislation regulating civil service 
employment has generally addressed issues incidental to 
getting the work done. The management style or control that 
can be practiced on the job to accomplish federal work has 
been left to the discretion of management. Nevertheless, 
since the Civil Service Act of 1883, which checked federal 
managers' power over who works for them, when the person is 
eligible for rewards or promotions, or how much the employee 
is paid, there has been continual dissatisfaction with the 
civil service system because of its bureaucratic rules or "red 
tape."
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CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND REFORM
Civil Service Act 
The Civil Service Act seems to stand almost alone in its 
charter for reform. It occurred during a period of great 
social change at a time when government was being called upon 
for greater involvement. Most of the 1800s had been 
tumultuous times marked by economic expansion with great 
industrial growth and extraordinary population increase 
through immigration. The labor situation in private industry 
was contentious and constantly changing. In 1883 at the time 
the Civil Service Act was passed, the New York Times reported 
numerous labor strikes in progress or being contemplated. 
There was a Western Union strike in which telegraphers in 
major cities in the East and Midwest were participating, an 
impending strike of the iron manufacturers and workers, a 
puddlers' strike at Reading ironworks, and strikes by coal 
miners, railway laborers, and tobacco stemmers and cigar 
workers. Various workers' organizations were agitating for a 
half holiday on Saturday, and they were raising the issue of 
the Irish paupers who were arriving en masse and being paid
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lower wages for unskilled work. Also the affect of convict 
labor on competition was an issue. Thus, the first reform of 
the federal civil service occurred within a context of 
employment unrest in the private sector which had placed 
greater demands on the government.
Yet, at this time when government was expanding, 
employment in federal work was based on who federal office 
seekers knew, what party they represented, and/or how much 
support they could realize. "Office-beggars," for example, 
sought positions through the circulation of petitions gaining 
signatures from the public, a practice which apparently became 
so routinized that individuals would sign papers thrust in 
front of them without reading them. A February 25, 1877,
editorial in the Chicago Tribune (1970: 49-50) questioning the 
rise of petitions being circulated to appeal for employment by 
President Hayes ironically notes that just such a state-level 
petition circulated in 1869 to arrest and remove the 
citizenship from the Speaker of the House in the General 
Assembly was signed "conspicuously and officially by the 
gentleman whose banishment was asked." Such editorials not 
only took the petition practice to task but helped keep alive 
a concern for civil service reform after legislative reform in 
1871 to give President Grant the authority to prescribe 
regulations for the admission of persons into the civil 
service failed when Congress did not continue to appropriate 
funds to support the testing of applicants. General media
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coverage also helped highlight the need for reform. The New 
York Times, for example, ran an article a month regarding 
civil service reform from January through June 1874. 
Legislative reform of the civil service had long been 
politically and publicly debated. Thus, the assassination of 
President Garfield in 1881 by a disappointed office seeker 
impelled congressional action which not only got civil service 
reform legislation passed but the funds set aside to support 
it.
The Civil Service Act of 1883 contained few requirements 
that directly infringed on management's ability to direct 
work. Its primary emphasis was on the establishment of a 
system which would stop patronage hiring by removing from 
management the absolute control over the individuals hired 
into the civil service. That is, it supplanted key elements 
of simple control with bureaucratic control. Rules replaced 
personal decisions, particularly in the hiring of federal 
workers. In addition, the execution of those rules was moved 
from the supervisor/manager to the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC).
The multitude of changes effected by the Civil Service 
Act centered around the establishment of the Civil Service 
Commission to promulgate the act and execute a personnel 
system based on merit. It established the Commission as a 
politically diverse group of three to attend to the civil 
service and assist the President in preparing suitable rules
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for carrying the act into effect, allowed for administrative 
assistance for the commission, contained provisions for 
appointing individuals to carry out the examination function, 
identified types of positions to be brought under the 
classified service requiring examinations, and established 
prohibitions regarding political activities and assessments. 
Provisions which comprise the core of a competitive civil 
service to curb management's control over workers, are 
contained in Section 2 of the Act which profiles criteria for 
entry into the federal civil service.
Specifically, the Act called for competitive examinations 
(or noncompetitive examinations when there were no applicants 
for the competitive classified positions); selection of those 
ranking highest on the examinations; apportioning workers in 
Washington, D. C., by the states from which they came with an 
oath taken by the new civil servants swearing to their place 
and length of residence (which would assure that all workers 
at the seat of government would be proportionately 
distributed); and a six-months probationary period. It also 
prohibited employee political contributions and the use of 
authority inherent in federal positions for political 
purposes. Agencies were to keep records of these hiring 
activities and provide the Civil Service Commission the names 
and addresses of their federal employees, those terminated 
during the probationary period, and all transfers, 
resignations and removals. In short, federal workers were to
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be hired through the Civil Service Commission based on what 
they knew, not whom they knew; and, in this sense, the federal 
civil service became a model employer.
Under the Act, the day-to-day management of the federal 
work force was left to the discretion, or design, of 
management. Even the ability to fire workers at will, the 
ultimate management leverage used to dominate workers and a 
key aspect of simple control, was not a part of the Civil 
Service Act of 1883. The Act constrained hiring procedures by 
requiring that employees be hired based on merit, but it 
contained no removal provisions that required employees be 
fired only for work related reasons. Terminations were merely 
to be recorded and provided to the Civil Service Commission. 
Not addressing the termination of workers could have been 
viewed as a serious omission insofar as firing employees at 
will had been commonplace under the political patronage 
system. When a new person was placed in charge of an agency, 
he normally fired his predecessor's staffs and gave the jobs 
to his friends, family and partisan political supporters. On 
the other hand, not being able to make personal appointments 
hampered any removal to provide a place for a supporter even 
were they able to be referred through the Civil Service 
Commission. Nonetheless, by 1897 bureaucratic control was 
extended by President McKinley to include removal procedures.
Federal employee removal procedures did not take away 
management's ability to discharge workers who would not
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perform the work according to management ' s direction, or even 
those who could not do the work. Rather, it required removals 
from the competitive classified service be for just cause as 
would promote the efficiency of the service and the reasons 
had to be given to the worker in writing. In addition, the 
employee was to be allowed a reasonable time to answer the 
charges. In other words, the at-will firing common to simple 
control during the era of political patronage was replaced by 
a bureaucratic control which further circumscribed 
management's authority: removals of federal workers could
only be for work-related reasons, those reasons were to be 
documented, and the reasons were subject to review by others. 
Disdained by many, these and other rules were workable. Naval 
Constructor Evans (1940: 179-180), for example, conceded in 
the early 1900s that maintaining incompetent civil service 
employees was not due to civil service regulation, rather it 
was due to laxity on the part of management. While he 
personally viewed the discharge process as tedious, he did not 
let it stop him from initiating action against workers who 
ignored his suggestions and then refused to follow his orders 
when he was implementing the principles of scientific 
management. Evans (1940: 154) felt that civil service
regulations might retard improvements in government industrial 
plants, but they never prevented them from happening. Thus, 
the presence of limitations seems to be more restrictive than 
the rules themselves.
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Despite management's discontent with these employment 
rules created in response to the public outcry against 
patronage politics on the waves of the progressive political 
movement, they were administered and further developed by the 
Civil Service Commission until the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978 reconfigured the institutions established to carry out 
the merit system. And although the Civil Service Act remained 
virtually unchanged during this 95 years, a period of 
tremendous growth in the classified civil service, its tenets 
were repeatedly reviewed.
Reconsidering Civil Service Act Procedures
In addition to the reviews initiated during the period in 
which scientific management was being introduced into federal 
work forces in the late 1800s and early 1900s, such as the 
Cockrell Committee, Dockery-Cockrell Commission and President 
Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, other efforts 
have continued to question federal employment practices. The 
Brownlow Committee, 1936-1937, and the two Hoover Commissions 
(Hoover I, 1947-1949, and Hoover II, 1953-1955) examined, 
among other aspects of federal management, employment 
procedures as administered under the Civil Service Act and 
recommended changes, some of which were not realized until the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
President Roosevelt's three-person Committee on 
Administrative Management included Louis Brownlow, journalist
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and public administrator, who chaired the committee, Charles 
E . Merriam, university professor in political science, and 
Luther Gulick, a public management expert who was devoted to 
promoting scientific management in government. This committee 
was appointed to address the inadequacy of the civil service 
system in the Executive Branch. Although its report in 
January 1937 supported an extension of the merit system 
"upward, outward, and downward" to cover all non-policy 
determining positions, it recommended the elimination of the 
Civil Service Commission to be replaced by a Civil Service 
Administrator, with a board of seven members serving for a 
period of seven years each. The focus of the Brownlow 
Committee, however, was directed more toward civil service 
management and found, in this respect, that the problems of 
civil service were due to its lack of opportunities and 
inadequate salaries which inhibited recruitment of men and 
women of "outstanding capacity and character" into the career 
civil service. Thus, while the Brownlow Committee confronted 
the Civil Service Act at the heart of its administration, the 
Civil Service Commission, it did not challenge key elements of 
the merit system.
On the other hand, the two Hoover Commissions which also 
reviewed government practices with a concern for efficiency 
and economy, scrutinized civil service employment procedures 
as they were administered under the Civil Service Act. The 
first Hoover Commission, appointed in 1947 to look into ways
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to downsize big government after its buildup during the 
depression of the 1930s and World War II, reported that 
directives dealing with dismissal should be amended so as to 
provide a more workable method of separating inefficient 
employees. This Commission (194 9: 109-134) also recounted a 
multitude of problems with the merit system as it was being 
administered by the Civil Service Commission. It claimed that 
the centralization of hiring caused delays, and recruiting and 
examining was not adapted to the variety or numbers of needed 
workers causing it to fail to get the "right man" for the job 
or reach the best of the professional, scientific, technical, 
or administrative potential applicants. Further roadblocks to 
recruiting the best included the lack of a comprehensive pay 
policy, a need for clearer standards for classifying jobs, and 
salary ceilings that were too low. The ability to promote 
career employees in levels of responsibility and a too- 
complicated rating system that was used to both reward the 
employee for exceptional work or penalize the employee who did 
not perform adequately were also identified as impediments to 
work management. And, of course, the separation of 
inefficient and unnecessary employees was claimed to be 
surrounded with so much red tape as to inhibit action.
Practically every objection specified by the Hoover 
Commission impinged on the merit system, those factors which 
required following rules rather than personal preferences in 
hiring, promoting, paying, training, terminating, etc. The
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Hoover Commission also identified the need to reduce the size 
of personnel offices, which were usually responsible for the 
implementation of the merit system. They claimed that 
personnel offices were over staffed inasmuch as operating 
officials, not personnel specialists, should be carrying out 
personnel management responsibilities.
The second Hoover Commission (1953-1955) seemed to echo 
some of the conclusions of the first Hoover Commission. In 
addition to pointing to the need for a senior executive 
service to provide the continuity enjoyed by industry which 
was able to remunerate its employees at much higher levels, 
and a deficiency in managerial training at the lower levels of 
management, this Commission challenged employment practices 
pertaining to the majority of the employees. Still of concern 
was an overly elaborate classification system seeking to 
assure equal pay for equal work; recruitment and testing which 
overlooked candidates in outlying areas and then restricted 
referral of qualified candidates for consideration because of 
the "rule of three" limiting consideration to the top three; 
an unwieldy efficiency rating system making only the most 
perfunctory judgments of performance; complex removal 
procedures due to agencies supplementing the simplified 
removal system existing in law; a need to simplify reduction- 
in-force procedures and include safeguards against losing the 
experienced and skilled employees; and, extending the merit 
system to many agencies that stood outside its protections.
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And, of course, all changes to the public service should 
result in greater efficiency and economy of operation.
The task forces and subcommittees of the Hoover 
Commissions which arrived at these conclusions were using 
private industry as their model, and private industry was well 
represented in Commission members, with membership of the task 
forces and their staffs heavily weighted in favor of the 
business community (Moe 1982: 28-29). Present or past
positions, for example, held by members of the second Hoover 
Commission include: Retired Chairman of the Board, Standard
Oil Company; former President, Rockefeller Foundation; 
President of Brown Publishing Company; President in charge of 
Personnel, National City Bank of New York; President, General 
Builders Supply Corporation; Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, Coca-Cola Export Corporation and Chairman of the 
Board, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Boston; owner of a men's 
apparel store; former President, Carnegie Corporation; 
Chairman of the Board, New York Life Insurance Company; 
President and Chairman, Film Booking Offices of America; 
Chairman, Keith, Albee, Orpheum Theatres Corporation; 
President and Chairman, Pathe Exchange, Inc.; Chairman of the 
Board, Sylvania Electric Products Company; Board of Trustees, 
National Industrial Conference Board; former member, Bonbright 
and Company, Inc.; former Vice-President, Air Transport 
Association of America; President, Eastern Air Lines, Inc.; 
Director, Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation; and. Vice
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President, Belgian American Educational Foundation (MacNeil 
and Metz 1956: 317-337) .
Further, some of the review of federal work processes was 
turned over to individuals who did similar work in private 
industry. For instance, the first Hoover Commission assigned 
the analysis of the structure and work of the Veterans 
Administration to a committee composed of prominent insurance 
company executives. And, except for the insurance portion of 
the review, the committee contracted all the other work to a 
management firm (Moe 1982: 71).
On the other hand, only two industrial representatives, 
Honeywell and International Business Machines, are found among 
the staff and task forces assigned to President Jimmy Carter's 
Personnel Management Project which studied civil service 
procedures and developed recommendations for the Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA). Comment, however, was solicited from 
private industry and others through public hearings held by 
the U . S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. In this 
fashion, the policy making, business-oriented Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) was able to interject corporate 
views. (See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978 Hearings before the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Ninety- 
fifth Congress Second Session on S. 2640, S. 2707, and S. 
2830, U. S. Senate, 1978a: 344-379.) The CED embodies a vast
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range of corporate, industrial, and financial interests. CED 
Program Committee members, for example, were from the Itek 
Corporation, John L. Burns and Company, Adela Investment 
Company, Robert A. Weaver, Jr., and Associated, Cutler-Hammer, 
Inc. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Klutznick Investments, The 
Fidelity Bank, Colorado National Bankshares, Inc., TICOR, 
Dayton Hudson Corporation and Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Company.
Thus, it is not surprising that the CED would advance 
ideas supporting greater managerial authority and 
responsibility for personnel be given to department and agency 
heads which happen to be political appointees often drawn from 
their own organization.
Through the hearings the CED suggested that cabinet 
officers, agency officials, and other administrators should 
have greater flexibility and discretion in the organization 
and direction of their personnel. This would include the 
abolition of the Civil Service Commission; decentralizing 
personnel authorities for hiring, classification of positions, 
promotions and adverse actions; rescinding rules which limit 
employee grades; abandoning the "rule of three" by which 
selections have to be made from the top three candidates 
referred for a position; letting each federal agency decide 
all appeals initiated by their disgruntled employees, etc. In 
brief, they recommended relaxing the merit system by handing 
back to management the ability to create the rules determining
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such processes as selection, removal, pay, rewards, etc.
The President's Advisory Council on Management 
Improvement (PACMI), another group providing business views at 
the hearings, was comprised of members from Schriever & McKee, 
Inc; Archer Daniels Midland Co; IFC Capital Resources Corp.; 
Flying Tiger Corp.; Continental Illinois National Bank; 
Rollins International, Inc.; General Motors Corp.; Dayton 
Hudson Corp.; and University Computing Company. This 
Council's Ad Hoc Committee recommended that an objective 
germane to reform of the civil service merit system should be 
to make it "consistent with and supportive of what are 
recognized as the best personnel management systems and 
practice in business and government'' (U.S. Senate 1978b: 562) . 
Toward this end, the Council also recommended that a Hoover­
like commission be established to include members of Congress 
so that recommendations might see their way into legislation 
and to give the public (a majority of the members) an 
opportunity to be involved. It would seem that the PACMI was 
less than enthusiastic with the prospect of the CSRA being 
forwarded without more business input. A Gulf Oil Senior Vice 
President echoed their request that a "Hoover Commission" be 
appointed on performance criteria for the Federal Government 
(U.S. Senate 1978b: 664).
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
Despite the paucity of direct business input, the Civil
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 2 1
Service Reform Act seems to have included many changes 
proposed in earlier efficiency reviews. The Chair of 
President Reagan's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control in 
the Federal Government (Grace 1984: 248) reported that the 
CSRA effected a complete redesign of the performance 
management program with the objective of improving federal 
employee efficiency, responsiveness, and productivity through 
measurement systems comparable to those used by private 
industry. In addition, the Hoover Commissions had not only 
recommended changing the rating system but revising removal 
procedures as well.
Perhaps the most significant change to the Civil Service 
Act of 1883 brought about by the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978 was the reorganization which eliminated the Civil Service 
Commission, the realization of a recommendation made as far 
back as the Brownlow Committee. In its stead the Office of 
Personnel Management (0PM) was established with one political 
appointee in charge of administering the merit system. 0PM 
leadership stands in stark contrast to that of the neutral, 
bipartisan Civil Service Commission. A bipartisan board, the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) was created, however, to 
handle employee appeals. The reorganization also brought 
about the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) a protective avenue 
for employees who "blow the whistle" on fraud, waste or abuse, 
and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to handle 
labor relations matters.
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Except for the 0PM, these other forums appear to have 
been established to provide services to employees which may be 
contrary to greater control over workers. The OSC, for 
example, was designed to protect whistleblowers from improper 
reprisals, while, paradoxically, the legislation increased
managers' ability to fire employees. The CSRA (Public Law 
95-454) not only directed that each agency establish a 
performance appraisal system to be used as a basis for
training, rewarding, reassigning, promoting, reducing in 
grade, retaining and removing its employees, but it also made 
it easier for management to remove employees with unacceptable 
performance. After an opportunity period in which to improve 
performance, the employee who does not do so, will receive a 
written 30-day advance notice of removal from the federal 
service. While employees in the competitive service may 
appeal these removals to the MSPB, their chances of prevailing 
are limited since the burden of management's proof is only 
that of providing substantial evidence. That is, if a 
reasonable person would also see that the person could not
perform the work, the removal is upheld. (This is a much
lighter burden to prove than is the preponderance of evidence 
burden required in other removal actions.)
Other modifications of the merit system included the 
establishment of the Senior Executive Service (SES), that 
bureaucratic level of management which would need to be more 
responsive to agency directors or they would not receive
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monetary increases and could be put back into lower level 
management. Also, managers at the GS-13 to GS-15 level were 
taken off the GS pay schedule, classed as General Managers 
(GM) and given pay adjustments based on their performance. 
For general managers, the annual cost of living adjustment 
(COLA) was their comparability pay of which they would 
receive one-half automatically. Any additional increase to 
their pay had to be earned. Marginal performers only received 
comparability pay. It was expected that such arrangements 
would make both the senior executive service and the general 
managers more responsive to the needs of the administration.
Another section of the Act which is paid little attention 
is its provision for research and development. This provision 
allows the establishment of demonstration projects which, in 
fact, enable management to create its own rules outside the 
merit system under the auspices of an experiment. For 
example, a demonstration project the Navy ran at China Lake 
involving pay banding for workers allowed its management to 
disregard grades on pay schedules which is established in law, 
group pay grades, and pay employees at a range of pay within 
the groups. Workers with the same seniority could be paid 
differently depending on how management rated their work. 
This ability to develop demonstration projects gave individual 
managers greater freedoms to handle personnel in accord with 
private sector practices.
The CSRA not only provided greater control to operating
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officials, but it enervated the merit system on several 
counts. The President would now have full control over the 
rules and regulations for which the 0PM would be responsible. 
And for pay or monetary awards, senior executives and general 
managers would need to satisfy their politically appointed 
bosses ' requirements as opposed to adhering more closely to 
bureaucratic rules or the logic or mission of the agency as it 
had been previously established.
Despite the long-standing public and private support for 
revamping civil service employment practices, passage of the 
CSRA did have some opposition, particularly by labor unions 
and veterans groups. To placate labor unions, collective 
bargaining heretofore covered by Executive Order became law 
under Title VII of the CSRA, and the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority (FLRA) was given a consolidated authority to protect 
union activity. And, veterans were able to keep out of the 
act such limitations as restricting veterans preference in 
hiring to a period that ended ten years after their separation 
from the military. Along with proposals to curtail veterans 
preference was the attempt to expand the "rule of three." 
The rule limiting hiring consideration to the top three 
candidates referred by the Office of Personnel Management had 
long been a bone of contention to managers attempting to have 
a wider selection of applicants.
All told, the Civil Service Reform Act with its many 
impingements on the federal civil service merit system could
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be regarded as not only the most significant legislation 
affecting the federal civil service and management of workers 
since the Civil Service Act of 1883, but also the most 
significant for this century. President Reagan's corporate 
review of governmental functions by the President's Private 
Sector Survey (PPSS) on Cost Control in the Federal Government 
(called Grace Commission after its chair, J. Peter Grace) and 
President Bush's attempts to rightsize government have not 
lead to major personnel management legislation or alterations 
of the merit system although the Grace Commission attempted to 
align federal management with corporate management. The 171- 
member executive committee of the Grace Commission, mostly 
comprised of present and past presidents, chief executive 
officers, partners, etc., of large corporations, reads like a 
Who's Who in Corporate America. Focusing on cost containment, 
the Commission, which saw human resource management as 
something that the public and private sectors had in common, 
examined the compensation of federal employees, including 
retirement and fringe benefits, how workers were managed, 
incentives provided and productivity, staffing patterns, 
grading (pay levels of jobs), number of workers per supervisor 
and training and development. Ultimately, their
recommendations reflected the greatest savings by effecting 
changes in human resources management with regard to 
productivity, pensions, compensation, benefits and staffing.
The Commission was concerned with the "brain drain" of
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career executives and felt they were leaving federal service 
because of inadequate pay. On the other hand, most employees 
were seen to be better compensated than those in the private 
sector because federal pay schedules did not factor in 
earnings of state and local public employees (whose pay is 
also established through wage survey formulas) or nonprofit 
organization worJcers. While the Commission had much to say 
about rates of pay, benefit packages, and work direction 
insofar as it related to productivity and therefore cost, its 
recommendations did not seem to have adversely affected the 
merit system. And the present administration's National 
Performance Review does not appear that it will have a great 
impact either, even though reform legislation has received 
constant attention. Even without legislation, however, the 
National Performance Review has provided an avenue for 
controlling workers akin to that of private industry of the 
1980s, cutting jobs.
National Performance Review 
The National Performance Review (NPR), also called 
Reinventing Government and most recently National Partnership 
for Reinventing Government, is, according to President 
Clinton, doing what the smartest companies did in the 1980s, 
cutting back their operations. Following through on campaign 
promises, in February 1993 President Clinton issued Executive 
Order 12839 to cut 100,000 federal positions and unveiled the
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National Performance Review in his remarks on March 3, 1993, 
announcing the initiative to streamline government. In 
addition to reducing work forces, the NPR was to make a 
conscious effort to copy business operations in other ways 
which seemed to make them successful. President Clinton 
appointed Vice President A1 Gore to carry out this initiative 
to make the government "work better and cost less."
John Kamensky (1998, 1997} who participated in the NPR
from the beginning recounts how Vice President Gore led the 
review with an interagency task force of 250 federal workers 
which was supplemented by teams in each agency. And seeing 
private corporations which had led the quality revolution in 
the 197 0s and 1980s as the "models, teachers and partners" of 
the project. Gore also met with business leaders who had 
undergone major changes and were willing to share their 
insights and experience (Gore 1997). These inputs along with 
the reform ideals which had been developed in the Progressive 
Policy Institute, the think tank of the Democratic Leadership 
Council (a policy group of over 750 elected Democrats from 
every state in the nation), framed the focus of the National 
Performance Review.
The progressive ideas stemming from the Democratic 
political party, emphasized the importance of tailoring 
government to market principles. A key principle is that 
economic growth generated in free markets is the prerequisite 
for opportunity for all. It would thus follow that market
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incentives be introduced into the public sector such as
.,.managed competition, public school choice, 
social service vouchers, and market-based ways to 
combat pollution. Just as U.S. businesses have 
reorganized to meet the challenge of global 
competition, a radical revamping of America's 
public sector— schools, public housing, welfare, 
federal, state, and local agencies— is now required 
(Marshall and Schram 1993: xviii) .
David Osborne (1993: 265), presidential advisor on the
National Performance Review and a Fellow of the Progressive
Policy Institute, states that the federal government's goal in
public service organizations should be the same as that in the
private, competitive sector of the economy.
Our goal must be to have public organizations that 
constantly improve, redesign, and innovate; that 
constantly drive their costs down and their quality 
up. After all, a typical business strives to
increase its productivity by 3 to 4 percent every 
year. Why shouldn't government do the same?
Osborne's (1993) comments could apply to any of the wide range
of organizational management issues addressed by the NPR,
however, he also specified a concern with overhauling the
Civil Service system and supported several reforms, many of
which found their way into the NPR's reinvention of human
resource management (HRM) initiative. Consequently, it would
seem that increasing productivity, which without a product has
been defined under HRM 07 as "improved job performance," has
been equally applied to industrial and nonindustrial work.
Thus, inherent in the National Performance Review is the
propensity to evaluate government work in the same manner as
productive work is assessed in the private sector. By the
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1990s, corporate America was judged to have reinvented itself 
in accord with the global economy and the information age. 
The federal government, on the other hand, was charged with 
still being organized and managed according to principles 
appropriate to the industrial age and therefore unable to keep 
up with the present rapidly changing, highly competitive, 
information-rich society and economy. The review to reinvent 
this alleged behemoth was to last six months. And, although 
Vice President Gore wanted the focus to be on things that 
could be done administratively without legislation, some of 
the activities undertaken in response to the review that 
require federal statutes be changed are still ongoing, 
particularly in human resource management which is primarily 
law driven with many rules or practices generated to implement 
the law or respond to "law" as it was developed in the 
judicial system.
The National Performance Review identified several 
barriers and obstacles to effective human resource management: 
complex hiring rules, inflexible classification and pay 
systems, a division between individual performance and 
organizational mission, adversarial labor-management 
relations, and overly restrictive leave practices. To 
overcome these handicaps, the NPR developed 14 recommendations 
grouped into five categories. First, to enable managers to 
build and maintain a quality, diverse work force, a need was 
expressed to create a flexible and responsive hiring system
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(HRM 01) as well as reform the general schedule classification 
and basic pay system (HRM 02) . In this respect, it was 
decided that recruitment and examining programs be 
decentralized and given to agencies to personalize their 
hiring progrcuns and would include the authority to hire 
without ranking when recruitment shortages existed. Further, 
agencies could hire temporary employees indefinitely, these 
employees could compete for permanent jobs in the internal 
career ladder, and, if hired, would face a three-year 
probationary period (as opposed to the present one-year 
requirement for new employees appointed to the competitive 
service) . Also included would be the ability for management 
to promote employees more than once in a year and non- 
competitively detail employees for an extended length of time 
to be determined by the agency. Another essential of the 
merit system which would be opened to management determination 
includes the dispensing of grade/pay levels to workers. By 
removing all grade-level classification criteria from the law 
while retaining the 15-grade structure and by allowing the 
agency to establish a broadbanding pay system built on the 
General Schedule framework, supervisors may vary workers' pay 
despite their performing similar duties.
Although these flexibilities to be accorded to management 
appear to sabotage merit principles by giving a great deal of 
hiring and pay discretion to management, NPR proposes an 
associated grouping of recommendations for holding managers
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accountable for adherence to principles of merit and equal 
opportunity. In this respect NPR recommends improving 
processes and procedures established to provide work place due 
process for employees (HRM 08) , accountability for Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEC) goals and accomplishments (HRM 
09) , and interagency collaboration and cross-training of human 
resource professionals (HRM 10). Employee due process would 
be enhanced, according to NPR, by eliminating mixed-case 
processing (adverse action cases or grievances with EEC issues 
may have those issues reviewed by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission) and by establishing and encouraging 
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods and 
options for the informal disposition of employment disputes. 
Enhancements to the meeting of EEO goals include holding 
federal agency heads (many of whom are political appointees) 
accountable and assigning them the task of incorporating EEO 
and affirmative employment elements into the agency's 
strategic business plan. Toward this integration would also 
be the cross-training and rotational assignments of human 
resource professionals into federal EEO and civil rights 
positions before they are promoted to supervisory and 
management positions. Reporting of EEO/affirmative employment 
reports would be consolidated and totally automated.
Besides recruiting and paying workers, another category 
of recommendations is that of enabling managers to empower, 
develop, train, reward and discipline employees. NPR
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recommended that agencies be authorized to develop programs 
for improvement of individual and organizational performance 
(HRM 03) and incentive award and bonus systems to further 
improve individual and organizational performance (HRM 04). 
Also, to assist management NPR advised that systems to support 
management in dealing with poor performers be strengthened 
(HRM 05) and training be made more market-driven as well as 
tailored toward improving individual and organizational 
performance (HRM 06) . The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) had 
changed the performance management system to accommodate 
management's requirement to hold workers accountable by 
linking performance and pay (to include retention and/or 
recognition) rather than longevity and pay. The NPR, on the 
other hand, not finding that management was reticent about 
dealing with poor performers (although management felt it took 
too much time) suggested that pay and performance be de-linked 
in order to seek improvement to both the present and future 
performance of all employees, including those who were 
performing adequately. In addition to recommending that the 
removal notice period for unacceptable performance be changed 
from 30 days to 15 days, NPR suggested that agencies develop 
their own incentive programs to link individual and 
organizational performance as well as create gainsharing 
programs to recognize employees for efforts which improve 
government operations. Further, any savings realized from 
such reinvention initiatives would be distributed to agencies
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to invest in employee training and development toward the 
improvement of both individual and organizational performance.
Perhaps recognizing the economic need for families to 
keep both parents employed, the NPR directed one section with 
a single recommendation toward employees. To enable employees 
to better manage work and family responsibilities, NPR 
suggested that programs to provide family-friendly work places 
be enhanced (HRM 07) . To the extent that quality customer- 
service or improved job performance is assured, support is to 
be given for flexiplace and telecommuting work arrangements 
and other family-friendly work arrangements. These include 
establishing and funding dependent care programs, allowing 
employees to use sick leave to care for family members, 
recrediting sick leave to reemployed workers, and 
reauthorizing the voluntary leave transfer/bank programs where 
employees donate their annual leave to workers with personal 
or family medical emergencies.
The last category of human resource management 
recommendations provided a method for the changes wrought by 
the NPR to be self-renewing and continually improving. They 
include strengthening the Senior Executive Service (SES) so 
that it becomes a key element in the government-wide culture 
change effort (HRM 11). While SES employees are not viewed as 
chief executive officers (CEOs), they are assigned the 
responsibilities of developing a "corporate perspective" 
toward government-wide culture change, expected to promote an
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executive level succession planning model to provide a 
reservoir of potential replacements, and to be mobile for 
various positions within and between agencies. In other 
words, the SES is expected to keep NPR recommendations and/or 
changes alive during subsequent administrations when they will 
be forming working relationships with different political 
appointees under different administrations. Eliminating 
excessive red tape and automating functions and information 
(HRM 12) was the second prong to this succession objective. 
Phasing out 0PM's Federal Personnel Manual and automating 
personnel processes and accountability measures create an 
indelible structure for carrying out human resource 
management. And, upon advice from CEOs who had reinvented big 
corporations that the NPR initiative could not succeed without 
a true partnership between management and labor (Gore 1996: 
19) , NPR recommended that labor-management partnerships be 
formed (HRM 13) to establish an open forum for the discussion 
and resolution of problems regarding conditions of employment. 
Thus, upon the heels of the six-months review begun in March 
1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12871, Labor- 
Management Partnerships, October 1, 1993, in order to achieve 
the National Performance Review's government reform 
obj ectives.
And, finally, to assure that those who may not be 
supportive of its objectives as well as to accommodate the 
downsizing of the federal work force which was underway, the
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NPR recommended providing incentives to encourage voluntary 
separations (HRM 14) . This recommendation included providing 
agencies with the authority to approve early retirement and 
offer separation pay (normally $25,000 or the amount payable 
as severance pay, whichever is less) , to fund job search 
activities and retraining of employees scheduled to be 
displaced, to expand out-placement services, and in order to 
encourage a turnover in top management, to limit annual leave 
accumulation by SES executives to the 240 hours per annum that 
applies to the rest of the work force.
In addition to the proposed HRM initiatives, other NPR 
actions also affected civil service workers. For instance, 
federal reforms included downsizing, which private companies 
undertook to maintain or increase profit margins when they 
moved assembly—type work in clothing and electronics 
manufacturing activities overseas. Federal agencies
outsourced or let contracts for a substantial amount of work 
to the private sector. Recommendations to merge smaller 
agencies or those with similar charters, followed the lead of 
corporations which had merged smaller companies with larger 
ones to consolidate activities and cut jobs. Even the 
elimination of higher paid employees and hiring new, younger 
and lower paid ones in their places like K-Mart was alleged to 
have done with their managers, seems to appear in HRM 14 where 
federal employees are given inducements to retire or SES 
employees' leave is restricted to provide a further incentive
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for them to retire. And to carry out the principles set forth 
in the NPR, President Clinton issued E. O. 12862, Setting 
Customer Service Standards, which required that federal 
customer service standards be competitive with those in the 
"best" businesses. Thus, business methods were to revitalize 
federal employment practices.
Civil Service Rules and Reforms
Two themes surface in a review of proposed or effected 
reforms to federal employment procedures. Since the Civil 
Service Act, attempts to make federal agencies operate more 
efficiently result in employment practices which are 
consistently modeled after private sector practices despite 
the fact that government work is not for-profit corporate 
work. And, in so doing, there has been a continuous movement 
toward regaining elements of simple control, many of which 
were yielded under the Civil Service Act.
Once the Civil Service Act had established the rules for 
civil service employment, subsequent major attempts at reform 
have most often been directed toward changing or curtailing 
those rules rather than any particular practice not covered by 
rules. And, even though a reform review may be prompted for 
political reasons to gain public support by denigrating the 
civil service or to achieve greater partisan control over 
Executive Branch agencies, business economic efficiency has 
been seen to be the desirable management style for government
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operations not only generally but also with regard to 
personnel management.
With the exception of the Brownlow Committee which was 
comprised of two public administrators and a political 
scientist. Presidents normally appeal to the business sector 
to conduct efficiency studies of the federal government. The 
Hoover Commissions were replete with private sector 
representatives, and they documented a concern with the 
government competing with private industry. They, too, 
advanced the notion of a career executive service to be paid 
at much higher rates, and they noted that employer-employee 
relations lagged behind American industry.
And, although President Carter's Personnel Management 
Project has been viewed as a political initiative generated by 
politicians and/or a response to political rhetoric on the 
campaign trail (Cole 1982-83), and though it was worked by 
federal agency representatives, it did seek private sector 
views during congressional hearings. It also considered 
others which had been fashioned much earlier, such as the 
Senior Executive Service which brought to fruition proposals 
by the Brownlow Committee and the Hoover Commissions. On the 
other hand. President Reagan's Private Sector Survey on Cost 
Control Commission comprised of corporate leaders exhibited a 
straightforward private sector involvement in attempting to 
redesign federal administration. Almost all of their efforts 
centered around looking at how federal programs, work
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processes, etc., compared to those in the private sector.
The National Performance Review, too, may appear to be a 
political attempt to transform government processes since it 
was the fulfillment of campaign promises, but its objective of 
recreating government in the image and likeness of private 
industry is more similar to its predecessors' concern with 
business practices. Executive Order 12862 explicitly requires 
"continual reform of the executive branch's management 
practices and operations to provide service to the public that 
matches or exceeds the best service available in the private 
sector." And, Vice President Gore's publication Businesslike 
Government Lessons Learned from America 's Best Companies 
dispels any doubt that the NPR sought to incorporate private 
sector business practices. Such propensity for applying the 
private sector's standards of economic efficiency to 
government management is pursued despite less than 
satisfactory outcomes in the private sector.
President Clinton's efforts to reform health care, for 
example, was a major failure that has been largely attributed 
to using a business perspective which did not fit the 
government environment. Goddard and Riback (1998: 61-7 8)
reveal how the successful business consultant Ira Magaziner, 
who had been hired to help design the new national health care 
system, found himself mired in over-involvement. His 
business-oriented 12-member task force grew to over 500 people 
as politicians and other interested parties pressured the
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White House to be represented. Just delivering progress 
reports to these numbers debilitated the planning process. 
And the secrecy which is an important tool in business 
planning or corporate mergers generated suspicion and 
animosity when it was used in this situation. Thus while some 
private sector methods may be adaptable to government work, 
many are not since government work must get public permission 
to operate.
Nevertheless, the NPR's application of business practices 
to civil service employment reflects a plethora of methods 
which have had only more or less success in the private 
sector. Mergers, for example, which has been a popular way to 
improve profit margins have been reported to not work very 
often {Business Week 1985) . And, if one of the most common 
blunders in a merger is an assumption that the skills honed in 
one business can be readily applied to another, then promoting 
the mobility of senior executives between agencies may be 
nonproductive when their cultures conflict. It is suspected 
that senior Department of Defense executives would have a much 
different philosophy from that of executives honed in tax 
collection activities of the Internal Revenue Service or the 
distribution of pensions in the Veterans Administration. And, 
since corporate cultures with values developed around the 
company's activities may be hard to change {Business Week 
1984, 1980) , such mobility between federal agencies could have 
the effect of keeping civil service management off balance
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which could provide more opportunities for political 
appointees to implement partisan policies.
Further, several human resource management objectives 
seem to dovetail with management principles popularized by Dr. 
W. Edwards Deming's (1993) total quality management and Peters 
and Waterman's (1982) quest for excellence. These views were 
seen to undergird Japanese business practices and extolled for 
Japan's economic successes during the 1980s. Yet, Japan's 
economic successes have also been traced to adverse working 
conditions and a large supply of poorly paid female labor. 
(See "The Japan They Don't Talk About" video and Ginsbourger 
1981.)
Appealing to the private sector may also account for 
reforms reflecting a movement toward giving management greater 
control over workers. The issue of control was most apparent 
in the work provided by the Grace Commission as its chief 
executive officers and other leaders compared federal 
processes to the way work was accomplished in the private 
sector. While appraising worker performance was important and 
was recommended to be given greater weight in force 
reductions, of larger concern was extracting more work from 
the employees. The Grace Commission pointed out that by 
increasing the number of supervisors and having them tightly 
control the work flow by executing daily and weekly plans and 
rewarding employees for meeting or surpassing goals, they 
would be able to increase productivity per worker and thereby
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reduce the need for overtime, contracting jobs to the private 
sector or hiring large number of temporary employees.
Such methods had been the conventional means for 
extracting greater work from workers. And, as might have been 
expected, the number of federal workers increased during the 
Reagan administration. But the wisdom by which corporations 
operated changed dramatically during the 1980s and downsizing 
labor forces (seeking cheaper labor or increasing the profit 
margin) became an accepted practice. Corporations also 
increased the use of peripheral workers who were paid less 
with fewer benefit packages. By the 1990s under the Clinton 
administration, the federal government followed suit and went 
beyond its mandated 100,000 reduction eliminating 309,000 
workers (Gore 1997). It also stepped up the outsourcing of 
work to the private sector which helps reduce the number and 
cost of workers, although it does not necessarily reduce the 
overall cost to the government. And, the NPR recommended the 
increased use of temporary workers peripheral to the 
competitive classified system. Although control over work in 
the manner done in private industry has been most apparent 
under the NPR, it has been a continuing concern in attempts at 
reforming the civil service. Three major areas of control 
which have received continuing attention include hiring and 
pay practices, performance appraisal and removal procedures.
The primary method of control which was taken from 
management by the Civil Service Act, that of recruiting and
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examining potential workers, has been repeatedly addressed. 
Without legislation, however, no significant change has 
occurred. The Hoover Commissions recommended that the primary 
responsibility for recruiting and examining workers be placed 
on the departments and agencies but that their programs be 
approved by the Civil Service Commission before they were put 
into effect. They also suggested an end to the "rule of 
three" which has limited management's hiring options to the 
top three candidates. This alleged impediment to hiring the 
best candidate was further discussed during the development of 
the CSRA, but did not get changed. Not only has the rule of 
three persevered, but veterans' preference, which often 
assures the top three are veterans, remains. The NPR 
recommended several changes to afford management greater 
control over the hiring process. Hiring temporary workers 
with different rules of employment, for example, would be a 
great benefit to management inasmuch as dismissing temporary 
employees is done easily and quickly. They do not get the due 
process afforded permanent employees in the competitive 
service. And by allowing them to compete for permanent jobs 
in the internal career ladder with a three-year probationary 
period, those selected would continue to serve as at-will 
employees vulnerable to termination. Hiring without ranking 
means that supervisors could pass over the best qualified 
candidate to select anyone who meets basic job qualifications. 
Another significant NPR proposal which would allow management
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to control the pay of employees would be the elimination of 
classification standards for differentiating pay grades and 
then broadbanding or grouping pay rates. This would enable 
supervisors to set worker's pay at any level within the group 
they feel is warranted. These classification and pay 
recommendations were made with the knowledge gained from 
demonstration projects that broadbanding pay by grouping grade 
levels may not fit all situations and can lead to increased 
salary costs in the absence of skilled managers, appropriate 
budget controls and an effective performance management 
system. Apparently, giving the supervisor greater control 
over the worker is more important than containing labor costs.
Assuring adequate work performance has been a continuing 
concern in reviews of federal work. Both Hoover Commissions 
addressed the topic. The first Hoover Commission recommended 
the adoption of ability and service record ratings to appraise 
ability, past performance, progress and potential usefulness 
to the organization. These ratings, however should stand 
alone and not be linked with periodic salary increases, 
considered in reductions in force, or used as a basis for 
removal actions. The second Hoover Commission also advocated 
efficiency ratings but felt they should be simplified to make 
the process easier and less time consuming for supervisors. 
Ratings should only be done annually for the purpose of 
identifying employees who warrant further development and 
awards, those who may be malassigned in their present
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positions or who do not deserve a pay increase, and those who 
should be dismissed. Further, any appeals should be limited 
to one level within the agency. The Civil Service Reform Act 
took an even stronger stance and linked performance 
evaluations to periodic increases, awards and dismissals for 
unacceptable performance if no improvement is made after 
assistance is provided. The National Performance Review, 
however, was also not satisfied with the performance appraisal 
system. Rather than linking pay with performance evaluations, 
NPR decided they should be disconnected and a new system be 
developed with the sole objective of improving individual and 
organizational performance. With the NPR view of productivity 
as "improved job performance," even top ratings will require 
improvements over the previous work accomplished. Thus, 
performance evaluation will be a continuous process toward 
extracting greater amounts of actual labor from labor power, 
and additional pay for the added work is not required.
Another control mechanism which receives recurring 
attention in reviews of federal employment procedures is 
dismissing workers. Supervisors, according to the NPR, wish 
to have simplified procedures and the ability to take 
immediate action to remove workers. In other words, 
supervisors want to have personal control over these actions. 
This desire for a simple, clear-cut and "intelligent" 
procedure for discharging incompetent or undesirable civil 
service employees was presented in both Hoover Commissions and
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supposedly found fruition in the Civil Service Reform Act 
(CSRA). CSRA removal procedures for unacceptable performance 
continued the requirement for a 30-day notice period (also 
mentioned in the Hoover reports) and gave greater credence to 
the supervisor's views, as opposed to the employee's, in any 
appeal so long as the dismissal was not unreasonable and was 
supported by factual evidence. The NPR had little to improve 
upon in this regard, but did recommend that the 30-day removal 
notice period be lessened to 15 days. Of course these 
procedures only applied to employees who had completed the 
probationary period. Newly-appointed civil service worleers 
could be released during the probationary period with a two- 
week notice and only an opportunity to have a higher level 
agency management official review the action. The NPR did 
want, however, to encourage supervisors to take action and 
suggested that they not only be supported in their efforts to 
remove employees, but that they be given training as needed to 
improve their ability to either improve performance or remove 
poor performers.
Although the NPR, too, has recommended significant 
changes to the federal merit system, limiting laws which 
prevent the full implementation of proposed reforms still 
govern the hiring process, performance evaluation and removal 
procedures. For example. Public Law 104-52, Treasury, Postal 
Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1996, 
addressed the creation of a flexible and responsive hiring
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system and the creation of family-friendly workplaces. 
However, delegating examining authority to federal agencies, 
for example, has created a greater workload for agencies at a 
time when the NPR, by Presidential Memorandum of September 11, 
1993, reduced the numbers of positions associated with 
personnel management control structures by half. It has not, 
however, changed the hiring process, just where it occurs. 
And through 1998, temporary employment laws had not changed, 
nor had the 30-day notice period for removing poor performers 
from the competitive service. And, Public Law 103-226, The 
Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, addressed the 
training of workers and provided incentives to encourage 
voluntary separations but had no significant impact on the 
hiring, firing or rewarding of workers.
Extracting more work from federal worker labor power may 
have a consensus, but crafting legislation that will get 
enacted is another issue which must be faced for significant 
changes to occur. For the most part only noncontroversial 
proposals regarding employee benefits and veterans preference 
have been able to be passed. Thus, despite a history of 
attempting to regain more control over civil service workers, 
the Clinton administration has not been successful in 
achieving any major legislative reform of the federal civil 
service merit system. A major opposition that all reform 
activity faces and which may account for the lack of major 
reforms at this time is found in the federal labor movement.
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Influences of Federal Labor Unions
Although ever present, federal labor organizations began 
to thrive in the 1960s when President Kennedy's Executive 
Order 10 988, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal 
Service, officially sanctioned them. Initially, most federal 
workers associated with private sector trades and craft, 
industrial or local unions. Retaining association with a 
trade union was especially helpful to workers who moved in and 
out of government employment. But as federal employees came 
to see their differences from their private sector brethren, 
they moved to form units which also recognized their community 
of interests as federal workers, albeit under the auspices of 
private sector unions. Others, however, such as Post Office 
workers did not have counterparts in private industry and 
formed their own units which were sought out for affiliation 
by the American Federation of Labor (Spero 1972). In brief, 
there was a continuous association between the organization of 
workers in the private sector and those in the public sector 
whether by trade, industry or local unions.
The testimony by Samuel Gompers, President of the 
American Federation of Labor, and other labor officials at the 
Taylor hearings in 1911 and 1912, for example, although 
presented on behalf of federal labor, represented the 
interests of workers whether they were employed in the private 
sector or the federal sector. The first hint that this
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association between public and private labor would be abridged
started in 1912 with the first legal recognition of federal
labor, a milestone in federal labor-management relations.
Section 6 of the 1912 Postal Service Appropriations Act
(referred to as the Lloyd LaFollette Act) not only brought the
removal procedures initiated by President McKinley under the
law for all civil service wor Jeers, but also prohibited adverse
actions be taJcen against postal employees for their belonging
to organizations dedicated to improving worJcing conditions.
Specifically, the law established
...That membership in any society, association, 
club, or other form of organization of postal 
employees not affiliated with any outside 
organization imposing an obligation or duty upon 
them to engage in any striJce, or proposing to 
assist them in any strilce, against the United 
States, having for its objects, among other things, 
improvements in the condition of labor of its 
members, including hours of labor and compensation 
therefor and leave of absence, by any person or 
groups of persons in said postal service, or the 
presenting by any such person or groups or persons 
of any grievance or grievances to the Congress or 
any Member thereof shall not constitute or be cause 
for reduction in rank or compensation or removal of 
such person or groups of persons from said service 
(37 Statute 555).
Further, all civil service workers, individually or
collectively, were given the right to appeal to congressional
representatives. This provision may have been, the greatest
advantage federal employee unions have received. It enabled
them to lobby congressional representatives who make the rules
on pay, promotion, tenure, etc. that govern federal
employment. And although Samuel Gompers worked for passage of
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this act (Spero 1972) , the recognition of federal labor 
organizations apart from the private sector seems to be the 
start of a move toward truncating the tie between private and 
public worker organizations.
Groups affiliated with outside organizations which 
advocated strikes were excluded from such protection. Also 
this earliest legislation intimates that the power of strikes 
is not advocated for federal workers. It was not until 1947, 
however, that the federal employee strike ban was clearly 
enunciated in an amendment of the National Labor Relations Act 
(Public Law 101, June 23, 1947). At this time not only were 
strikes by government employees established as unlawful, but 
federal employees who participated in strikes against the 
government were to be discharged immediately, forfeiting their 
civil service status.
The next turning point in federal labor relations came in 
1962 when their autonomy as federal labor unions, some of 
which had come into existence in the 1800s, was established by 
President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management 
Cooperation in the Federal Service. E. O. 10988 and President 
Kennedy's Memorandum in 1963 adding standards of conduct for 
employee organizations and a code of fair labor practices in 
the federal service laid the groundwork for the provisions 
found in Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
This foundation, however, was changed several times. In 
response to suggestions from labor unions and management.
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President Johnson (1967) designated a committee to identify 
the deficiencies which needed addressing, but did not initiate 
change. In 1969, however. President Nixon revoked President 
Kennedy's Executive Order and Memorandum and reestablished, 
with greater specification, the rights of federal labor unions 
in Executive Order 114 91, Labor-Management Relations in the 
Federal Service. Several further amendments to include adding 
grievance and arbitration procedures were made before E.O. 
114 91 was incorporated into the Civil Service Reform Act to 
gain labor cooperation in its passage.
Also to gain cooperation from the unions. President 
Clinton went a step further, but without legislation. Under 
President Clinton's Executive Order 12871, October 1, 1993,
Labor-Management Partnerships, federal union and management 
officials are directed to operate as full partners to help 
reform the federal government by identifying problems and 
crafting solutions to better serve the agency's customers and 
mission, finding consensual methods of dispute resolution, and 
negotiating over the formerly permissive areas of bargaining 
in 5 use 7106(b)(1).
The measure of the best advice from CEOs that was taken 
by the National Performance Review may be found in this last 
requirement to bargain over the CSRA-established elective 
topics of "...the numbers, types, and grades of employees or 
positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work 
project, or tour of duty, or on the technology, methods, and
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means of performing work." This requirement bears a strong 
resemblance to work teaims in private industry where work 
methods seem to have moved full circle from the scientific 
management method of performing work; workers in teams are 
involved in making the decisions regarding how the work is 
accomplished.
An appeal to replicate the methods for performing work in 
private industry is also continued in the application of 
federal partnerships. Training material on labor-management 
partnerships used by the U. S. Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service (undated), for example, highlights an 
article by Aaron Bernstein [Business Week, May 23, 1994) which 
chronicles a labor-management change in the private sector 
from adversarial relationships to collaborative ones in 
corporations such as Ford, Xerox, and Scott Paper where 
workers gained wage concessions when worker teams fed big 
efficiency gains. This was contrary to the 1980s experience 
when the pay increases for private sector union members lagged 
behind those for nonunion ones and fringe benefits were 
steadily eroding as unions lost membership and power. Because 
some unions in productive work faced with survival of the 
organization moved toward a "we're-in-this-together" attitude 
and began to work with management toward mutually beneficial 
outcomes, partnership suggests federal management and labor 
should follow suit. In face of federal downsizing with a 
concomitant loss in union membership, gaining union support
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would be especially significant in order to "championship 
change in the federal government to transform the government 
into an organization that promotes excellence, providing 
quality services to the American people" (U.S. FMCS undated: 
12) .
Partnership, however, has had to rely on the willingness 
of individuals and is further restricted in the language of 
the executive order which demands that its provisions occur 
"to the extent permitted by law." According to the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority (98 FLRR 1-1118) the executive 
order's direction that agencies bargain permissive areas is 
not an election to bargain made on behalf of executive 
agencies and remains therefore at the discretion of the 
agencies as stated in 5 USC 7106 (b) (1) . The extent to which 
labor has benefitted from Partnership is not clear. Most 
unions are still faced with a business of handling employee 
complaints unless agencies allow them to participate in the 
more substantive methods and means of determining work. Many 
agencies, on the other hand, feel they have benefitted insofar 
as partnership has helped reduce the number of grievances and 
unfair labor practice charges they have had to process.
Thus, the global environment in which manufacturing 
activities shift large portions of productive work outside the 
country is recreated in federal work as federal work is 
contracted to be accomplished by the private sector and work 
forces are downsized. And, federal labor organizations.
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albeit smaller, continue to eke out small concessions at the 
level of exerting their influence in congressional lobbying 
activities. Federal labor's greatest force which has gained 
it concessions is found in its ability to persuade 
congressional officials to support or oppose federal 
employment legislation.
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THEOEIETICAL DISCUSSION OF WORK PRACTICES 
AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND FORMS
The process by which private work sector practices are 
recreated in the federal workplace can be viewed from three 
theoretical perspectives : social pluralism, structural Marxism 
and instrumentalism or class dominance theory. While all 
perspectives seem to provide an aspect of meaning for the work 
practices implemented and civil service reforms that have 
occurred, their variation helps to transcend the unique sets 
of circumstances surrounding the changes. A review of the 
questions within these frameworks this research posed (see 
Chapter 3, Theoretical Considerations) is now offered to 
clarify how private sector work practices become implemented 
in the federal sector.
Civil Service Act of 1883 
The greatest reform of the federal civil service 
employment procedures occurred with the Civil Service Act of 
1883. The Civil Service Act reflects decentralized power at 
the level of interest and ultimately a consolidation of 
interests at the Congressional level. Many groups were
154
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concerned with the reform of the civil service and were 
pressing for regulating employment practices, not only at the 
federal level but at the state and local levels as well. 
Partisan office holders, advocates of the progressive 
movement, mothers who associated political patronage with 
other social ills, reformers, and the general public all 
sought change.
These groups became focused on patronage politics with 
its wholesale removal of workers from one administration and 
their replacement by the next. While the practice was felt to 
have grown out of the Tenure-of-Office Act of 1820 which 
required vacating nearly all the executive offices of the 
government every four years, it was seen as a method for 
Representatives and Senators to use minor offices to bribe the 
people to keep themselves in power. Yet, because the 
appointed workers were often unable to perform the work, as 
well as there being graft and corruption In some agencies such 
as the customs houses, the federal civil service came to be 
characterized in such negative ways as an asylum for 
incompetents or a place in which work was provided based on 
poverty and incapacity to otherwise obtain a livelihood (U.S. 
CSC 1898). It became a public issue.
As a public issue, the Civil Service Act fulfilled the 
aims of the many groups whether they were based in morality, 
on efficiency, for safety, or sense of fairness. Their aims 
came together in the Civil Service Act's requirement that
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federal workers be individuals who were qualified and capable 
of performing the work, not people selected because of their 
political support.
While the passage of the Civil Service Act may reflect 
changes stemming from the general public, it also represents 
a situation where the state was looking out for its own 
interests. The spoils' system had become life-threatening; 
the assassination of President Garfield hastened its passage 
and assured its continued funding. Further, the thousands of 
individuals seeking government jobs had become an imposition 
on office holders.
Overall, the Act was more identifiable with the needs of 
the government than with industrial interests. Elected 
officials were beginning to fear for their own safety, the job 
of finding places for constituents had become burdensome, and 
the electorate was becoming more anxious about the 
inefficiency inherent in the political patronage system. In 
addition, the restrictive merit system the Civil Service Act 
established was a departure from private industry's hiring 
practices and, therefore, does not tend to support the notion 
of elitist involvement either. Notwithstanding the fact that 
corporate economic power had not yet congealed to become a 
force in government operations, it also does not appear that 
powerful industrialists were directly involved, as could have 
been the case insofar as Mills' (1956) elites were directly 
involved in controlling political parties, buying laws or
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checking Congressional actions.
Whether the Civil Service Act reflected working class or 
capitalist interests, or both, is not clear from the brief 
excursion taken by this research. However, it could be argued 
they were contrary to capitalist class interests. Although 
extended simple control was still featured in private 
industry, it was being limited in federal employment. The 
Civil Service Act restricted the bosses' ability to hire whom 
they wished. Its intent was to discriminate among workers 
according to their knowledge, skills and abilities rather than 
whom they knew or supported politically.
Further, it would appear from the documentation by the 
U.S. Civil Service Commission of its earliest history and by 
the public concern shown in the media, that civil service 
reform did not, at least not directly, stem from a class 
struggle, did not encourage or retard working class unity, did 
not seek greater productivity outright, nor did it appear to 
come from industrial interests. Rather, it had long been a 
public concern and had been politically debated over many 
years and confronted to the extent of having had reform 
legislation enacted and dropped a decade earlier.
Thus, a retrospective of the passage of the Civil Service 
Act is clearly articulated using the social pluralist view. 
The urgency for change arose from the general public and was 
joined by legislators in a state action which benefitted many. 
Trust in government was restored to the public, and political
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parties could expect fewer encumbrances and enjoy a safer 
public environment. Those individuals who were hired under 
the Act could also expect to maintain their employment 
regardless of which political party was in office. The 
history of the removal of scientific management from the 
workplace, however, discloses an opposite image.
Scientific Management Reconsidered 
In this particular case, the primary contenders were 
labor and management from both sectors of the economy. 
Neither the implementation of the principles of scientific 
management nor their removal was a result of democratic action 
originating with groups wanting change. It is not explainable 
using the social pluralist argument. Scientific management 
did not originate with the general public, was not an affair 
of partisan politics, nor did it come from companies seeking 
contracts with the government. Rather, the principles of 
scientific management were arranged according to capitalist 
interests and presented a win-lose situation between 
management and labor. They offered the employer both greater 
productivity and greater control over workers. At the same 
time, the workers who became cogs in an assembly line of work 
activity moved by principles of extracting maximum labor 
output could only experience a loss. Of course, labor opposed 
this determination to remove decision-making authority over 
the labor process from the workers.
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Since the introduction of scientific management in 
federal work can be linked to representatives of the upper 
class and their relationships with top governmental officials, 
the class dominance view of industrial/upper class involvement 
in effecting public sector decisions is supported to some 
extent. On the other hand, the elimination of this work 
practice, brought about with an appeal to the same top 
officials as well as to Congressional representatives, may be 
attributed to the challenge presented by the workers through 
their labor organizations. These actions are more
understandable in the context of the structural Marxist 
argument.
Working class unity was evident in federal employment as 
was capitalist class unity. The Senate hearings in 1912 to 
learn about scientific management and again in 1916 to 
determine whether specific legislation banning it from federal 
employment should be enacted found the National Association of 
Manufacturers, businessmen, and federal military managers on 
one side of the issue and public and private sector unions on 
the other side. Both sides presented their arguments.
Although the presentation of capitalist interests seemed 
to have been limited in the 1912 hearings which were held to 
learn about practices that federal workers were dissatisfied 
with, management presented a vigorous defense of scientific 
management in the 1916 hearings concerning legislation to ban 
its use. Not only did businessmen who used the principles of
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 6 0
scientific management in their firms testify to its benefits, 
but they also introduced employee testimonials favoring 
working under the principles of scientific management. Their 
argument could have been the most convincing. However, the 
hearings were held during a period of great labor strife in 
the United States and appeasing labor could prevent further 
disruptions and worker walkouts. Further, organized labor had 
consistently worked toward the removal of the principles of 
scientific management, almost before scientific management was 
introduced. Seeing Taylor's book on a supervisor's desk was 
enough to suggest to labor they take some action at the Rock 
Island arsenal. And the subcommittee hearings provided the 
audience organized labor sought to publicly display all that 
was wrong with the principles of scientific management, which 
they had been presenting to military leaders.
The extent to which Congressmen were swayed based on 
their own political ambitions to pass legislation favoring 
labor's position is not clear. However, it could be imputed 
that they were attempting to please both sides. The 
legislation specifically to ban scientific management (H.R.
8 665) did not pass, yet the implementation of scientific 
management was stopped by the inclusion of prohibitions in 
appropriations bills.
There is no doubt that it was politically efficacious to 
stop the use of scientific management in the agencies where it 
was protested, yet not ban it in federal employment generally.
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The distressed workers and their labor organizations achieved 
their goal by not having to work under time management or the 
bonus system. And, management achieved its goal of keeping 
the door open for the use of scientific management in the 
federal work place.
Whether this outcome was happenstance or the state was 
looking out for its own interests could be conjecture. On the 
other hand, the fact that the legislation which business 
interests rejected was not passed did support capitalist class 
interests; their overall support and use of scientific 
management in the private sector remained intact. The riders 
on appropriations bills just kept it from being used in 
productive government work. And, the appeasement of both 
sides of the issue does suggest that it was a politically 
expedient decision.
By accommodating labor interests which stood in 
opposition to the general move toward the greater efficiency 
and economy of government operations, it would appear that the 
"split decision" does attest to the notion that while it 
generally supported capitalist relations, it was more 
responsive to the needs of the political system. To placate 
labor and win their allegiance while not upsetting capitalist 
efforts toward gaining greater amounts of labor from the labor 
power they purchased could not only ensure a modicum of labor- 
management harmony but could also elicit political support 
from both sides. While the decision may have left both sides
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wondering how much they had achieved, legislative action 
regarding civil service employment has consistently taken 
labor into account. Labor was at the forefront of passage of 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the greatest overhaul of 
civil service procedures since the Civil Service Act of 1883.
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
A cursory review of the development of the Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA) may leave one with the impression that it 
emanated from within the civil service. The President's 
Personnel Management Project staff was appointed to analyze 
the civil service operations and develop reforms to meet 
President Carter's objectives. These included restructuring 
the institutions that ran the civil service, safeguarding 
against abuses of official power, reducing red tape and 
delays, speeding up grievance processing and disciplinary 
actions, and making equal employment opportunities more 
effective (U.S. Senate 1978a: 7). It was headed by a retired 
civil servant and comprised almost totally of civil service 
bureaucrats representing about 30 different agencies. Thus, 
it could appear to have been an internal review since there 
were only seven members from outside the civil service: two 
corporations, three universities, the House of 
Representatives, and the Brookings Institution. In spite of 
the legislation having been crafted by civil servants, 
however, a closer look reveals many similarities between CSRA
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provisions and the proposals made by the Hoover Commissions.
Hoover Commission views that seem to have reappeared in 
the Civil Service Reform Act included their recommendation for 
a reorganization of the Civil Service Commission and how it 
operated, shifting primary responsibility for recruiting and 
examining to agencies, eliminating the rule-of-three in 
hiring, greater emphasis on recruiting the best for junior 
professional, scientific, technical, and administrative jobs; 
increasing the pay for top civil-service employees with 
exceptional professional, scientific, technical and 
administrative qualifications; simplifying the efficiency 
rating system; changing reduction-in-force rules to assure the 
best employees are kept; and amending the rules dealing with 
dismissals so as to provide a more workable method for 
separating inefficient employees (U.S. Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government: 194 9).
One of the signature pieces of the CSRA legislation was 
a simplified process for removing employees who could not do 
the work for which they were hired. Another key feature was 
the establishment of a Senior Executive Service to replace 
grades GS-16 through GS-18 and merit pay for the next lower 
echelon of general managers from grades GS-13 through GS-15. 
Reduction-in-force rules were changed to factor in performance 
appraisal rating information to be used along with length of 
service in determining retention standing. Beyond giving the 
President the authority to delegate personnel management
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 6 4
functions to the new Office of Personnel Management (0PM), it 
also gave OPM authority to delegate most of its functions to 
the agencies. Consequently, regardless of the individuals 
chosen to draft proposals for the Civil Service Reform Act, 
many of them had been drafted 20-30 years earlier by a 
commission comprising many individuals from the business 
community using private industry as their model. In this 
respect private sector views were brought with little change 
across into the legislation. The Civil Service Reform Act, 
however, had caught the attention of many groups and as such 
may appear to have been the outcome of a democratic process.
Unlike the hearings held regarding legislation to remove 
scientific management from the workplace which were attended 
by labor and industrial interests, many groups spoke out at 
the CSRA hearings or submitted documents/statements regarding 
the legislation. There were corporate representatives, public 
and private labor organizations, veteran groups, public 
administration associations, women's groups, minority groups, 
engineering societies, management groups, legal associations, 
consumer advocates, etc. It would seem that the "general 
public" was interested in the proposed legislation. When 
taking a closer look at the special interests of the groups 
represented, however, worker groups predominate followed by 
public personnel management. As might be expected with any 
legislation affecting workers, this civil service employment 
legislation was an issue between management and workers.
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However, there was a fragmentation of worker concerns.
The disparities in worker interests seem to follow the 
different aspects of the legislation, but also reflect a 
fragmentation of the working class in society. Ostensibly, 
women's groups and minority groups were most interested in the 
sections of the law dealing with the establishment of the 
Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program; veteran groups 
were concerned about proposals to restrict veterans' 
preference in employment, with disabled veterans focusing on 
special employment provisions for them; and, labor 
organizations were concerned with legislation which supported 
their right to bargain collectively- This fragmentation of 
effort, however, may be responsible for provisions contrary to 
worker interests getting passed, such as the performance 
appraisal provisions and the clarification of removal and 
other adverse action procedures.
When scientific management threatened workers' 
employment, labor organizations were organized around crafts 
and trades and primarily composed of white male wage earners. 
At the time of the CSEIA, after the social upheavals of the 
1960s along with civil rights legislation in 1964 and federal 
equal opportunity in employment legislation in 1972, women and 
minorities were seeking to assure their lawful rights were 
assured. Veterans' groups had long established their need to 
provide a distinct voice on behalf of veterans rights as was 
evidenced in their establishment of the National Association
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of Government Employees (NAGE). In brief, labor organizations 
did not adequately represent the interests of women, 
minorities and veterans. And, in the instance of the CSEIA, 
labor organizations were apparently more concerned with their 
legal recognition than with particular issues affecting 
workers and/or the concerns of specific groups of workers. 
Despite the fragmentation in the working class, all these 
worker groups received some benefits from the CSRA legislation 
which, in turn, further emphasized their differences, causing 
them to lose sight of their interests in common.
When looking at which group's concerns prevail with 
regard to civil service employment rules, it would seem that 
management interests brought in through the recommendations 
identified by the Hoover Commissions established the core 
controls over work with extraneous provisions handed to labor 
organizations and other groups. Additionally, contemporary 
business interests were encouraging changes which reflected 
private sector practices. The Committee for Economic 
Development (CED) , which had set up an "Improvement of 
Management in Government" activity in 1962, clearly expressed 
that civil service reform was good corporate business because 
no group must work more or interface more with the government 
than the American business community.
Not only did the CED strongly support the newly 
established Office of Personnel Management being directly 
responsible to the President, but it also saw no problem with
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political appointees running agencies and suggested they be 
increased from 10 percent to 15 percent of the positions. 
Such a position understandably favors business interests 
inasmuch as political appointees often come from the corporate 
community.
Prior to the CSRA hearings, the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Executive 
Session Hearings, Watergate and Related Activities: Use of
Incumbency-Responsiveness Program, as reported in the Malek 
Manual (1976: 429—508), noted that notwithstanding the civil 
service merit system, so many appointees come from the 
business world into an administration that there is a tendency 
for managers to equate government with corporate life and to 
manage accordingly. It further advised that political and 
patronage appointees were necessary for the President to 
achieve political control in order to be able to control 
programs and management and to make policy.
Hence, despite the presentation of many views and the 
accommodation of many in the legislation, capitalist interests 
were served as seen in the core worker control issues that 
were supported in the CSRA. And, fragmentation of the working 
class with an appeal to their differences opened it to 
manipulation and kept it from effectively challenging these 
provisions.
The presence of civil servants in the framing of the CSRA 
does not seem to support the instrumentalist position of the
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new ideas stemming from policy groups, foundations, think 
tanks, or university research institutes. Conversely, when 
reviewing the normal involvement of the Brookings Institution, 
for example, in federal government operations, there appears 
to be a more encompassing connection than just their presence 
on the President's Personnel Management Project. As early as 
1923, the Brookings Institution started training students for 
public service, and by 1980 they had federal executive fellows 
who were supervised by a senior staff member. However, not 
only does the institute train individuals for public service, 
but it continues to train civil servants. Extrapolating from 
their contemporary training activities which target federal 
executives along with businessmen and provide courses designed 
to teach the relationship between business and government, it 
becomes apparent that the federal employment policies 
evidenced in the Civil Service Reform Act, if not directly 
attributable to outside influences such as were provided by 
the Hoover Commissions, have at least been filtered through 
ideas developed in privately financed and/or controlled policy 
planning networks.
Again, the Civil Service Reform Act did not contain 
reforms which were solely derived from the work experience or 
perceived needs of those involved in government work. And 
although those ideas may have been appropriated from private 
sector business practices, they had to undergo the political 
process of gaining legislative approval which can prove
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difficult inasmuch as issues may be redesigned during 
congressional deliberations. Further, it was clear that Title 
VII was included to indulge the growing federal labor 
organizations which made it clear that they wanted statutory 
recognition for collective bargaining. Thus, not only was the 
CSRA the result of President Carter making good on campaign 
promises, but the assortment of interests reflected in its 
provisions is a political statement; the legislation appears 
to give many things to many people. And some things which did 
not make it into the legislation, such as restricting the use 
of veterans preference, have less to do with employment needs 
since they act to restrict whom management may select than 
they do to fulfill political commitments. Nevertheless, the 
central work force controls first identified in the Hoover 
Commissions were not abridged.
The CSRA's two most significant changes were handing 
personnel management over to partisan political control and 
implementing provisions for the greater control of workers. 
This legislation was able to support business interests 
generally while it provided for greater state control. 
Accordingly, the CSRA appears to have been a situation where 
the state was looking out for its own interests. The most 
recent attempt at civil service employment reform, the 
National Performance Review, albeit a political program, has 
attempted to avoid the uncertainties of the legislative 
process in favor of administrative reforms and has.
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nonetheless, extended a peace offering to labor.
National Performance Review
The National Performance Review (NPR) has been a 
political program from its inception with an openly stated 
objective of implementing business practices in the federal 
sector. It has not appealed to the general public for sources 
of change; it has appealed to the business community for 
sources of change. The NPR has only appealed to the general 
public for reasons to change, particularly seeking anecdotal 
evidence, and to gain its approval for actions taken. A 
similar appeal has been made to federal workers.
Vice President Gore's (1993) publication Creating a 
Government that Works Better & Costs Less Report of the 
National Performance Review is sprinkled with personal 
examples given by dissatisfied civil service workers, military 
members, bureaucrats and others associated with the federal 
government. The context of the cited problems is not revealed 
and some assertions appear to be misstatements or at least 
statements that may be difficult to support when taking a 
closer look at the civil service merit system. One claim, for 
example, that it takes an average manager a year to fire an 
incompetent employee disregards the provisions contained in 
law. The law requires a minimum notice period of 30 days for 
most offenses and provides a 10-day notice for criminal 
offenses. Even allowing reasonable administrative time beyond
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that minimum, it would be difficult to comprehend the process 
taking one year to remove an employee from the federal 
service. Such a lengthy average could be achieved, however, 
if management is negligent in its duties of dealing with the 
employee or if the time being considered is from the time of 
the incident warranting removal to the last appeal decision 
upholding the removal.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for removal-though- 
appeal processing to be completed within a six-month period 
(which also allows time for administrative processing) ; the 
Merit Systems Protection Board normally issues their decisions 
within 120 or fewer days. However, the last appeal decision 
in cases with allegations of prohibited discrimination can 
take longer, even several years until a final decision is made 
when cases go to federal court. But using the time from the 
incident to the last appeal decision distorts the situation. 
An employee is removed and off the rolls from the effective 
date established at the end of the minimum notice period. 
Appeals are made by former employees.
In other words, such an example to portray unacceptable 
red tape misrepresents the standard application of civil 
service procedures. Further, although the NPR recommended a 
reduction of the 30-day notice period to 15 days for 
performance removal cases (unable to do the work) , to date no 
legislation has effected such a change. And, interestingly, 
there was no recommendation for a reduction in the 30-day
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notice period for misconduct removals which are proposed when 
employees will not perform the work or otherwise violate the 
employer-employee contract by failing to follow work place 
rules.
Especially disdained with regard to personnel policy were 
the rules and regulations of the merit system from the Civil 
Service Act to present-day requirements- The Federal 
Personnel Manuals (FPMs) that the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) disposed of in response to the NPR did not 
help agencies with their work of hiring, firing, paying, 
rewarding, or promoting employees. They were primarily 
explications of the law; and since the laws have not changed, 
agency employees responsible for carrying out their provisions 
now have a greater burden to assure that they are applying the 
law correctly. Until the legal bases of the merit system are 
repealed, civil service employment laws must still be 
followed. To do so, many personnel or human resource offices 
have kept bootleg copies of these directives for their use, 
and at least one internet web site has made them available as 
historical documents. Agency and other regulations which were 
found to be equally undesirable have been rewritten as agency 
instructions, policy directives, pamphlets, manuals, 
handbooks, etc. and placed on the electronic media. The 
orderliness inherent in large bureaucratic organizations 
cannot exist without written guidance whether it is on paper 
(hard copy) or computer screen.
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Another goal of the National Performance Review, to 
create a flexible and responsive hiring system by giving 
departments and agencies authority to conduct their own 
recruiting and examining for all positions and. abolish all 
central registers and standard application forms, may have, in 
fact, added to agency workloads and duplicated the process in 
each agency. Whereas certain jobs could be filled by seeking 
applicants who were screened at one location (Office of 
Personnel Management), each agency now has to seek and screen 
the applicants. Discarding the standard application forms 
also can retard the application process. Without a block or 
square or line identified for specific information, applicants 
are not prompted to provide necessary information which can 
delay processing. Besides, without the standard form other 
forms had to be developed to gather information needed to 
perform such things as security clearance background checks.
Most of the NPR-instituted changes regarding personnel 
management have been administrative which is problematic since 
the many procedures for which personnel administration has 
been taken to task arise from the implementation of 
requirements based in statute or from case law. How civil 
service employment laws are carried out is not only set by 
agencies with government-wide authority such as the Office of 
Personnel Management or the Office of Management and Budget, 
but other agencies such as the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
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the Merit Systems Protection Board, as well as the federal 
courts, provide legal guidance through their decisions. Thus, 
to achieve fundamental change in personnel processing demands 
revising civil service employment laws that establish the 
merit system; to be changed, it must be modified from the 
bottom up, rather than the top down as has been proposed by 
the NPR.
Although the NPR has suggested the elimination of the 
merit system (described as the rules which "year after year" 
and "layer after layer" have piled up), no legislative 
proposals are being seriously considered to eliminate or 
reform the objectionable law(s) or other legal bases for the 
rules and procedures. In this respect, it could be concluded 
that NPR employment reforms have been a piecemeal attempt to 
change practices without substantive revision to the merit 
system. Modifications are not changing the basic civil service 
employment process. Federal employment is still not handled 
the way it is in the private sector where implicit employment 
contracts are made on a person's word that they can do the 
work, and whom a person knows may still be more relevant to 
finding employment than what a person knows.
The most substantial change to the federal employment 
process wrought by the NPR, and one that has followed the lead 
established in corporate America, has been externalizing the 
work. Privatization, commercialization, outsourcing, etc., 
are methods by which federal work is handed to the private
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sector. While the government retains oversight responsibility 
and taxes are still collected to pay for its accomplishment, 
the workers are not civil service workers. This is not only 
the most significant accomplishment of the NPR, it is also one 
which exercises the ultimate control over workers, the 
reduction of jobs which adversely affects the promotion 
possibilities of those workers remaining and reduces union 
memberships.
In sum, the National Performance Review does not appear 
to be a situation where political power and influence is 
derived from and responsive to interests of a multitude of 
constituents. It was not developed from the bottom up. 
Taking civil service workers to task has been a political 
issue before and since the Civil Service Act. Rather, it was 
an intentional program conceived in the Democratic Leadership 
Council waiting for its party to be elected. The celerity 
with which it was instituted a few weeks after President 
Clinton took office attests to it having been a program 
waiting to be implemented.
Further, the NPR's personnel management "improvements" 
did not seem to particularly benefit the general public, 
federal workers, personnel management specialists, or even 
federal managers. Its primary beneficiary lies in the 
business community with companies seeking contracts with the 
government. One example of the eagerness with which the 
private sector is seeking government contracts may be found in
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the ü. S. Chamber of Commerce's support of the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998 as it was 
originally proposed to mandate that all activities that were 
not "inherently governmental" be performed in the private 
sector. The legislation, however, fell short of meeting that 
goal to the dismay of business. It has since been reported 
that industry groups have made no secret of the fact that they 
will be closely watching to see whether agencies comply with 
the FAIR mandate to list all their commercial activities, and 
then determine whether further legislation is needed to make 
the agencies do the A-76 cost comparison studies on those 
activities (BNA 1999).
As more federal work has been outsourced, the federal 
work force has been downsized to around 2,725,100 civilian 
(including postal service) workers in the executive branch in 
1997 (OPM 1998) . The "shadow government," on the other hand, 
has been estimated to contain about 5.6 million federal 
contract-created jobs (Light 1999)- The federal government is 
not smaller, it is less visible. At this writing civil 
service rules are not fewer, they are merely applied to fewer 
people as work is moved "offshore." Thus, the National 
Performance Review is arranged according to capitalist 
interests, endorsed and promoted by the Democratic Party.
The National Performance Review is also a program which 
fragments the interests of the working class. The first split 
comes between the public and private sectors. Many federal
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labor organizations are affiliated with private sector labor 
organizations, such as the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) which is an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. Moving 
jobs from the federal sector depletes AFGE membership and 
ultimate bargaining strength, yet private sector AFL-CIO 
unions could stand to gain members in situations where there 
are large contracts. Furthermore, federal labor unions are 
almost helpless when it comes to downsizing since they have no 
legal right to assert their interests in decisions whether 
work may be contracted to private companies. Their only input 
is to help determine whether the process has adequately 
described the work requirements and correctly reflected its 
costs.
Much like what has occurred in the private sector when 
work is moved offshore or subcontracted, the downsizing and 
outsourcing of federal work have also had the effect of union- 
busting. Although the number of employees covered by 
negotiated agreements rose steadily between 1964 (when data 
started being kept) to a high of 59% of such employees in 
1987, to 57% in 1989, between 1992 and 1997 the proportion 
fell from 57% to 55% with the loss of 164,787 bargaining unit 
members (U.S. OPM 1997). Another NPR goal, albeit one not yet 
realized but one that potentially has the same affect on 
bargaining units as downsizing, is to enable agencies to hire 
temporary employees indefinitely and then authorize the temps 
to compete for permanent jobs in the internal career ladder.
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Presently, temporary employees are excepted from coverage by 
the competitive service and excluded from coverage by 
bargaining units.
Working under the threat of losing one's job not only 
causes workers to strive to be more productive, but encourages 
unions to be more compliant. Thus the private sector 
management model that came to characterize American 
corporations in the 1980s began to define the federal sector 
in the 1990s. Labor-management partnerships may be a peace 
offering of questionable value; 50% of say-so over working 
conditions of smaller units isn't much! Notwithstanding the 
eviscerating effects of the NPR, federal labor unions are 
still able to exert pressure at the national level and through 
their activities have been able to keep some of the NPR goals 
from becoming law. No significant reform legislation has yet 
been able to be passed.
Although the NPR is arranged according to capitalist 
interests, its developers do not appear among the upper class 
or corporate elite. Its primary architects are found in the 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI) , many of the members having worked in and out 
of government service at the federal level. The current 
president and founder of the Progressive Policy Institute, was 
a former newspaper reporter, a policy director of the 
Democratic Leadership Council, and has worked with leading 
members of Congress and other elected officials. The experts
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hired by the PPI share similar histories of working on 
Congressional staffs or as legislative assistants. Affiliated 
PPI scholars include professors in political economy, 
sociology, history and social development as well as expertise 
in military affairs and public administration. Further, 
members of Vice President Gore's NPR staff primarily included 
individuals who had held political appointments in federal 
agencies or were career civil servants. While corporate 
and/or upper class connections may be found in organizations 
such as the Brookings Institution which is funded largely by 
endowment and by the support of philanthropic foundations, 
corporations, and private individuals, they did not seem to 
supply the source of ideas from which the National Performance 
Review emerged.
The framers of the NPR reforms were not among a power 
elite identifiable among the top income earners and holders of 
wealth. But, there appears to be a direct connection between 
those who formulated the NPR and American corporations, and 
through corporations a link to the upper class. Although the 
NPR was produced in a think tank developed by the Democratic 
Party to achieve political success, it is funded by corporate 
and financial entities which are watching out for their own 
interests. According to one journalist who covers the 
political scene, corporations are so well represented at the 
events given by the Democratic Leadership Council that without 
seeing the donor list, he concluded that they were corporately
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funded. Private sector business interests not only fund the 
DLC, but their representatives stay in touch with the members 
of the DLC.
Around 90 percent of the Board of Advisors of the 
Democratic Leadership Council is comprised of representatives 
from corporate, financial and other business interests. While 
there are twelve individuals represented on the board, only 
one employee organization, the Hotel Elmployees and Restaurant 
Employees, is found on the board. The DLC s Policy Roundtable 
becomes even more concentrated with business interests; it has 
no employee organizations, and one individual and three 
foundations are represented.
The Executive Council which leads the Policy Roundtable 
has representatives from the larger, older corporations which 
are easily recognizable to most Americans: AT&T, ARCO, Aetna 
Inc., Bell Atlantic, BellSouth Corporation, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Company, Chevron Corp., GTE Corp., IBM, Koch 
Industries, MCI communications, Pepsi-Cola Company, Philip 
Morris Companies, Inc., etc. And, as might be expected of such 
corporations, their Chief Executive Officers and Chairmen, as 
reflected in Who's Who in America and Standard and Poor's 
Register of Corporations Corporation Directory, conform to 
Domhoff's (1990, 1996) characterizations of club, business and 
other memberships.
Corporate representatives on the DLC's Executive Council 
of the Policy Roundtable, however, may or may not hold
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leadership positions with the corporations and, with only two 
exceptions, are not listed in Who's Who. The executive 
position most often held relates to government affairs. Five 
of the eight members holding a vice president or senior vice 
president position are holding them for government relations 
or affairs. (It is also interesting to note that many of the 
corporations have positions identified to focus on government 
relations even when the office holder is not on the Democratic 
Leadership Council.) With one exception these DLC Executive 
Council members apparently hold corporate positions at lower 
levels than would warrant recognition in Who's Who.
The level of support these corporations contribute was 
not supplied when the Democratic Leadership Council provided 
a copy of their "donor list." Corporations are not allowed to 
make "hard-money" or regulated contributions to federal
candidates, thus there would be nothing to report. They are, 
however, allowed to create political action committees which 
may donate limited amounts to candidates and political 
parties. And, they may contribute unlimited monies that fall 
within the category of "soft money," which represents the 
"barely regulated contributions that individuals, groups,
companies and corporations are allowed to make directly to 
political parties" (Cawley 1998) to be used for anything,
according to the Federal Election Campaign Act, except
activities directly related to endorsing candidates in, or 
otherwise affecting, federal elections.
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The Democratic Leadership Council is an organization of 
the Democratic Party, and does not appear to be funded by a 
Political Action Committee with its "hard money" donations, 
although it does have a representative from the New Democrat 
Network Political Action Committee on its Board of Advisors. 
Thus, funding for the Progressive Policy Institute think tank 
of the Democratic Party from which the National Performance 
Review emanated comes more directly from corporate and 
financial sources than Domhoff identified in his class
dominance theory, but carries, nonetheless, the same
encumbrances.
While the connection between corporate America and the 
Democratic Party has been less obvious than the Republican 
Party's corporate ties, especially since almost all the
corporate donors contribute more heavily to the Republican 
Party and the Democratic Party is heavily financed by labor 
unions, its presence clarifies the National Performance Review 
impetus for outsourcing federal work to the private sector 
where a great deal of available work was depleted when 
corporations moved assembly and informâtion-type work off­
shore during the 1980s. The connection also highlights the
business of government being integrated with private sector
business interests and, consequently, questions the autonomy 
of the political system. The capitalist class has been in a
key position to affect the development of policy without
interference by the working class. It is not until
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legislation is considered that the working class is able to 
voice its objections through lobbying activities.
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A recapitulation of the events addressed in this research 
illuminates federal work practices being characterized by a 
continuing class struggle. The aim of the Civil Service Act 
was to limit the power of politicians, but it also had the 
effect of limiting the power of management personnel, who were 
charged with carrying out the programs established by 
politicians. Following this restriction, there has been an 
ensuing struggle to restore management control, on the one 
hand, and to limit the power of workers on the other.
The public consensus in the 1800s that the federal civil 
service had become corrupted by politicians who used it to 
gain supporters and ensure votes led to the passage of the 
Civil Service Act of 1883 to check this use of power. It did 
so by depersonalizing work choices made by persons in 
positions of authority over the civil service, that is, by 
requiring federal work be conducted according to impersonal 
rules. The Civil Service Act required that examinations by 
objective criteria replace recommendations by politicians to 
place individuals in civil service jobs, a process which
184
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neutralized the influence of those in positions of authority. 
Coincidentally, the simple or extended simple control which 
had been common to the federal workplace was checked. 
Supervisors were not able to hire individuals recommended to 
them or whom they personally may have wished to hire, nor were 
they allowed to promote those they liked or fire those they 
did not appreciate. Personnel actions had to be based on 
objective criteria defined by rules, not made according to 
personal preferences. Bureaucratic control had largely 
replaced extended simple control. Following the establishment 
of this model method of employment in which personal 
preferences were removed from public personnel matters, and 
notwithstanding the fact that the Civil Service Act did not 
change the basic hierarchical power relations in the federal 
workplace, there has been a constant attempt to regain the 
lost powers.
One of the early, albeit small-scale attempts to change 
federal work practices is found in the implementation of 
scientific management. Scientific management was not only 
contrary to worker interests but was also philosophically in 
conflict with the Civil Service Act which had enhanced the 
position of workers when it exchanged rules for personal 
preferences. Under the Civil Service Act, individuals were 
able to obtain federal employment based on their knowledge, 
skills and abilities, elements mainly under their control. 
But, workers who were subjected to scientific management
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methods were denied the use of much of the knowledge, skills 
and abilities which had formed the bases for their being 
hired.
While scientific management, too, may have seemed to be 
a drive to depersonalize work, it, was, rather, a shift in the 
position of the person who controlled the work process. It 
gave individuals in positions of authority over work a greater 
say in the way work was performed, which thereby restricted or 
removed the worker's ability to command the work process. By 
management mechanizing the work process apart from the worker, 
scientific management could dislocate any control over work 
held by workers. Further, this shift in control enabled 
management to dominate the workers. Although government 
officials may not have been able to select their friends or 
give jobs to others based on personal recommendations or 
political direction, they could condense the labor power 
purchased to remove any activity not directly contributing to 
the production process. And, exclusively using the work 
process, they could determine whether to promote or remove 
employees using the work as the justification. Federal bosses 
could regain some of the power which had been denied them 
under the Civil Service Act.
Subsequent to the Civil Service Act and after legislation 
banned scientific management in federal production activities, 
many attempts have been, and are continuing to be, made to 
reform the Civil Service Act to restore to government
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officials some of the controls the Act had taken from them. 
Until the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, however, these 
endeavors remained mostly at the theoretical level. The 
Hoover Commissions, in particular, advised of many changes by 
which management officials could regain control over the 
personnel process. Until 1978, most of these type 
recommendations did not get incorporated into legislation, a 
step which is necessary to change the rules established by the 
Civil Service Act and its Civil Service Commission.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, most significantly, 
disbanded the Civil Service Commission and replaced it with 
the Office of Personnel Management which is headed by a 
presidential appointee. This arrangement assures that 
personnel rules are responsive to the political party holding 
office and, consequently, allows greater political control 
over the civil service process.
The Civil Service Reform Act also decreased the proof 
necessary for removing federal workers. If a "reasonable 
person" concludes an employee cannot perform the work, the 
removal is upheld. And, it provided managers options for 
operating outside the law using demonstration projects. Of 
course, the fewer the personnel rules that are established in 
law, the greater the political control over the civil service. 
But, the dominance restored to civil service bureaucrats, 
political appointees and the President through the Civil 
Service Reform Act in no way approaches the level suggested by
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the National Performance Review which has been attempting to 
make changes through administrative means because of the 
Clinton Administration's inability to get an omnibus civil 
service reform act seriously considered.
The National Performance Review's reinvention of the 
civil service is not only attempting to get legislation to 
change laws governing federal employment, but is also trying 
to make as many changes as possible to the rules which are not 
covered in law. Perhaps the most effective means the National 
Performance Review has used to operate outside civil service 
procedures is to downsize the workforce. By outsourcing 
government work and having it performed in the private sector, 
civil service rules no longer cover workers performing 
government work. Establishing alternative personnel systems 
is another method being considered. One such proposal has 
been made by the Department of Defense to move its civil 
service workers out from under Title 5 (as has occurred with 
the Federal Aviation Administration) and place them under 
Title 10 which regulates military members. By so doing, new 
rules could be established by agency management for a large 
segment of the civil service.
And another example of granting management greater 
immediate control over workers is pay banding. While this 
process does not give management total dominance over pay, it 
will have greater latitude in setting workers' pay than it now 
does. Despite this measure's less than compelling success in
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the Navy's China Lake project, which tended to increase 
employment costs without a recognizable increase in 
productivity, the Office of Personnel Management, commanded by 
a partisan presidential appointee, initiated a government-wide 
classification study "before [emphasis added] the widespread 
implementation of broad pay banding as recommended by Vice 
President Gore's National Performance Review" (0PM News 
Release, Nov. 9, 1995) . Apparently, the study is a precursor 
to its implementation, not an undertaking to determine whether 
pay banding would be more appropriate. Consequently, the 
remaining, smaller federal force should enjoy higher salaries 
as federal supervisors are able to elevate the esteem of their 
own positions with higher pay/grades of their workers. Since 
there is no bottom line from which to draw acclaim, position 
importance may be drawn from the levels held by subordinates.
Perhaps the most contentious example of politics 
overcoming civil service sense, however, lies in Executive 
Order 12871 which was a concession to organized labor to get 
it to support downsizing the federal workforce and to back the 
objectives of the National Performance Review. At this 
writing, the Federal Labor Relations Authority's ruling, 
namely, that the Executive Order does not constitute an 
election by agencies of the Executive Branch to bargain topics 
which were established in the Civil Service Reform Act as 
permissive bargaining areas, is being challenged in the 
courts. Federal labor organizations are also urging the
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administration to direct agency heads to comply with the 
Executive Order. Because the National Performance Review did 
not live up to its promises to organized labor. Vice President 
Gore, a presidential hopeful, stands to gain or lose labor 
support over this matter. Of course if the courts decide the 
issue, the political ramifications of further deregulating the 
civil service may be forestalled.
This research has also pointed out how this struggle is 
not wholly contained within the federal arena. Private sector 
business interests have played an active role in reform 
efforts, whether their views appear to be requested by 
politicians or foisted upon them. Presidential
administrations include an array of appointees from the 
business and financial communities who are selected for their 
assistance in carrying out the programs of the Executive 
Branch. And, commissions such as the Hoover Commissions and 
the Grace Commission have been convened, directly seeking the 
views of the corporate and financial communities.
Further, politicians have (and are) courting the holders 
of American wealth in order to finance their political 
campaigns. It is common knowledge that big donors are more 
often motivated by the need for a legislative or regulatory 
fix whether it is to block tougher EPA regulations or assure 
favorable treatment of mutual funds. But less obvious is the 
private sector influence in the reform of the civil service 
employment process. Not only has the Democratic Leadership
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Council (DLC) , for example, helped reshape the agenda of the 
Democratic Party, but it was also the incubator for the 
National Performance Review which, among other changes, sought 
civil service reforms. Corporations fund and guide the DLC. 
Of the 20 firms represented in the Executive Council of the 
DLC Policy Roundtable, 16 are among the top 500 corporations 
leading in "soft money" contributions. It is not surprising, 
then, to note that the most significant change to the civil 
service, its downsizing, has benefitted the private sector. 
Private companies enjoy guaranteed incomes with government 
contracts. And the business community is enhanced in its 
ability to provide jobs to replace those that were moved out 
of the country. Such benefits have not escaped the notice of 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which has ardently lobbied for 
privatizing most federal work.
In addition to reviewing several major reforms and 
attempts to reform federal civil service employment 
procedures, noting how the reforms address control over work 
and pointing out the involvement of the private sector in 
developing those reforms, this research has used three 
theoretical perspectives to reach an understanding of how 
these measures are introduced. Of the three standpoints, 
social pluralism, structural Marxism, and instrumentalism or 
class dominance theory, the latter, notwithstanding its many 
criticisms, seems to offer the greatest clarification of the 
federal civil service reform process.
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To a large degree, the subject of the study, federal work 
practices, does not lend itself to a social pluralist 
explanation. The federal workplace is not a democratic 
institution. It is a setting in which the lines of authority 
have been clearly established, initially in practice and then 
in law. The key players are the workers and their bosses. 
Outside of these two groups, one other, politicians, has 
traditionally shown an interest. When analyzing the outcomes 
of reform actions, we see that managers generally, and in 
particular political managers, are regaining control over 
workers and the work process. Thus, even when it appears 
there are many groups vying for ascendancy; management 
realizes the greatest gain. Rather than there being a shift 
in social power, it is clearly retained in the management 
class as opposed to the working class and is increased as 
partisan political management is increased.
Consequently, with the exception of the Civil Service Act 
which was a concern among various groups in American society 
and which, when implemented, curtailed the exercise of 
political and management power, there has been no shift in 
power relations. Although the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) 
appears to take on an aura of social pluralism with its many 
groups represented, an analysis of its outcomes reveals that 
the CSRA brings forth only two special interests, management 
and workers, with a disunity among workers. Women, minorities 
and labor unions had legislative agendas at odds with each
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other, which fragmented their interests, emphasized their 
dissimilarities and kept the groups from joining forces to 
provide a united front. In fact, work processes became 
secondary to the esoteric goals of these groups to gain 
advantage. Women and minorities wanted civil service jobs, 
and labor unions wanted collective bargaining recognition. 
The intrinsic work issue of control over the work was not 
paramount to any of them. They were divided by their 
legislative objectives, so all workers lost ground in relation 
to management control. Management, on the other hand, not 
only held the controlling position but was united in its 
efforts to gain greater control over workers and, 
concomitantly, more direct political involvement. Their 
interests, whether focused on management or political control, 
were complementary.
The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) perhaps fits best 
with the structural Marxist view of lawmaking insofar as it 
underwent the legislative process after rising as a political 
objective of the Carter Administration. The many interest 
groups it sought to appease, however, were a diverse 
constituency rather than a reflection of a decentralization of 
power. The CSRA worker-management power relations communicate 
an outcome that not only supports capitalist work methods but 
also administers to the needs of the political system in 
gaining more control over agencies. Nevertheless, while this 
legislation seemed to enhance political sovereignty, it
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carried through personnel practices recommended in the Hoover 
Commissions and, at the same time, garnered the genuine 
interest and involvement of corporations which does not 
support the notion of political independence. This abridged 
autonomy between the state and the economy has been recognized 
in Domhoff's class dominance view of power relations and/or 
the instrumentalist view, which becomes most evident in the 
more recent National Performance Review (NPR) activities to 
reform the civil service.
Corporations not only finance political parties but 
maintain a working relationship with the party, helping to 
define its internal organization. They do not blindly 
contribute monies, rather, they establish high-level corporate 
positions and assign representatives to work with governmental 
entities which facilitate a corporate focus on managing 
government. And, if Philip Morris is an example, corporations 
increase their interaction with government when they encounter 
problems with the public. In brief, powerful corporations 
consciously involve themselves in governmental matters.
Of course, a question that has haunted the 
instrumentalist position is whether corporations consciously 
engage in activity contrary to the interests of the working 
class. This research contends that the answer would be in the 
affirmative. They may not do so with a consciousness found 
between warring parties, but the result is nonetheless as 
effective, albeit moving at a slower pace. Corporations
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pursue making a profit. The most effective method for 
achieving that objective is to cut labor costs. Thus, 
inherent in the corporate makeup is to find ways to reduce 
labor costs, which, presently, ranges from finding slave labor 
in underdeveloped and developing countries to increasing the 
use of technology such as the most recent McDonald's 
corporation attempt to replace workers with automatic menu 
machines by which customers may order and pay for their meals 
interacting with machines placed at restaurant tables.
This same rationale is prevalent in governmental work. 
Agencies are being downsized with the intent of technology 
replacing workers. Labor unions fail to benefit from promises 
to enhance their status. And, federal workers lose more 
control over their work activities. These changes were not 
due to happenstance or aping the private sector. Rather there 
is a partnership between the government and corporate America 
in the running of America, which can be charted in the results 
of actions taken.
Reviewing the outcomes of activities to change government 
employment practices not only reveals detriments to government 
workers, but also discloses benefits accruing to the private 
sector. Private sector businesses openly gain from displacing 
federal workers. Not only do they get to do the work of 
government through contracts, they also get higher 
pay/benefits than government workers. Further, the
incorporation of private sector business practices in the
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remaining government employment legitimizes private sector 
practices that are detrimental to workers : downsizing,
contingent labor, reduced benefit packages, etc. For these 
reasons, Domhoff's instrumentalist or class dominance theory 
provides the best view of the public-private connection. 
Admittedly, this research has not been able to provide a 
complete picture of that bridge. It does suggest, however, 
that an analysis of the various deliberations of corporate- 
federal interactions such as those in the Democratic 
Leadership Council could provide a more complete view of that 
relationship.
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